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This thesis investigates the dynamics of community participation led by intermediary 
organisations in the urban regeneration of South Korea. Since the 2010s, the Korean 
government has tried to institutionalise community participation in its planning system 
by devising new partnerships between the state, citizens, and intermediary organisations. 
Intermediary organisations act as brokers to promote community participation throughout 
the regeneration process. Such intermediary intervention is a distinctive part of the recent 
planning system, which forms the basis for alternative approaches to past state-led or 
market-driven urban development in Korea. Despite its importance, the dynamics behind 
intermediary intervention have rarely been addressed. In particular, little attention has 
been paid to power relationships and social networks that are constructed through 
intermediary intervention, which can provide an additional insight into the fundamental 
nature of community participation in Korea’s planning system. Using research data 
collected mainly from fieldwork in Korea, this study explores the dynamics of community 
participation, with a focus on the governance arrangements and network structures that 
have evolved through intermediary intervention. 
 
This thesis argues that intermediary intervention remains largely under state control, 
which restricts the financial resources and legal rights of intermediaries. While 
intermediary intervention has been managed by professional firms, its transformative 
potential for community empowerment has been undermined due to new rules and norms 
armed with expertise and professionalism, which were preferred by the state. On the other 
hand, more autonomous intermediary intervention has contributed to community 
empowerment but gained less institutional support, and this has enabled the state to 
maintain control over community participation, albeit in indirect ways. This thesis 
concludes that new challenges facing community participation emerging from 
intermediary intervention can be understood as a developmental legacy of the 
interventionist state in the post-developmental context in Korea. At the same time, it 
highlights that intermediary intervention can serve as a long-term platform to address 
such new challenges by constantly attempting to communicate with the citizens and 
negotiate with the state throughout the regeneration process. Investigating the dynamics 
of community participation also provides an opportunity to expand the empirical basis 
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1.1. Research background 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the so-called Four Asian Tigers – Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea – witnessed late but rapid industrialisation under a 
strong interventionist state (Hamilton, 1983; Gulati, 1992; Dunford and Yeung, 2011). 
As late industrialisers, these states had rationalised a growth-first agenda since the 1960s 
to maintain steady high rates of economic growth and transform their productive system 
through centrally-governed market mechanisms. An interventionist state that prioritises 
extensive industrialisation for national development over other policies is referred to as a 
‘developmental state’ (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Castells, 1992; Huff, 1995). South 
Korea (hereafter Korea) is a case in point. Between the 1960s and the 1980s, its rapid 
economic growth was possible by harnessing national resources and directing incentives 
through a strong alliance between the state and a small number of large industrial 
conglomerates (Joo, 2019). This allowed the state to develop industrial clusters, improve 
the built environment and accommodate a growing urban population by constructing 
large residential complexes with service amenities (Shin and Kim, 2016). In this way, the 
state has systematically intervened in and deliberately expanded Korean cities to sustain 
rapid economic growth. In other words, the Korean developmental state instrumentalised 
the built environment to support its industrial and social policies aimed at maximising 
national economic development. 
 
With the democratisation and globalisation of Korean society and economy during the 
1990s, the state has liberalised domestic markets and repositioned itself from a leader to 
a facilitator of economic growth (Choi, 2012). The neoliberal turn of the developmental 
state, however, followed a different course compared to the West. While Western 
neoliberal states dismantled the ‘social-welfare state’, the Korean developmental state 
embraced neoliberalisation to revive the domestic economy, which had been hit by the 
1997 Asian financial crisis (Cho and Križnik, 2017). This means that the neoliberal turn 
in Korea represented a departure from, as well as continuity with, earlier policies and 





markets as vehicles of private investments has become a promising strategy to revive the 
sluggish domestic economy. Consequently, Korean cities went through speculative 
urbanisation based on the combined operation of market mechanisms as a developmental 
engine, with state intervention as the manager of that engine (Choi, 2012; Shin and Kim, 
2016). 
 
However, the speculative urbanisation has slowed down, as the 2008 global financial 
crisis reduced opportunities for the market and the state to collaborate on new urban 
development. Due to the crisis, a number of planned urban development projects were 
cancelled, and, accordingly, promised market investments or state supports were 
withdrawn with no backup plan (Jang et al., 2013). As a result, the cancelled 
redevelopment areas remained undeveloped and faced further deprivation, with growing 
conflicts among the citizens, as well as between the citizens and the state. This prompted 
calls for alternative urban development to the past state-led or market-driven approaches 
in Korea. As one of these alternatives, the state launched a new Urban Regeneration 
Programme by introducing a new national Special Act on Promotion and Support for 
Urban Regeneration in 2013. The Urban Regeneration Programme was devised to 
incorporate citizens and create a ‘community-based initiative’ as an acting association to 
improve deprived neighbourhoods (KRIHS, 2016, 2017). In contrast to the previous 
programmes, it pays more attention to community participation that can serve as the basis 
for more inclusive urban development. This means that the aim of the programme is not 
only to achieve physical improvement of the built environment but also to foster and 
sustain a communal life and shared identities in the built environment. In this respect, 
such new institutional effort can be seen as a community-based urban regeneration 
approach based on a partnership between the state and citizens. As a result, citizens could 
become directly and more actively involved in the planning and management of the built 
environment along with the state. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that community-based urban regeneration is not simply 
initiated by direct interactions between the state and citizens. Rather, it is guided and 
facilitated by ‘intermediary organisations’ that are state-funded or self-funded bodies 
working between the state and citizens (Park and Lim, 2014; Seo, Park and Lim, 2014). 





the country since the introduction of the new national Act for the promotion of urban 
regeneration. Accordingly, community participation through intermediary organisations 
has been largely popularised and institutionalised as a part of urban regeneration. In this 
thesis, this particular approach to community participation is termed ‘intermediary-led 
participation’. Articulated within the emerging discourse of post-developmental urbanism 
(Jeong, 2016; Cho and Križnik, 2017; Park and Hong, 2019), intermediary-led 
participation has gained academic attention in the field of urban planning and urban policy 
in Korea. A growing body of literature demonstrates its significance, arguing that the 
intermediary-led participation can reduce bureaucracy and enhance the efficiency of 
urban regeneration (Park and Lim, 2014; Seo, Park and Lim, 2014; Kim and Choi, 2017; 
Y. Kim, 2017; Kim, 2020). The main focus of these studies, however, is the ‘functional’ 
aspect of the intermediary-led participation, such as operational structure or management. 
Comparatively less attention has been given to its ‘social’ aspects, such as collective 
identity, chronological relationships, or everyday interactions, which can shed light on its 
underlying participatory mechanisms. To fill the research gap, therefore, this thesis 
scrutinises the social side of intermediary-led participation by exploring what participants 
have experienced from regeneration practices, and what their experiences have told us 
about intermediary intervention in the new regeneration framework in Korea. 
   
1.2. Research Objective and Questions 
This thesis is based on the initial awareness that only a little systematic research exists on 
the influence of intermediary intervention on community participation in urban 
regeneration in Korea. Intermediary intervention is recognised as an important part of the 
recent regeneration framework in Korea. Growing academic attention has been paid to 
the operation or management of intermediary intervention in Korea’s planning system 
(Park and Lim, 2014; Seo, Park and Lim, 2014; Kim and Choi, 2017; Y. Kim, 2017; Kim, 
2020). However, such academic attention has barely addressed the dynamics behind 
intermediary intervention in terms of the intermediary process of promoting community 
participation in regeneration. In particular, how intermediary intervention works to build, 
develop, and transform power and network dynamics of community participation remains 
unresearched. This highlights the need for a deeper understanding of power relationships 
and social networks that are constructed through intermediary intervention, which can 





Korea’s planning system. In this respect, the objective of this thesis is to examine the 
nature of community participation in Korea’s recent regeneration practices by 
investigating the power relationships and social networks formed by intermediary 
intervention. Therefore, it tackles the research gap identified above by addressing the 
question: How does intermediary intervention construct power relationships and social 
networks, and thereby influence community participation in the regeneration process in 
Korea? To answer this question, particular attention is paid to three key parts: 1) 
governance, 2) networks, and 3) long-term prospects of intermediary-led participation in 
regeneration in Korea. In this manner, my research questions are defined as follows: 
 
1) How does intermediary intervention change governance arrangements in 
regeneration and affect power relationships in community participation? 
 
2) How does intermediary intervention develop social interaction patterns in 
regeneration and influence social networks in community participation? 
 
3) Can intermediary intervention serve to sustain community participation and attain 
community empowerment in regeneration in the long run? 
 
Based on the research questions, this thesis will focus on the following three themes to 
investigate. Firstly, evolving governance arrangements in regeneration will be 
investigated with a focus on changing role of intermediary intervention. While the role of 
intermediary intervention has gained attention in Korea’s planning literature, little 
attention has been paid to how this role is chronologically changed to continue promoting 
community participation throughout the regeneration process. In this regard, this thesis 
will place its initial focus on how the changing role of intermediary intervention has 
transformed governance arrangements in regeneration, and thereby affected power 
relationships in community participation. This initial investigation will serve as a basis 
for identifying the power dynamics underlying intermediary-led participation in 
regeneration practices in Korea. 
 
Secondly, the changing social interactions in regeneration will be examined to clarify 





narratively explore how intermediary intervention has enabled participants to interact 
with each other, and developed the interaction throughout the regeneration process. Then, 
it will investigate how the mediated interactions have formed into a comprehensive social 
network structure in regeneration, which influences the characteristics of community 
participation. This second investigation will provide a basis for a nuanced understanding 
of network dynamics underpinning the social fabric of communities and intermediaries 
involved in regeneration practices in Korea. 
 
Lastly, the long-term prospect of intermediary-led participation will be addressed. In 
principle, intermediary intervention was introduced to promote community participation 
in the urban regeneration process in Korea. However, the extent to which intermediary 
intervention could serve to sustain community participation and attain community 
empowerment in the future remains unclear. In this regard, this thesis will critically 
examine the opportunities and challenges of intermediary-led participation by answering 
the first and second research questions, which can help us to explore the prospect of 
intermediary-led participation as well as to understand its status quo. This third 
investigation will serve to illuminate the essence of the recent community-based 
regeneration in Korea, and, by extension, expand an empirical basis for a wider discourse 
on post-developmental urbanism in Korea and East Asia. 
 
1.3. Thesis Overview 
This thesis comprises seven chapters, including this chapter, which introduces the 
research background and research questions. Chapter 2 presents the contextual backdrop 
of this thesis with a historical overview of urbanisation and intermediaries in Korea. First, 
it frames urbanisation in the East within three main periods: developmental, neo-
developmental, and post-developmental. Drawing on this periodic frame, urban 
development in Korea is conceptualised from state-led redevelopment to community-
based regeneration. Then, the second half of this chapter discusses the nature of the 
intermediary sector in Korea by exploring the growth of Korean civil society 
organisations. Particular attention is paid to their growth within the identified periodic 
frame of urbanisation in Korea. By doing this, Chapter 2 provides a more nuanced 
understanding of the local context where intermediary-led participation has gained 





Chapter 3 presents a systematic review of the literature to create a conceptual framework 
for this thesis. For this, it conceptually explores communities, governance, and networks 
in the recent urban regeneration context in Korea. In the first section of this chapter, the 
nature of communities in intermediary-led participation is identified by exploring the 
concepts of community of practice and right to the city in the context of Korea’s 
urbanisation. The second section conceptualises governance in intermediary-led 
participation by reviewing the multi-level, multi-stage and non-linear forms of 
governance structure and transformation in Korea’s post-political context. This is 
followed by a conceptualisation of networks in intermediary-led participation by 
exploring the concepts of social capital and structural holes in the contemporary context 
of competitive and individualised Korean society. Then, this chapter concludes by 
summarising how such a conceptual framework is used for data analysis and 
interpretation in the following chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 provides details on the methodological framework of this thesis in two sections 
for research design and research implementation respectively. In the research design 
section, the philosophical orientation of this thesis, social constructivism, is explained. 
This is followed by a demonstration of the methodological approach of this thesis: a 
qualitative case study approach. Then, it illustrates specific data collection and analysis 
methods. The research implementation section presents details on the fieldwork process. 
First, the rationale for three case studies is shown by elaborating why and how each of 
the cases were selected and compared. This is followed by an illustration of the data 
collection process in the fieldwork and potential ethical considerations in this research. 
Then, the section finishes with a description of the challenges that were encountered in 
the fieldwork, which could affect the research design. 
 
In Chapter 5, findings from analysis of the case studies are presented. Each case study 
analysis begins with a brief description of its specific local context. This is followed by 
an exploration of the governance structure and transformation, with a focus on the 
changing roles of intermediaries and the evolving capabilities of participants in urban 
regeneration. Based on this exploration, a thematic analysis of intermediary intervention 
and community participation is presented, with rich local narratives collected from each 





of power and network dynamics in intermediary-led participation, which is demonstrated 
in the following chapter. 
 
In Chapter 6, the findings in Chapter 5 are put into the conceptual framework presented 
in Chapter 3 for further discussion on different types of intermediary-led participation. 
For this, the findings are reviewed through the conceptual lens of community of practice 
to interpret the changing landscape of power relationships among those involved in each 
case of intermediary-led participation. Then, these cases are reviewed within the 
conceptual framework of the social network structure to systematically decipher the 
social interactions that emerge and evolve in each case of intermediary-led participation. 
Drawing on such critical reviews, this chapter concludes with a cross-case discussion of 
the opportunities and challenges of intermediary-led participation in the recent urban 
regeneration framework in Korea.  
 
Lastly, Chapter 7 summarises the key arguments from Chapters 5 and 6 and reviews them 
in the post-developmental context. Then, it discusses the contributions of this research to 
a broader body of knowledge on community-based urban regeneration and, by extension, 
post-developmental urbanism in Korea and other East Asian states such as Singapore and 
Taiwan. Finally, it presents the limitations of this research and provides suggestions for 













                                              Chapter 2. Contextualising Urbanisation and Intermediaries in South Korea. 






The aim of Chapter 2 is to present a historical overview of urban development and the 
intermediary sector in Korea. It begins with a comparative exploration of urbanisation 
between the West and the East through which to clarify its distinctive characteristics in 
the East. The urbanisation in the East is framed within three distinctive periods: 
developmental, neo-developmental, and post-developmental urbanisation. Drawing on 
this periodic frame, urban development in Korea is conceptualised from state-led 
development to community-based regeneration.  
 
The second half of this chapter aims to trace and characterise the intermediary sector in 
Korea. For this, a comparative exploration of civil society between the West and the East 
is briefly outlined. This is followed by further exploration of the growth of civil society 
organisations in Korea. Particular attention is paid to associating their growth within the 
above periodic frame of urbanisation in Korea. By doing this, Chapter 2 seeks to provide 
a more nuanced understanding of the local context where community-based unban 
regeneration has gained prominence while intermediary-led participation has become 
popularised. 
 
2.2. Framing Urbanisation in East Asia 
This section explores the historical context of urbanisation in East Asia and frames it 
within three distinctive periods: the post-colonial (developmental urbanisation), the post-
Asian financial crisis (neo-developmental urbanisation), and the post-developmental 
period (post-developmental urbanisation). Such framing serves as a basis for historic 
overviews on urban development and the intermediary sector in Korea, which are 






2.2.1. Emergence of Developmental Urbanisation 
The United Nations reported that more than half of the world’s population lives in urban 
areas (United Nations, 2015). This proportion is expected to increase to two-thirds by 
2030 (ibid.). However, there is no standard international definition of ‘urban’ to clarify 
where urban areas are. For example, ‘urban’ is defined as localities with populations of 
50,000 or more in Korea, while it is recognised as places with 1,000 people or more in 
Canada, and 2,500 or more in Mexico (United Nations, 2007). As such, there is the great 
variation in definitions of ‘urban’ from one country to another. What is urbanisation? At 
the most general level, it has to do with spatial concentrations of people and goods in 
cities and towns (Tallon, 2013). It seems a simple question of how to quantify 
urbanisation, such as increasing population or businesses. However, the question is not 
that simple in reality, as it is involved with ‘spatial concentrations of human economic, 
social, cultural and political activities distinguished from non-urban/rural places by both 
physical aspects such as population density or administrative definition and lifestyle 
characteristics’ (Pacione, 2005, p.676). In other words, urbanisation refers to a set of 
interconnected transformations encompassing not only where people reside and what they 
produce, but also how they live in terms of economic well-being, political changes, 
distribution of power, cultural rules, and social relationships in cities. Beyond physical 
factors, therefore, economic, political, cultural, and social elements must gain prominence 
in order to identify urbanisation in certain localities. In short, ‘urban’ is not a homogenous 
term, while ‘urbanisation’ is open to multiple definitions in different localities.  
 
From this point of view, it is hard to define urbanisation in the East with a single word. 
Alternatively, a comparative exploration of urbanisation between the West and the East 
could offer some insights into characterising urbanisation in the East. In this regard, a 
brief historical overview of urbanisation in the West would be useful. In the following, 
this overview is framed within three distinctive periods: 1) the industrialisation period, 2) 
the welfare state period, and 3) the neoliberal state period. Despite a concern over the 
simplified periodic approach to urbanisation in the West, it can at least provide a 
comparative basis to elucidate East Asian urbanisation. 
 
It is widely known that the first urbanisation in the West began along with the Industrial 





an increased demand for labour at single locations such as factories, ports, or mines. This 
was facilitated by new infrastructures such as railroads, which served to concentrate 
goods and people into new industrial cities. Despite the growth in size and density of the 
cities, however, the living conditions were unlikely to be improved, but rather worsened. 
The reason is that central to the urban change was ‘free market capitalism’, which 
underestimated workers’ quality of life but increased their productivity growth. This 
market-oriented approach resulted in unregulated and unbalanced urban growth 
associated with urban slums and squatter settlements (Tallon, 2013). That is to say, the 
West experienced its first urbanisation through industrialisation, mainly managed by the 
free market, leading to economic and social inequality in inner cities. 
 
The second distinctive urbanisation in the West appeared in response to urban problems 
resulting from the Second World War: war-damaged town centres and residential areas. 
The post-war problems caused the emergence of strong governments across the Western 
world, with emphasis on ‘the nationalisation of industry, the creation of the welfare state, 
and the nationalisation of development rights’ (Tallon, 2013, p.30). In this second period, 
the governments introduced many social-welfare-based or Keynesian urban improvement 
policies (Hemerijck, 2013). This social-welfare-based approach served to promote area-
based community initiatives for urban development, albeit in a centrally controlled 
manner.  
 
The third distinctive period began along with loss of faith in the Keynesian welfare state 
and revival of the free-market capitalism. This transition was a response to concerns over 
excessive public spending and heavy dependency on the state. This was facilitated by the 
1970s fiscal crisis, which led to economic stagnation across the Western world (Mack, 
1985). Such economic stagnation caused the states to mobilise market-driven urban 
projects. This prompted a change in urbanisation from managerial to entrepreneurial 
mode (Harvey, 1989; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Central to this transition was 
neoliberalism, which promotes new public-private partnership in the context of 
government austerity. Hence, it is seen as neoliberal urbanisation where new forms of 
urban governance are institutionalised while private-sector-based-systems are introduced. 





with three distinctive economic and political creeds: free-market capitalism, welfarism, 
and neoliberalism.  
 
The important point is that such evolution has occurred gradually through the centuries. 
On the other hand, the East has experienced a fast-paced urbanisation along with rapid 
economic growth. This is evident particularly in the so-called Four Asian Tigers – Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea – which witnessed late but rapid industrialisation 
in the second half of the twentieth century (Castells, 1992). Dunford and Yeung’s (2011 
cited in Shin, 2019, p.2) study provides insights into the ‘condensed economic 
development’ that affected the pace of urbanisation in the Asian Tigers. It provides a 
useful statistical analysis of how long it took each country to achieve a five-fold increase 
in its real GDP per capita since its economic take-off. 
 
 
The analysis indicates that Eastern countries such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
South Korea took about 28, 26, 24, and 22 years respectively to achieve a five-fold 
increase in real GDP per capita, while Western countries such as the USA and the UK 
took more than 100 and 160 years respectively (Shin, 2019). In other words, it took less 
than 30 years for the late industrialisers to achieve such economic growth, while similar 
growth for the front-runners took over a century. Such rapid economic growth in East 
Figure 1. Economic growth trajectories since take-off.            





Asia was made possible largely due to the emergence of authoritarian regimes with strong 
control of the national economy in the post-colonial period. 
 
For example, as colonies, Singapore and Korea were used to serve the interests of the 
British and Japanese empires respectively. During the colonial period, both countries’ 
main industries were farming- and agriculture-based on landlord-tenant relations in the 
pre-capitalist forms (Hamilton, 1983). The industry structure started to be reframed with 
the advent of authoritarian regimes after the end of the colonial period. The authoritarian 
regimes gave prominence to the manufacturing industry or heavy industry in order to 
achieve certain levels of economic growth as soon as possible. Particularly, it was 
facilitated by ‘providing capital, giving directions, and working with home-grown 
conglomerates’ such as chaebol in Korea (Chu, 2016, p119). As late industrialisers, these 
authoritarian regimes rationalised a growth-first agenda since the 1960s to maintain 
steady high rates of economic growth and transform their productive system through 
centrally-governed market mechanisms. Such an interventionist state that prioritises 
extensive industrialisation for national development over other policies is referred to as a 
‘developmental state’ (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Castells, 1992; Huff, 1995). 
 
The developmental states could hardly embrace free-market capitalism or welfarism in 
their economic and political creeds. This is because such states were dedicated to realising 
sustained, rapid industrialisation by controlling entire industrial activities. Under these 
circumstances, all national resources were centrally distributed and industrial incentives 
were given based on the growth-first agenda. This allowed the states to mobilise the built 
environment by, for example, developing industrial clusters and constructing large 
residential complexes to accommodate a growing urban population (Castells, 1992). In 
this way, the developmental states systematically and deliberately expanded their cities 
to sustain rapid economic growth, which is recognised as ‘developmental urbanisation’ 
(Hwang, 2016; Shin, 2016; Doucette and Park, 2019). In other words, developmental 
urbanisation took place while the developmental states instrumentalised the built 
environment to support their industrial and social policies with the aim of maximising 






2.2.2. Expansion of Neo-Developmental Urbanisation 
With the democratisation and globalisation of East Asian society in the late twentieth 
century, the developmental states liberalised domestic markets and repositioned 
themselves from leaders to facilitators of economic growth by introducing private-sector-
based systems in their national policies. This transition was facilitated by the Asian 
financial crisis, which caused government austerity (Choi, 2012; Chu, 2016). The Asian 
financial crisis broke in 1997 and spread throughout East Asia, leading to currency 
devaluation and capital outflow. Before the crisis, the states could maintain high rates of 
economic growth through their intensive subsidies or supports for selected firms or 
industries (Corsetti, Pessenti and Roubini, 1998). However, such trend was changed by 
the sudden huge capital outflows, which prompted massive financial bailouts across East 
Asia. In this period, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forced the troubled states to 
open their domestic markets and restructure their labour markets to facilitate free trade.  
 
Responding to such external pressure, the developmental states introduced neoliberal 
ideas in their national policies while acting as facilitators rather than leaders in their 
economic growth. But the neoliberal turn of the developmental states followed a different 
course compared to the West. While Western neoliberal states dismantled the ‘social-
welfare state’, East Asian developmental states embraced neoliberalisation to revive the 
domestic economy hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Choi, 2012). That is, in the East 
Asian developmental states, new public-private partnerships emerged but remained state-
controlled for rapid economic recovery, while the partnerships in Western neoliberal 
states were more oriented towards privatisation and entrepreneurial transformation. This 
means that the neoliberal turn in East Asia represented a departure from, as well as 
continuity with, earlier policies and institutions of the developmental state, which was 
transformed into what can be called a ‘neo-developmental state’ (Cho and Križnik, 2017). 
In this period, urban development was used to revive domestic economies hit by the Asian 
financial crisis. It was facilitated by the states’ efforts to ease planning regulations, open 
domestic property markets, and attract foreign investments rather than only injecting 
public funds. Under these circumstances, urban real-estate markets were mobilised as a 
promising strategy to revive the sluggish domestic economy while serving as a new 
vehicle of capital accumulation. Consequently, many East Asian cities went through ‘neo-





speculative market mechanisms as a developmental engine with the ‘property state’ as 
the operator and manager of that engine (Choi, 2012; Cho and Križnik, 2017; Joo, 2019). 
 
2.2.3. Towards Post-Developmental Urbanisation 
Entering the twenty-first century, however, there was a fundamental change in the nature 
of state–economy and state–society relations in East Asia. Along with low economic 
growth and low birth rates, coupled with an increase in the ageing population, many East 
Asian cities have faced new challenges such as population decrease, shrinking workforce, 
and rising inequality (Asian Development Bank, 2012). Such challenges caused reduced 
opportunities for the states and the markets to collaborate on new urban developments 
such as high-rise housing development and mega-infrastructure construction. 
Furthermore, while the 2008 global financial crisis hit the East Asian property markets, 
the speculative urbanisation slowed down (Yeung, 2011). This prompted calls for 
alternative approaches to the previous urban development based on exclusive state-
market partnership. 
 
As one of alternatives, some East Asian states began to make institutional efforts to create 
new forms of urban governance involving local communities beyond the traditional 
public-private partnership. It is evident in novel urban policies devised to include 
community participation as essential in urban processes. Some examples are the BOND 
programme (Building Our Neighbourhoods’ Dream) in Singapore in 2013 and the NID 
programme (Neighbourhood I Dream) in Seoul in 2016 (Cho and Križnik, 2017). In such 
programmes, the states were dedicated to putting more local interests or demands into 
practice for local improvement by inviting more citizens to participate in their decision-
making processes. These new approaches have served as the basis for nurturing the 
culture for more participatory urban processes. 
 
Such change implies a post-developmental turn in modes of governance in urban 
development in East Asia. This means that urban development partnership has been 
diversified and transformed from exclusive state-market collusion towards more inclusive 
state-citizen cooperation. This can be seen as a signal for a change in the aim of urban 
development: that is, not only to improve the built environment but also to foster and 





become directly and more actively involved in the planning and management of the built 
environment along with the state, which recent studies recognise as a distinct 
characteristic of emerging ‘post-developmental urbanisation’ in East Asia (Jeong, 2016; 
Cho and Križnik, 2017; Cabannes, Douglass and Padawangi, 2018; Douglass, Garbaye 
and Ho, 2019). In other words, ordinary citizens have been foregrounded in the period of 
post-developmental urbanisation, which concentrates on community participation that 
can serve as the basis for more inclusive urban development. 
 
However, concern has been raised that the sticky nature of the developmentalism 
continues to play a role in affecting the post-developmental urbanisation of East Asia 
(Park, Hill and Saito, 2011; Doucette and Park, 2018; Shin, 2019). This means that 
community participation can be initiated but rarely self-directed in the post-
developmental urbanisation. Central to this concern is that the states in the post-
developmental period continue to take the lead on the formation of new urban governance 
in the name of assistance due to the lack of civic culture. In this context, it is likely that 
community participation could be mobilised to achieve certain goals of the states rather 
than the local demands of citizens (Tang, Lee and Ng, 2012; Park, 2013; Kim and Cho, 
2019; Križnik, Cho and Kim, 2019). In this particular point of view, it is understood that 
East Asian cities are at a critical crossroads of socio-spatial transformation, which this 
thesis recognises as a point of emergence of ‘post-developmental urbanism’. In other 
words, contemporary East Asian urban development has taken place against a backdrop 
of post-developmental urbanism where community participation gains increasing 
importance while its governance remains in the control of the states. From this perspective, 
this thesis is situated in the particular context of post-developmental urbanism with a 
critical question regarding how the states can intervene in new community participation 
and new urban governance creation for more inclusive urban development. 
 
2.3. Conceptualising Urban Development in Korea 
Based on the overall framework of urbanisation in East Asia, the following section is 
focused on a historical exploration of urban development in Korea. This exploration is a 
detailed explanation of representative urban development programmes in a periodic frame. 





reconstruction policy in the 1990s, the New Town Programme in the 2000s, and the Urban 
Regeneration Programme in the 2010s. 
  
2.3.1. Control of Substandard Settlements in the Developmental Period 
In Korea, the developmental state emerged under the authoritarian regime of General Park 
Jung Hee, who came to power through a military coup in 1961 and took office as president 
in 1963. His authoritarian regime lasted almost two decades until his assassination in 1979. 
During this period, the industry structure was reformed from agriculture to manufacturing 
or heavy industry. With access to massive foreign loans, funds, and subsidies, especially 
from the USA and Japan, it was possible to boost export-oriented industrialisation, 
resulting in rapid economic growth. Park’s regime directed such financial assistance to a 
selected group of industries run by a small number of home-grown conglomerates known 
as ‘chaebols’, such as Samsung and Hyundai (Chang, 2009). In exchange for this 
privileged position, the chaebols agreed to prioritise the national goals of economic 
reconstruction. Such a give-and-take relationship produced synergy between the state and 
the chaebols by building unprecedented economic growth through exports. In other words, 
the developmental state in Korea instrumentalised a synergetic alliance with the industrial 
elites for export-oriented industrialisation through strategic use of fiscal incentives and 
trade policies.  
 
Such an alliance was not only used to promote industrialisation but also to improve 
housing provisions for rural-to-urban migrants. During the Park regime, there was a 
considerable growth in labour-intensive industries, such as textiles and electronics, which 
caused a concentration of cheap labour in major cities such as Seoul. Between 1960 and 
1970, according to an official count, the population in Seoul had more than doubled, while 
its annual population growth rate exceeded 10 per cent on average (Seoul Institute, 2010). 
However, it was hardly possible to accommodate such growing population with the 
existing housing and infrastructure in Seoul. This gave rise to a proliferation of illegal 
substandard settlements, known as panjachon, which mushroomed in vacant lands along 
roads, streams, and foothills (Shin and Kim, 2016). In 1966, the number of the 
substandard housing units reached about 136,650, accounting for almost one-third of the 
total housing stocks in Seoul (ibid.). Park’s regime tried to stem the spread of the illegal 





part of the ten-year (1972-1981) housing construction programme. Each danji was huge 
in size, consisting of a group of medium-rise apartments with around 19,000 flats in the 
case of Jamsil danji (Hong, 1997). Such danji development gained prominence with 
introduction of the 1973 Act on Temporary Measures for the Promotion of Housing 
Improvement. It is true that the new Act provided illegal settlers with legal ownerships at 
less than market rate. Yet, there was little progress, as the lower rate was still unaffordable 
for the illegal settlers while the state’s financial support for their resettlement or relocation 
was limited. 
 
Having learnt from the lessons in the 1970s, the state introduced a revised programme in 
1983, known as the Joint Redevelopment Programme (hereafter JRP), which became the 
model for subsequent urban redevelopment in the coming decades (Kim and Yoon, 2003; 
Ha, 2007; Shin and Kim, 2016). The JRP was based on the use of joint contributions of 
local property owners and large builders that acted as housing funders and marketers as 
well as constructors. To initiate the joint contributions, the property owners first had to 
form a so-called ‘redevelopment association’ dedicated to preparing a redevelopment 
plan. Once the plan was adopted by a majority of the property owners and then approved 
by the government, the association could embark on redevelopment work with the large 
builders. In this process, the builders financed the development and carried out housing 
construction as well as marketing. Hence, instead of the government, the large private 
builders took responsibility for clearing illegal settlements and constructing new high-
rise flats through the JRP. In return, the builders were able to reap massive profits by 
putting the remaining flats up for sale after distributing to the participating property 
owners at construction rate. This gave rise to the increase of the housing supply rate in 
Seoul from less than 50% in 1980 to more than 75% in 2000 (Ha, 2007). Hence, it is seen 
that the JRP contributed to a significant change in the urban landscape of Seoul by 
increasing the number of high-rise apartments. In this regard, the JRP represents the 
developmental urban practices to accommodate the concentrated population by 
improving the housing supply through the control of panjachon growth and the promotion 






2.3.2. Speculative Redevelopment in the Neo-Developmental Period 
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korea’s property market experienced a neoliberal 
turn that deregulated planning regulations and attracted foreign investments (Shin and 
Kim, 2016). It was facilitated on the assumption that urban real-estate markets can serve 
as a vehicle of capital accumulation to revive the domestic economy hit by the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis (Choi, 2012). Such a unique neoliberal turn in the property market gave 
rise to more speculative large-scale housing or infrastructure projects focusing on city 
branding and marketing through which to attract more capital in the context of 
government austerity (Križnik, 2013). Hence, under these circumstances, urban 
development was used to capture mobile financial capital for the economic turnaround 
rather than addressing socio-economic inequalities in cites. This can be seen as neo-
developmental urbanisation in the Korean context. 
 
In the 2000s, such neo-developmental urbanisation often took place in low-rise residential 
urban areas where one- to four-storey houses were densely concentrated. The New Town 
Programme (hereafter NTP) is a case in point. It was introduced in Seoul in 2002 and 
spread across the country in 2006. Like the JRP, the NTP was also driven by joint 
contributions of local property owners and construction firms. However, the NTP entailed 
large infrastructure projects such as roads, stations, schools, and telecommunications. 
That is, the NTP was much larger in scale and took a more comprehensive approach to 
improving the built environment. This new approach gained more prominence at the 
national level with the introduction of the national Special Act on Urban Renewal 
Promotion in 2006. As of 2008, the NTP zones covered almost 6% of Seoul’s surface 
area and affected more than 850,000 people, accounting for about 8% of the city’s 
population (Jang and Yang, 2008). This implies that the NTP was one of the most 
effective tools for improving the quality of the built environment in the 2000s. The NTP 
was particularly successful in the low-rise residential areas with speculative property 
owners who could not benefit from the previous rounds of the JRP (Shin and Kim, 2016). 
Accordingly, it became a statutory urban redevelopment model that transformed deprived 
low-rise neighbourhoods into high-rise residential complexes in Korea. 
 
However, such neo-developmental urbanisation slowed down as the 2008 global financial 





new redevelopment. Moreover, the first round of the NTP caused social problems such 
as involuntary displacement and homelessness. For example, in the NTP in the Gireum 
area, only 10% of the original residents were able to resettle, while the rest were forced 
to leave due to soaring housing rates and living costs (Kim, 2010). Such economic and 
social challenges caused negative effects on the progress of a variety of redevelopment 
projects. Due to the crisis and changes, more than half of the planned redeveloped projects, 
including the NTP, were cancelled, and accordingly, promised market investments or 
state supports were withdrawn with no backup plan (Jang et al., 2013). In Seoul alone, 
the number of cancellations exceeded 390 and affected more than 400,000 local residents 
(Jang, 2018). As a result, the cancelled redevelopment areas remained undeveloped and 
faced further deprivation with growing conflicts among the residents, and between the 
residents and the state. This prompted calls for alternative urban development to the past 
state-led or market-driven approaches in Korea. 
 
2.3.3. Community-based Regeneration in the Post-Developmental Period 
As one of the alternatives, the state launched a new Urban Regeneration Programme 
(hereafter URP) by introducing the national Special Act on Promotion and Support for 
Urban Regeneration (hereafter UR Act) in 2013. The URP was devised to incorporate 
local residents beyond only property owners or investors and create a ‘community-based 
initiative’ as an acting association to improve the deprived neighbourhoods. Compared to 
the NTP, hence, the URP is focused on community participation, which can serve as the 
basis for a more inclusive and sustainable urban development. The important thing is that 
it aims not only to improve the built environment but also to foster and sustain communal 
life and shared identities in the deprived neighbourhoods. In this respect, the URP is seen 
as a community-based urban regeneration approach based on a partnership between the 
state and residents. 
 
 Since the introduction of the UR Act, the number of URP zones has shown a steady 
increase every year. As of 2018, its total number topped 200 throughout the country (Jang, 
2018). However, it turned out that only 11 URP zones were designated in Seoul due to 
the national goal, which aimed at balanced regional development (ibid.). Such a national 
goal rather caused reverse discrimination where major cities like Seoul were given hardly 





deprived neighbourhoods. As a result, the Seoul Metropolitan Government (hereafter 
SMG) established the 2050 Seoul Urban Regeneration Guideline in 2015, and launched 
the so-called mayoral Urban Regeneration Programme (hereafter mayoral URP) in 2016, 
while Park Won-soon, a former human rights lawyer, served as the mayor in Seoul (Seoul 
Metropolitan Government, 2018c). Like the national URP, the mayoral URP also stressed 
community participation in the urban regeneration process. But, extra effort was made in 
the mayoral URP to localise the national URP by extending its official implementation 
period and subdividing its official tasks to be addressed. Such mayoral URP has spread 
further across the city since Mayor Park’s successful re-election in 2018. As of 2018, 
more than 120 neighbourhoods benefitted from the mayoral URP (Seoul Urban 
Regeneration Support Centre, 2018a, 2018b). The diagram below shows the 




The above explanation confirms that the URP zones are mainly the low-rise residential 
areas where previous redevelopment such as the JRP or the NTP did not take place. The 
Figure 2. A summary of major urban development practices in Seoul.             





reason for this is that the redevelopment in such areas was considered unprofitable due to 
strict building and planning regulations such as building height restrictions or land use 
restrictions (Jang, 2018). Moreover, the existing residents in such areas could hardly 
establish a redevelopment association or pay a charge for redevelopment due to their low 
financial capacity (ibid.). That is, the URP has focused on the deprived neighbourhoods, 
which have been constantly marginalised outside the interests of the state and the market. 
Recently, such approach has gained more national prominence since the inauguration of 
the progressive national government, which announced the so-called Urban Regeneration 
New Deal policy in 2018 (An et al., 2018). Putting such change into the periodic 
framework of East Asian urbanisation, it can be seen as a post-developmental turn in 
urban development in Korea. That is to say, it signifies that Korea has been undergoing a 
fundamental change in the direction of urban development where unprofitable deprived 
neighbourhoods are foregrounded while urban development partnerships are diversified 
with the inclusion of residents. This represents a crucial transition from the speculative 
neo-developmental towards the more inclusive post-developmental urbanism in Korea. 
 
However, it should be noted that such post-developmental urbanism is not simply 
initiated by direct interactions between the state and residents in Korea. Based on the new 
UR Act, it is required to establish intermediary organisations, such as local urban 
regeneration support centres, which serve to facilitate the regeneration process by 
working between the state and residents. Considering this point, it is worth taking a close 
look at the nature of such intermediary organisations for a better understanding of the 
post-developmental urbanism in Korea. In this regard, the following section provides a 
brief historical exploration of the intermediary sector in Korea from the developmental to 
the post-developmental period. 
 
2.4. Identifying the Intermediary Sector in Korea 
This section provides a basis for an improved understanding of emerging intermediary 
organisations in Korea. For this, the nature of civil society in Korea is reified in 
comparison with that in the West. Then, the ways in which different intermediary 
organisations have emerged and grown in Korea’s civil society from the developmental 





developmental period, where a new breed of intermediary organisations has recently 
emerged in the new urban regeneration framework. 
 
2.4.1. Nature of Civil Society in Korea 
There is no unified definition, theory or model of intermediary organisation. Hence, 
understanding the exact meaning of the term ‘intermediary organisation’ is not easy, as it 
may mean different things in different situations. Despite its equivocal nature, it is clear 
that the intermediary organisation is positioned as a collective entity beyond family and 
distinct from the state and market. In other words, an intermediary organisation takes its 
conceptual roots in the third realm that is formed outside of the state, the market, and the 
family, which is civil society (Cohen and Arato, 1992). In this regard, it is worth exploring 
the nature of civil society to gain an insight into the origin of diverse intermediary 
organisations.  
 
Civil society is defined as the ‘sphere intermediate between the family and the state, in 
which social actors pursue neither profit within the market nor power within the state’ 
(Schwartz, 2003, p.23). Central to this intermediate sphere are collective interests beyond 
the familial sphere that the state and market might underestimate. This suggests that a 
major role of organisations in the intermediate sphere is to prevent certain collective 
interests from being subordinated to the power of the state and market profit. Hence, civil 
society is understood as the third sphere encompassing non-state and non-profit 
organisations. Environmental groups, women’s rights groups, labour unions, co-
operatives, community-based associations, independent research institutes and not-for-
profit media are a case in point (OECD, 2012).  
 
In fact, this concept of civil society has its origins in the Western world. The primal idea 
of civil society originated in ancient Greece and Rome, where civil society was 
synonymous with political society (Cohen and Arato, 1992). In the city states, the state 
and society were merged into one entity – the polis – which was an organic association 
of citizens whose authority governed every aspect of their lives under the rule of law. 
Through this logic, the citizens had no sense of their own individuality apart from their 
role in the polis. The only conception of freedom that they could enjoy was freedom to 





Greeks referred to the citizens’ association as koinonia politike, translated into Latin as 
socitas civilis, which means a public political community of free, equal, and virtuous 
citizens (Kumar, 1993). Under this ancient idea of civil society, the state and society were 
not theoretically distinguished. Instead, the civil society was understood as an association 
with a cohesive socio-political and moral order in which the interests of individuals were 
seen as organically united with the interest of society as a whole. Hence, individual liberty 
or autonomous spheres of voluntary activities were likely to be negligible and undesired. 
 
However, there emerged a conceptual separation between the state and civil society since 
the 19th century. In Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ (Hegel and Knox, 1942), the civil 
society was differentiated from the state by defining it as an intermediary power between 
the state and individuals. Karl Marx also viewed civil society as separation from the state. 
For Marx, civil society was a more politically charged concept of bourgeois society that 
is a product of capitalism and the bourgeoisie’s rise to power (Cohen and Arato, 1992). 
This led to incipient theorisation of civil society encompassing everything overlooked in 
capitalist states: welfare, health, religion, and the voluntary associations. Such concept of 
civil society was developed further by some scholars who pointed out its organisational 
aspects in an emerging democratic environment: Alexis de Tocqueville and Antonio 
Gramsci. 
 
In his work ‘Democracy in America’ (1838), Tocqueville observed the spirit of 
association in American society and came to the conclusion that there would be 
significant benefits if people were to associate freely in everything. In a series of his 
observations in America, he stressed diverse associational networks of interdependent 
citizens and their active participation in free associations. His key understanding is central 
to the American society as an American civic culture: associationalism, which nourished 
‘volunteerism, community spirit and independent associational life as protections against 
the domination of society by the state, and indeed as a counterbalance which helped to 
keep the state accountable and effective’ (Lewis, 2001a, p.571). For him, the 
associationalism was a conceptual underpinning for modern civil society that refers to 
the autonomous area of liberty incorporating an organisational culture serving as a 





(Mcillwaine, 2007). Tocqueville’s conceptual insights inspired further exploration of 
European civil society in transition from the aristocratic to the democratic order. 
Drawing on Tocqueville’s argument, Antonio Gramsci attempted to identify the civil 
society in Europe by putting it in the context of the protection of the proletariat’s interests 
(subaltern groups) against the bourgeoisie (dominant group). Despite his Marxist 
orientation, Gramsci’s stance was removed from the typical Marxist understanding that 
power lies in the hands of the state per se. His understanding is that at the core of power 
is the concept of ‘hegemony’ that enables the ruling capitalist class to establish and 
maintain its control. In his prison notebooks (Gramsci, 1929), Gramsci stressed that 
hegemony is produced and reproduced by dominant groups that generate their own values 
and norms so that they can become the common-sense values of all. In this system, a 
hegemonic class continues to take state power capable of absorbing other classes socially, 
politically, and economically. This suggests that the state here does not refer to the narrow 
sense of the government. Instead, it encompasses a broad range of political society (the 
police, the army, and the legal system) and civil society (mass media, the education 
system, and trade unions).  
 
In this hegemonic context, Gramsci distinguishes between the political society and the 
civil society: the former is the realm of force and the latter is the realm of consent. His 
main argument is that ‘the consent is not the spontaneous outcome of free choice; consent 
is manufactured, albeit through extremely complex mediums, diverse institutions, and 
constantly changing processes. Furthermore, the power to manufacture consent is not 
evenly distributed in society’ (Buttigieg, 1995, p.7). Hence, not everyone is in an equal 
position to understand how consent is manufactured. This suggests that civil society is 
not a sphere of freedom but of hegemony, with consent which is manufactured – as 
opposed to coerced – by those with power: the dominant classes. However, Gramsci 
points out that civil society has a revolutionary potential, ‘disabling the coercive 
apparatus of the state, gaining access to political power, and creating the conditions that 
could give rise to a consensual society wherein no individual or group is reduced to a 
subaltern status’ (Buttigieg, 1995, p.7). He argues that such revolutionary potential could 
emerge when grassroots protests break out in spontaneous ways, creating a ‘counter-
hegemony’ that challenges the dominant classes and restructures the dominant hegemony. 





change of ‘deconstructing’ the previous hegemony, which served as an instrument of 
power for dominant groups and ‘reconstructing’ the hegemony to serve the interests of 
subaltern social groups. That is, the civil society undergoes significant transformation that 
disarticulates the existing social order of the hegemonic historical bloc while 
rearticulating it with a new social order of the emerging counter-hegemonic bloc. 
 
However, the counter-hegemonic change often accompanies the process of ‘co-optation 
of oppositions or trasformismo’ (Gramsci, 1929) where potential leaders or key 
organisations of subaltern social groups are co-opted into dominant projects without 
changing the hegemonic substance. Such co-optation by hegemonic power serves to 
forestall the formation of the counter-hegemonic bloc and prevent the growth of civil 
society towards more socially inclusive and sustainable paths. Under this insidious co-
optation, the civil society is seen as both a hegemonic and a counter-hegemonic force. 
This means that the civil society is ‘dialectically where the existing hegemonic social 
order is maintained but also the realm of social creativity, where a new social order can 
emerge’ (Katz, 2006, p.335). In this context, the civil society actors tend to consent to the 
dominant classes and function to secure the acquiescence of the dominated classes. The 
outcome is that people are made to feel a sense of empowerment, sovereignty, and even 
democracy, but in reality, they are lacking all of these.  
 
Despite their limited role, as Gramsci (1929) argues, the civil society actors still serve to 
form a counter-hegemonic bloc by forging ‘horizontal alliances’ with wider social forces 
seeking to build a broad network structure against the hegemonic historical bloc. The 
horizontal alliances include bottom-up organisations such as community-based 
organisations, trade unions, civil right groups, and professional associations. The growth 
of the horizontal alliances in the civil society renders the power dynamics between 
hegemony and counter-hegemony both unpredictable and replete with possibilities of 
domination, subordination, resistance, and emancipation beyond a fixed power 
relationship. After all, the civil society actors in the horizontal alliances contribute to a 
counter-hegemonic change, which is a highly delicate balancing act between co-optation 
and subversion. Gramsci’s concept of the civil society has had a large influence on the 
formation of modern civil society in the global South, such as Latin America, Africa and 






In Korea, the modern concept of civil society emerged in the context of resistance to the 
authoritarian regime in the 1960s. However, the early civil society was hardly an 
associational culture and had little revolutionary potential. This is because there remained 
a lingering hegemony of ‘Confucianism’ underpinning the social, cultural, and political 
structure in Korea (Weiming, 1989; Schmitter, 1997; Bidet, 2002; Kim and Jeong, 2017). 
Confucianism is a system of thought and behaviour that is oriented towards homogeneity 
and uniformity of society in which individuals prioritise their duties over their rights. It 
is thus fundamentally anti-rights and anti-individualism in nature. Confucianism also sees 
the state in familial terms. The Confucian conception of the state as guo-jia 國家 (state-
as-family) implies that the state has its model in the family. That is, the state is placed in 
a continuum of family-like social structure, while the state and family are considered 
similar or analogous.  
 
In this Confucian value system, the intermediate sphere between the state and family is 
often invisible or indistinguishable. The reason is that Confucian values barely encourage 
new kinds of ‘associational life’ or ‘condition of necessity’ by keeping all the demands 
inside the familial sphere (Bidet, 2002). Instead, the Confucian values give greater 
prominence to the duty of elites to take care of others rather than the right of individuals 
to build up associational power or initiatives beyond the familial sphere (Cho, 1997). In 
this regard, it is likely that the civil society in Korea has evolved under a long-lasting 
Confucian hegemony with the ‘literati or elites’ rather than grassroots or lower classes. 
 
In this unique context, Korea has experienced a change in its civil society organisations 
in the last decades. This change can be summarised by four representative types of civil 
society organisation: government-circled organisations, faith-based organisations, 
minjung (people) movement organisations, and simin (citizens) movement organisations 
(Cho, 1998; Kim and Jung, 2000; Yu and Kim, 2001; Kim, 2011). Despite being under 
the same Confucian hegemony, these organisations each have different roots and distinct 
value orientations that have informed the nature of the intermediary sector in Korea. In 
this sense, the following section shows a brief exploration of different civil society 







2.4.2. Civil Society Organisations in the Developmental Period. 
During the authoritarian regime of Korea, the civil society organisations were strictly 
controlled and repressed by the state. In 1961, Park’s regime introduced a new national 
Act called the Social Organisations Registration Law, which distinguishes between the 
legal and illegal civil society organisations. Based on this new Act, pro-government 
organisations were legally recognised, while anti-government organisations were not. 
The authoritarian regime promoted and mobilised the legally-recognised forms of the so-
called ‘government-circled organisations’ to undermine the anti-government 
organisations (Kim, 2011; Kim and Jeong, 2017). Government-circled organisations 
include, for example, the Federation of Korean Industries, the Korea Employers’ 
Federation, and the Korea Saemaul Undong Association. Such civil society organisations 
could hardly have grown as autonomous associations. The reason is that their leaders 
were not selected through democratic elections, but chosen by the state. Furthermore, 
their management was also largely monitored and guided by the state. In exchange for 
limited autonomy, the government-circled organisations could secure stable financial 
resources from the state to maintain themselves. Accordingly, the relationship between 
the state and the organisations could not be mutual, but rather was hierarchical, giving 
rise to a master-servant relationship. 
 
The second type of civil society organisation is the ‘faith-based organisation’ rooted in 
the post-war foreign aid groups. After the Korean war (1950-53), international NGOs 
contributed to the reconstruction of society through the provision of social welfare in 
Korea (Kim, 2008). This included such organisations as the Church World Service, the 
Catholic Relief Service, the Christian Children’s Fund, the Holt Adoption Agency, and 
World Vision. These foreign aid groups provided social services such as orphan care, 
homeless shelters and medical supplies in the immediate post-war period. Entering the 
authoritarian regime, it was hard for the foreign aid groups to freely carry out their 
missions. This caused the withdrawal of many foreign aid groups and transferred their 
roles to domestic faith-based philanthropic organisations in the 1970s (Korean 
Association of Voluntary Agencies, 1995; Chung, 2003). These faith-based organisations 





government-circled organisations, they were less associated with the state power as well 
as being fewer in number. 
 
The third type of civil society organisation is the ‘minjung (people’s) movement 
organisation’, which originated from radical social groups outside the law. In pursuit of 
political democracy, a number of minjung movements, meaning anti-government protests 
by subordinate classes such as a pro-democracy movement, emerged during the 
authoritarian regime. The minjung movements resulted from increased social injustices 
caused by the state-controlled economic structure. In this period, even social policies 
served as a tool to support national economic growth. For example, in 1964, health 
insurance only covered regular workers in big companies or factories with 500 or more 
employees, accounting for less than 10% of the national population (Deyo, 1992). The 
remainder were excluded from social protection and exploited for economic growth. That 
is, the social policies rather contributed to widening social inequalities by improving 
economic efficiency during the authoritarian regime (Holliday, 2000). This situation 
served as the basis for the subordinate people to participate in minjung movements, 
leading to the growth of the minjung movement organisations. 
 
What should be noted here is that the minjung movement organisations were often led by 
progressive intellectuals. There were two main intellectual groups in the minjung 
movements: progressive clergymen and university students (Kim, 2011). As 
aforementioned, faith-based organisations were generally neutral, apolitical philanthropic 
social groups. However, the deepening social injustice motivated some progressive 
clergymen to organise groups for the minjung movements. The emergence of the 
unofficial network known as the Catholic Priests’ Group for Justice in 1974 is a case in 
point. University students also forged other groups of progressive intellectuals. They 
began anti-government movements by creating internal seminar groups that provided 
workers, peasants, and poor people with knowledge such as labour laws and social 
theories. In pursuit of democratisation of the state, the intellectual groups devoted 
themselves to enlightening the underprivileged. Their efforts contributed to mounting and 
expanding the range of the minjung movements: labour movements, peasants’ 
movements, and anti-poverty movements (Kim, 2011). Such minjung movement 





government-circled organisations. Yet the bloc still remained outside the law while being 
led by dissident intellectuals rather than by subordinate people themselves.  
 
2.4.3. Growth of Civil Society Organisations after the Developmental Period 
Since Korea’s transition to democracy in 1987, its civil society organisations have 
undergone significant change. Many pro-government organisations incrementally 
became independent from the state while most anti-government organisations gained 
legal status and national recognition (Kim and Jeong, 2017). There was also the rise of a 
new strand of civil society groups along with the fall of the authoritarian regime (Bae, 
2017). Indeed, the pre-1987 minjung movement organisations focused on the radical issue 
of political democratisation by workers, peasants, and poor people. However, little 
attention was paid to a broader range of issues such as anti-corruption, consumer 
protection, gender equality, climate change, and international peace. 
 
Since the 1990s, new types of social movements, the so-called simin (citizens’) 
movements, have emerged to address such diverse social issues beyond the political 
democratisation. Compared to the minjung movement organisations, the simin movement 
organisations were identified as groups with ‘rights-bearing and rights-claiming citizens’ 
operating within the law (Kim, 2011). The Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
(founded in 1989), the Korea Federation of Environmental Movement (founded in 1993), 
the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (founded in 1994), the Korean 
Solidarity for LGBT Human Rights (founded in 1997), and the Citizens’ Action Network 
(founded in 1999) are cases in point. The emergence of the new groups represented a 
change in the characteristics of Korea’s civil society organisations from a pro-democracy 
camp towards ‘an advocacy group, identifying new issues, supporting new causes, and 






Such simin movement organisations blossomed when the previous Social Organisations 
Registration Law was abolished and the new Civil Social Organisations Notification Law 
was introduced in 1994. The new law streamlined the registration procedure for new civil 
society organisations without state permission and thereby facilitated their foundation. 
This led to an increase in the number of new civil society organisation in the 1990s, as 
shown in the figure below (KoFID, 2011). 
 
This shows that Korea experienced a dramatic development in its civil society 
organisations between the 1990s and the 2000s as it witnessed its rapid economic growth 
between the 1960s and the 1980s. At the core of the new civil society organisations were 
‘middle-class intellectuals’ such as journalists, teachers, social workers, lawyers, and 
doctors (Kim, 2011). They were distinct from the ‘intellectual activists’ such as dissident 
clergymen and university students who devoted their lives to the minjung movements. 
The middle-class intellectuals were less radical than the previous intellectual activists. 
They tended to participate in a variety of simin movements as fee-paying members or 
volunteers rather than as professional activists. These new actors gradually increased in 
number and became critical partners of political parties to devise new public policies (Bae 
and Kim, 2013). That is, the new simin movement organisations could gain more political 
power while being invited to public policy decision-making as advisory committees. 
 
Figure 3. Decennial proportion of the number of civil society organisations founded from 1940 to 2000.               





This trend was more pronounced along with the introduction of the Non-profit 
Organisation Aid Law in 2000. By legalising the state to give financial assistance to civil 
society organisations, the new law provided the basis for more citizens to be able to join 
civic activities related to their everyday life (Bae and Kim, 2013). Such change was 
accelerated by supplementary legislation such as the Framework Act on Volunteer Service 
Activities in 2006, the Social Enterprise Promotion Act in 2007, and the Act on the 
Assistance to Korean 4-H Activities in 2008. In this new legal framework, the civil society 
organisations were able to grow, with public financial assistance and increased 
membership. 
 
However, ironically, such legislation caused the heavy dependence of civil society 
organisations on state funds (Kim and Jeong, 2017). For many civil society organisations, 
these state funds had been a key resource for their annual budgets since their birth. A 
survey in 2012 reported that state funds covered a quarter of their budget on average (Park, 
2012), but it seems that this figure was over fifty per cent for small-medium sized groups, 
which comprise the majority of civil society organisations in Korea (ibid.). One thing to 
note here is that the state remained in charge of the distribution of the funds. That is, each 
organisation had to undergo an annual assessment against the state’s standards to maintain 
its funds for the next year. This enabled the state to selectively channel their funds on a 
basis of their preference. Accordingly, it is likely that the civil society organisations 
would accept the state interventions without criticism. In this regard, the simin movement 
organisations have often been questioned about their autonomy or neutrality despite 
having expanded their scope and enhanced their membership. 
 
2.4.4. Intermediaries Emerging in the Post-Developmental Period 
Entering the progressive regime of President Kim (1998-2003) and Roh (2003-2007), the 
state established two key national goals: decentralisation of central power and 
improvement of citizen participation in administration (Bae, 2017; Kim and Jeong, 2017). 
To achieve these goals, the state created internal intermediary organisations and assigned 
them the new task of progressive service provision at the front line. This meant that 
national efforts were made to institutionalise the function of civil society organisations 
by creating new intermediary positions within government institutions. The important 





civil society organisations (Kim and Jeong, 2017). In other words, the state tended to 
incorporate the experienced progressive intellectuals or activists into its administrative 
apparatuses to plan and provide new progressive public services. This unique approach 
gave rise to the emergence of a new breed of intermediary organisations dedicated to 
assisting the state to fulfil its progressive agenda while working between the state and 
citizens. The diagram below shows the relative positioning of the new intermediary 
organisations in the changing context of civil society that has informed the changing 
nature of the intermediary sector in Korea. 
  
 
In the above diagram, the new breed of intermediary organisations refers to a group of 
intellectuals (or activists)-turned-officials who came from a moderate group of simin 
(citizens) movement organisations. That is to say, these new intermediaries are situated 
between government and civil society, while their roles are transformed from external 
advisory committees to internal working groups for progressive national goals. In this 
context, the new intermediaries are positioned as semi-public institutions where former 
intellectuals or activists cooperate with government to provide progressive public services. 
This particular institutional approach to intermediaries can often be observed in multiple 
local authorities whose leaders were from progressive political parties in the 2010s. The 
Seongbuk community building support centre in 2011, the Suwon village renaissance 
Figure 4. A summary of historical change in civil society organisations in Korea.                   





centre in 2011, the Seoul community support centre in 2012, and the Incheon village 
support centre in 2013 are cases in point. 
 
Despite such growing popularity, introduction of the new intermediaries was at the 
discretion of local authorities because there were no nationwide standards, for example, 
for the establishment or roles of the intermediaries in planning. In 2013, a basic 
framework for the new intermediaries was developed at the national level with the 
introduction of the new UR Act. By stipulating establishment of the intermediaries in 
URP zones, the UR Act obligated local authorities to create intermediary positions in their 
administration and, accordingly, promoted the spread of so-called urban regeneration 
support centres across the country. According to an official count, the number of urban 
regeneration support centres dramatically increased from 9 in 2014 to 176 in 2018 (Jung, 
2019). Seoul alone established 22 new centres where about 190 activists (intellectuals)-
turned-officials were hired (Jin, 2018; Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2018b). Such 
urban regeneration support centres have a function similar to that of the previous 
community/village support centres. Yet they tend to put additional focus on regeneration 
of the physical environment as well as revitalisation of communal activities. That is, it is 
seen that the urban regeneration support centres serve to expand the scope of a new breed 
of intermediary organisations dealing with a broader range of tasks, from neighbourhood 
planning to building construction. 
 
To put that into perspective, the growth of the new intermediaries is seen as a signal of a 
post-developmental turn in the intermediary sector in Korea. This means that 
intermediaries are no longer a subject of pro- versus anti-government entities, as they 
were in the developmental period. Instead, they are recognised as semi-public institutions 
that can help government to achieve its progressive goals of decentralisation of central 
power and improvement of citizen participation in planning. Looking at the above long 
history of the intermediary sector in Korea, the government’s progressive approach to 
intermediaries can be considered as a reflection of the past struggles of minjung or simin 
movement organisations. That is, institutionalisation of intermediary positions within 
government organisations was a huge and unprecedented step towards a participatory 





intermediaries represents a significant transition towards more participatory and inclusive 
urban governance building in the post-developmental context in Korea. 
 
Despite such growth and prominence, the new intermediary organisations remain less 
flexible in their practices due to their total dependence on public funds. Unlike other civil 
society groups, these intermediary organisations are not allowed to fundraise or run for-
profit activities or businesses. They must maintain themselves with financial resources 
only from the public sector. As noted above, this is because they are not legally 
independent organisations, but rather, semi-public institutions that have to follow the 
regulations in force at government organisations. Hence, under these circumstances, the 
new intermediary organisations have greater responsibility, but are given less power to 
fulfil this responsibility. In this respect, the new intermediary organisations can be 
understood as progressive internal agencies within traditional institutions and practices, 
which are formed through the ‘co-optation of oppositions’ (Gramsci, 1929).  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly explored the historical context of urban development and the 
intermediary sector in Korea. The first section compared the urbanisation between the 
West and the East, and, through this comparison, clarified the distinctive characteristics 
in the East. The urbanisation in the East was framed within three distinctive periods: the 
post-colonial (developmental urbanisation), the post-Asian financial crisis (neo-
developmental urbanisation), and the post-developmental period (post-developmental 
urbanisation). Drawing on this periodic frame, the following section provided a historical 
exploration of urban development in Korea with a detailed explanation of representative 
urban development programmes. These include the Joint Redevelopment Programme in 
the 1980s, the medium-rise apartment reconstruction policy in the 1990s, the New Town 
Programme in the 2000s, and the Urban Regeneration Programme in the 2010s. 
 
In the second half of this chapter, the focus was to trace and characterise the intermediary 
sector in Korea. For this, a comparative exploration of civil society between the West and 
the East was outlined. This comparison served to foreground the nature of Korea’s civil 
society, which has evolved under the strong influence of the state and the long-lasting 





emerged and grown in Korea’s civil society from the developmental to the post-
developmental period were explored. These include government-circled organisations, 
faith-based organisations, minjung (people’s) movement organisations, simin (citizens’) 
movement organisations, and a new breed of intermediary organisations. Particular 
attention was paid to the new breed of intermediary organisations dealing with a wider 
range of tasks as semi-public institutions, consisting of intellectuals (or activists)-turned-
officials, who mainly came from simin (citizens’) movement organisations. 
 
By doing this, Chapter 2 provided a backdrop for a more nuanced approach to the post-
developmental urbanism in Korea, where community-based urban regeneration has 
gained prominence while intermediary-led participation has become popularised. With 
this in mind, the next chapter presents the conceptual framework of this thesis to reify 
and correlate three key ideas of communities, governance, and networks that emerge in 






    
                                     Chapter 3. Conceptualising Communities, Governance, and Networks in the Post-developmental Context 
Conceptualising Communities, Governance, and Networks in 
the Post-developmental Context 
 
3.1. Introduction. 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to provide a conceptual framework of intermediary-led 
participation for data analysis and interpretation in the following chapters. For this, it 
reviews the existing literature in the fields of communities, governance, and networks in 
the post-developmental context. This chapter comprises three main sections and one 
summary section. In the first section, communities in intermediary-led participation are 
conceptualised by exploring the concepts of community of practice (Wenger, 1998), right 
to the city (Lefebvre, 1968) and urban citizenship (Purcell, 2003) in Korea’s urbanisation 
context. The second section conceptualises governance in intermediary-led participation 
by reviewing the concepts of meta-governance (Jessop, 2004), the multistage 
participation ladder (Arnstein, 1969) and nonlinear involvement transformation (Dorcey, 
Doney and Rueggeberg, 1994) in Korea’s post-political context. This is followed by a 
conceptualisation of networks in intermediary-led participation. For this, the third section 
explores the concepts of social capital (Putnam, 2000; Lin, 2001; Woolcock, 2001), 
structural holes (Burt, 2000), and structural hole spanners (Lou and Tang, 2013; He et al., 
2016) and provides a conceptual basis for the social network structure in Korea’s recent 
urban regeneration context. Then, this chapter concludes by summarising how such 
conceptual approaches can be used for data analysis and interpretation in the following 
chapters. 
 
3.2. Communities as Urban Practice for Change. 
This section provides a conceptual basis to identify the nature of communities in 
intermediary-led participation. It begins with a conceptual comparison of two 
perspectives on the city: the city as a growth machine and the city for social mobilisation. 
Drawing on the latter perspective, it explores a civic group that builds ‘communicative 
rationality’ and generates ‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 1984), which is called 
‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 1998). This is followed by exploring the intellectual 





differential space (Lefebvre, 1974), and urban citizenship (Purcell, 2003). Then, this 
section ends by placing such conceptual exploration in Korea’s post-developmental 
context. 
3.2.1. Urban Communities as Communities of Practice. 
There are two distinctive ways to understand cities as a source of ‘economic growth’ 
versus a basis for ‘social mobilisation’. On one hand, cities are seen as a ‘growth machine’ 
or ‘growth engine’ serving to centrally manage economic growth and efficiently promote 
national development (Molotch, 1976; Logan and Molotch, 1987). On the other hand, 
cities are also considered as an ‘arena of social mobilisation’ through which grassroots 
can challenge central power and encourage their collective power to reshape where they 
live (Jacobs, 1961; Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 2003; Purcell, 2003). 
 
In East Asia, authoritarian regimes used cities as ‘growth machines’ by controlling urban 
development to support rapid national economic growth. In the authoritarian context, 
industrial elites were engaged in the developmental process while subordinate groups 
were overlooked, as their contribution to economic growth was considered insignificant. 
This caused uneven distribution of economic benefits, leading to social problems such as 
poverty, discrimination, displacement, or eviction in cities. Meanwhile, since the end of 
the authoritarian regimes, growing attention has been paid to ‘social inclusion’ in many 
East Asian cities. This does not simply mean giving more people more access to economic 
resources, goods, or services in cities. It contains a broader process of trying to increase 
opportunities for more people to participate in decision-making in diverse areas of urban 
life and thereby to improve their autonomy in the process of their neighbourhood 
improvement. This concept of social inclusion has gained academic prominence with the 
emerging idea of ‘progressive cities’ across East Asia (Douglass, 2016; Cho, 2017; 
Cabannes, Douglass and Padawangi, 2018; Douglass, Garbaye and Ho, 2019). 
 
In their book The Rise of Progressive Cities East and West, Douglass, Garbaye and Ho 
(2019) advocate that various approaches to participatory planning systems have 
increasingly emerged in cities such as Jakarta, Singapore, Chengdu, Taipei, and Seoul, 
while the local and national governments have taken a progressive stand on their urban 
policies. By describing them as progressive cities, the authors argue that the East Asian 





social values by placing citizens in the centre of the participatory planning system. This 
calls for a reconceptualisation of the recent East Asian urbanisation that goes beyond 
economic and material aspects of ‘development’ and encompasses other important social 
elements of ‘human flourishing’ (Douglass, 2016; Cabannes, Douglass and Padawangi, 
2018). 
 
Human flourishing is defined as a fundamental human right to the ‘full development of 
intellectual, physical and spiritual potentials in the context of wider communities’ 
(Friedmann, 2000, p466). Human flourishing often contrasts with human happiness. 
While happiness indicates a state of individualistic satisfaction, human flourishing 
contains ‘the idea of a process, of both a personal project and a goal for humanity’ 
(Triglav Circle, 2005). In this interpretation, human flourishing is about well-being that 
can be realised through interactions and engagement with others in a society, not in 
isolation from it. Hence, it is seen as a collaborative expression of citizens’ capabilities 
and aspirations for alternative ways to construct cities as theatres of social action 
(Cabannes, Douglass and Padawangi, 2018). Prioritising human flourishing over 
economic growth is a central concept underpinning the post-developmental urbanism in 
East Asia. 
 
However, in reality, the growth of human flourishing in East Asia often involves the 
contestation of hegemony and counter-hegemony within new institutional configurations 
in the shadow of the state (Lam-Knott, Connolly and Ho, 2019). That is to say, the 
progressive cities discourse in East Asia is being shaped and reshaped by hegemonic as 
well as counter-hegemonic forces while the concept of human flourishing becomes 
institutionalised. Progressive causes such as collaboration, participation, and inclusion 
have undergone the process of co-optation or trasformismo (Gramsci, 1929), which 
serves to maintain the existing hegemonic social order by absorbing progressive ideas 
within the established hegemonic bloc. The result is that counter-hegemonic forces in 
progressive cities tend to retain hegemonic elements or to be partially co-opted into the 
state agenda through funding ties and institutionalisation, which in turn neutralises 






What should be noted here is that the lines between hegemony and counter-hegemony in 
progressive cities are not clear but flexible. Predominantly hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic forces continue to change and adapt to sustain progressive urban reform over 
time. In the process, the co-opted counter-hegemonic forces form the basis for expanding 
horizontal alliances with wider progressive social forces across the boundaries between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic blocs. This means that there is room for co-optation 
to transcend cycles of bureaucratisation, professionalisation, and institutionalisation of 
progressive social forces. Understanding the co-optation as a stepping-stone to transform 
the dominant policy system, the progressive cities discourse provides a framework 
through which to see the world where the relationship between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic blocs ‘is constantly being constructed and contested, and is never a static 
reflection of an alliance of social class forces’ (Morton, 2007, p.97). In this light, the 
recent institutional changes in East Asian cities can be seen as a signal for creating an 
alternative city-making pathway between opposition and adaptation to the dominant 
system for progressive urban futures. 
 
In Korea, since the 2010s, progressive institutional change has been made to nurture the 
human flourishing by formulating a new policy framework for community-based urban 
regeneration in a post-developmental context (Ahn, Wi and Yoo, 2016; Cho, 2017; Cho 
and Križnik, 2017; An et al., 2018). The national and mayoral URP is a case in point. In 
this new policy framework, the state considers a ‘community’ as a unit to mobilise 
residents and engage them in urban regeneration processes. It should be noted, however, 
that a community here is more than just a group of residents living in the same place. It 
is a group of people who ‘share an interest in a certain domain of human endeavour and 
engage in a process of collective learning that creates bonds between them’ (Wenger, 
2001, p.2). In this respect, central to the community in the new framework is the element 
of ‘learning’, which values collaboration, pragmatic problem-solving and shared goals. 
 
Learning can be conceptualised in two distinctive ways: learning as a product versus 
learning as a process (Beckett, 2005). Learning as a product refers to the acquisition of 
facts, skills or methods produced through scientific evidence or explanation. Hence, this 
view emphasises a safe delivery of universal knowledge by qualified instructors and a 





is to gain ‘explicit knowledge’, referring to the know-what that is coded, articulated, and 
conveyed in certain media (Collins, 2010). On the other hand, learning can also be 
approached as a ‘process by which behaviour changes as a result of experience’ (Merriam 
and Caffarella, 1991, p.124). In this approach, learning is not a discrete instance of 
knowledge acquisition but a continuing process of learners’ participation in making sense 
of thoughts, feelings or experiences by interacting with each other. Thus, it is a process 
of accumulating and sharing locally oriented interpretations rather than delivering and 
acquiring universal knowledge. In this respect, central to the learning as a process is the 
‘tacit knowledge’ signifying the know-how that is stored and transferred in the form of 
memories, experiences, and practices among learners (Collins, 2010). 
 
Understanding of learning as a process foregrounds collective knowledge construction 
and perhaps resonates with what Habermas (1984) terms ‘communicative action’. 
Communicative action is cooperative action in ‘the deliberative process where two or 
more individuals interact and coordinate their actions based upon agreed interpretations 
of the situation’ (ibid., p86). Habermas (1984) argues that communicative action takes 
place based on its own rationality: that is, ‘communicative rationality’. Communicative 
rationality is distinct from instrumental and normative rationality due to its ability to 
concern the intersubjective (or social) world as well as the objective world (or facts) 
(ibid.). This means that communicative rationality is grounded on self-reflexive dialogues 
in which a certain group of people interpret the world in their own way through their 
mutual interactions.  
 
Hence, communicative action is an inherently consensual form of social coordination 
where individuals construct their own rational worldview with their shared pool of 
memories, knowledge, and information (Bohman and Regh, 2017). In this perspective, 
communication here is a process of investigating the ‘reason’ inscribed in everyday 
communicative practices by ‘achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus – and 
indeed a consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity 
claims’ (Habermas, 1984, p.17). This unique approach to communication shifts the 
focus in our concept of rationality from the individual to the social. This conceptual 





action, which is linked to what is referred to as ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 
1998). 
 
The community of practice (hereafter CoP) is ‘a group of people who share a concern or 
a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly’ 
(Wenger, McDermott and Snyder, 2002, p4). In this sense, a CoP can be seen as a unit of 
generating communicative action by fabricating communicative rationality through 
mutual interaction. In their book Cultivating Communities of Practice, Wenger, 
McDermott and Snyder  (2002, p.27) understand that a CoP is characterised by a unique 
combination of the following three elements: ‘a domain of knowledge, which defines a 
set of issues; a community of people who care about this domain; and the shared practice 
that they are developing to be effective in their domain’.  
 
Firstly, a domain is a shared sphere of interest, competence, and commitment that 
differentiates members from non-members and outlines boundaries between them. The 
shared domain ranges widely from small matters such as personal hobbies to broader 
issues such as environmental protection. When well defined, the domain creates a 
common ground and inspires members to participate by giving meaning to their 
participation. This serves as the foundation of the collective identity of the CoP. Secondly, 
a community is shaped by the sharing of information and the interaction among members 
on the shared domain. For members, community is a social structure that facilitates their 
mutual learning and enables their collective knowledge formation. Hence, community 
here serves as a frame to create a social fabric of learning and thereby form their collective 
identity. Lastly, a practice is a set of shared repertories of resources that include ideas, 
experience, stories, skills, information, and ways of problem-solving. While the domain 
provides the general area of interest for community, ‘the practice is the specific 
knowledge the community develops, shares, and maintains’ (Wenger, McDermott and 
Snyder, 2002, p.29). In essence, thus, the practice is a shared history of learning that 
informs the development of the collective identity of a CoP over time. Simply put, when 
the three elements work well together, a CoP can establish its own rationality and develop 
its own identity by optimising the creation and dissemination of its own knowledge and 
actions. In this regard, a CoP is considered as a learning community of which the 






Given this, it is worth a close look at the temporal dynamics of CoP to gain a better 
understanding of the transformative aspect of its collective identity. Wenger (1998) 
captures the temporal dynamics by splitting its development process into five stages: 
potential, coalescing, active, dispersed, and memorable. 
 
In the potential stage, people with similar issues gather and see if there is a chance of 
forging a community. They identify a shared domain of interests or needs that are enough 
for them to feel connected and find common values. In the coalescing stage, like-minded 
people gather together again and begin simple activities that promote mutual trust and 
confidence, leading to the establishment of a good rapport. Such initial activities are 
significant, as they provide grounds for local people to find meanings for their 
participation as community members. In the active stage, the focus is to develop the 
collective identity and capability of the community. That is, the active stage is a time 
when the community refines its role, responsibility, and boundary. Progress is made while 
the community members repeat shared practices, create artefacts and adapt to changing 
Figure 5. Five developmental stage of community of practice.                                   





circumstances. This is a very busy and important stage where the collective capability of 
the community is built up by storing its collective knowledge.  
 
Entering the dispersed stage, the community begins to plateau. Some active members step 
down from leading positions. Instead, other members collectively maintain the practices 
they need. The members no longer engage very intensively but the community is still 
alive as a force and a centre of knowledge. In the memorable stage, the community 
undergoes dissolution or revival while old members leave or new members come in. 
Some members leave the community when it is no longer useful or pertinent to them. On 
the other hand, new people come in and renew the shared domain. As a result, the 
community is put on a path back to a new growth stage or towards closure. Regardless of 
its death or rebirth, however, the old community is still remembered as a key part of the 
local identity through stories, artefacts, and memorabilia that continuously inspire people 
to participate in the future. 
 
This concept of CoP is useful for a temporal and historical understanding of the 
intermediary-led participation in the post-developmental context in Korea. In other words, 
the CoP can serve as a conceptual lens through which to see how a community in the URP 
emerges, grows, declines, or revives in Korea’s new urban regeneration framework. 
However, one thing to note here is that the community in the URP is transformed through 
the intervention of intermediaries in the state apparatuses rather than through self-
initiation. This suggests that the temporal scale should be calibrated rather than simply 
adopting the above stages. For example, in the beginning, a community in the URP may 
bring attention to the state’s goals and organise the goal-oriented initiatives. As it grows, 
the community may have an extensive membership where some are against the state’s 
goal orientation while others are supportive. This implies that the intermediary-led 
participation inherently contains a ‘counter-hegemonic power’, which influences the 
development process of community in the URP. If so, then what generates and sustains 
the counter-hegemonic power in the intermediary-led participation? What does such 
power mean for community-based urban regeneration in the post-developmental context 
in Korea? At the core of the counter-hegemonic power are perhaps a group of willing 





(Friedmann, 2000) in their neighbourhoods: this can be linked to what Lefebvre (1968) 
refers to as the ‘right to the city’.  
 
3.2.2. Community Right to Participation for City-Making. 
When seeing cities as an arena of social mobilisation, prominence is given to community 
right to participate, supposedly overlooked in the past (neo-) developmental urban change. 
That is, the post-developmental understanding of cities foregrounds a right of no 
exclusion of the urban community from qualities and benefits of urban life. Such 
participatory approach to cities is not a new idea. It has been widely argued by many 
urban thinkers (Jacobs, 1961; Lefebvre, 1968; Douglass and Friedmann, 1998; Harvey, 
2003; Purcell, 2003; Marcuse, 2009). Henri Lefebvre is one of those who stress and reflect 
on the aspects of civic participation in urban change, particularly from a socio-spatial 
point of view.  
 
In his book The Production of Space, Lefebvre (1974) traces the history of production of 
space from natural space to more complex space as a product of social relations. In the 
historical analysis, there are three distinctive modes of production of space: absolute 
space, abstract space and differential space. First, absolute space derives from the space 
of ancient civilisations. It emerges through consecration of fragments of agro-pastoral 
spaces such as mountaintops, groves, and riversides. These consecrated sites have socially 
significant symbolic buildings such as cathedrals, courthouses, and schools for rites and 
ceremonial practices. Such symbols and practices provide a basis for absolute space in 
which class society emerges and a clear division is made between urban (central) and 
rural (peripheral) areas. Absolute space is, therefore, religious and political in nature. 
Diverse social forces which occupy this space are condensed by the religious and political 
power but evolving within indigenous, tribal, and peasant communities. In this sense, 
absolute space can be seen not only as a production of religious and political value but 
also as ‘a product of the bonds of consanguinity, soil and language’ (Lefebvre, 1974, p.48) 
that retain the social value of space. 
 
Abstract space emerges along with the advent of capitalism, which prioritises the 
exchange value over the use value of space. Central to production of abstract space is, 





reduces or eliminates social value in absolute space by adding an abstract value of space, 
such as size, location and profit. This spatial turnover puts the symbolic, religious, 
political and familial mode of absolute space on a path towards fragmentation, 
homogenisation, and hierarchisation, which are outlined by Lefebvre as three key features 
of abstract space. 
 
Fragmentation is the most common feature of the spatial organisation of contemporary 
society. It is manifested through processes of breaking space into discrete units that can 
be commodified and traded. These fragmented units are rendered equivalent through the 
application of exchange criteria to space. Thus, although each unit takes different forms 
in space, ‘it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its lens’ (Lefebvre, 1974, 
p.90). In this logic, the exchange value system plays a pivotal role in diminishing or even 
excluding alternative spatial uses, which ends up leading to homogenisation of space. 
This capitalist production of space tends to go through a process of imposing hierarchical 
order on the ‘irrationality’ of the existing social value of previous space (Lefebvre, 1974). 
In this process, spaces are fragmented in a hierarchical order determined by powerful 
actors equipped with financial and regulatory instruments that affect or control the uses 
of space. Accordingly, social value in absolute space is, via capitalist logic, losing out to 
the value of exchangeability, profitability, and instrumentality in abstract space. That is 
to say, while being fragmented, homogenised, and hierarchised, abstract space becomes 
the spatial foundation for the powerful actors such as the state ‘to create a homogeneous 
society and to exploit and control existing differences’ (Wilson, 2013, p.369) in cities.   
 
In Korea, the abstract space is evident in the neo-developmental urbanisation where low-
rise residential areas were, via speculative logic, turned into high-rise apartment danjis. 
For example, NTP zones underwent wholesale destruction of old houses that removed 
pre-existing differences in their neighbourhoods. Hence, it is likely that the NTP zones 
could become the areas where the commodity value of space is maximised while the 
social value is underestimated. In this sense, abstract space is a useful concept for the 
better understanding of, particularly, the production of space in the neo-developmental 






Meanwhile, Lefebvre points out that there is an inherent ‘contradiction’ in the production 
of abstract space. The contradiction is the spatial expression of what Marx (1867) sees 
as conflict between productive forces and relations of production. Lefebvre (1974) 
exemplifies this point with capitalist spatial contradictions between the centre and the 
periphery; dominated space and appropriated space; conceived space and lived space. 
Central to the spatial contradiction in abstract space is the concept of ‘collective struggles’ 
over spatial uses in daily life practices. This means that abstract space evolves in 
everyday life, in which the marginalised groups are inherently challenging, confronting 
or resisting the powerful actors with dominance over uses of space. Lefebvre deciphers 
such challenge, confrontation, or resistance as growing pains in the change from abstract 
space to different modes of space. In other words, for him, the contradiction in abstract 
space is a point that creates the potential for alternative space. Lefebvre (1974) captures 
this alternative mode of space with the concept of what he terms differential space. 
 
In his historical analysis of space, differential space emerges at the cracks and the 
interstices of abstract space where spatial contradictions deepen. It takes shape outside 
of the exchange value system of measurable and quantifiable standards. Instead, it is filled 
with alterative values such as trust, consensus, belonging, participation, and cooperation 
in everyday life practices. This alternative approach to spatial production is oriented 
against homogeneity, fragmenting, and hierarchy, and towards particularity, connectivity, 
and inclusivity of space. Accordingly, compared to abstract space, the production of 
differential space requires active participation of a wider range of urban actors. This 
means that while it is only the powerful elites that can exert dominant influence over the 
production of abstract space, it is the collective power of the powerless that enables the 
production of differential space. Therefore, differential space is a space of appropriation 
rather than domination, as it is produced through the collective and inclusive participatory 
processes. In other words, it is seen as a spatial product as a consequence of the restoration 
and inclusion of social value in the everyday life practices of ordinary people. Simply put, 
Lefebvre’s historical analysis offers a critical look at the production of urban space in the 
transition from pre-capitalist ‘absolute space’ (sacred space) to capitalist ‘abstract space’ 
(space of exchange value) but with the potential for the emergence of post-capitalist 






In Korea, there have recently emerged new types of urban spaces differently produced by 
the associational power of the powerless in the new urban regeneration framework. 
Community gardens, community cafés, community galleries, and children’s playgrounds 
in the URP are a case in point. Compared to the NTP, such new spaces in the URP are 
more likely to mobilise existing community participation through which to preserve or 
promote the social value of previous spaces. In this sense, differential space is a useful 
abstraction to illustrate the concept of the societal production of space in the post-
developmental urbanism in Korea. 
 
To put that into perspective, such post-developmental understanding of space as a product 
of social interactions is linked to what is referred to as claimed space (Gaventa, 2004, 
2006). In the book Participation: From tyranny to transformation, Gaventa (2004) 
suggests a continuum of three distinctive types of spaces, namely invited, closed and 
claimed space. Invited space is a new space emerging in institutional settings in which a 
local community is invited by the state to participate in the decision-making process about 
the production of new urban spaces (Cornwall, 2002; Gaventa, 2004). Participatory urban 
policies, such as the URP, often prompt the generation of invited space by promoting a 
collaborative partnership between the state and the community. Hence, in invited space, 
the relationship between the inviters (the state) and the invitees (the community) is not 
oppositional but rather reciprocal. Although initiated by a state policy, invited space 
grows through community participation, localising the spatial production process and 
management. Hence, invited space is not fixed but fluid, and serves to create a basic 
spatial condition for further local participation. 
 
As invited space grows, it is put on two distinctive evolutionary paths: towards closed 
space or claimed space. Invited space tends to evolve into closed space when decision-
making is made by few actors behind closed doors (Gaventa, 2004). In closed space, there 
is little or no effort to broaden community membership or to reduce state bureaucracy. 
Under these circumstances, it is likely that community participation will become 
tokenistic while the state will remain dominant in the production process of new urban 
spaces. Accordingly, the decision-making right to new spatial production is eventually 






Meanwhile, claimed space emerges when invited space is used and managed by more 
diverse membership in an autonomous way (Gaventa, 2004). That is, at the core of 
claimed space are organisational diversity and collective capacity, enabling community 
members to autonomously and independently manage the spatial production process. In 
claimed space, community members often establish local initiatives, such as social 
cooperatives, to address ‘real tensions that arise between short-term and long-term 
solutions, between inclusiveness and effectiveness, between struggle and negotiation’ in 
new spatial production (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007, p.22). Such community-based 
initiatives serve to promote more authentic local participation activated by what the 
community demands rather than what the state puts forward. This means that claimed 
space develops as a third space where local people reject hegemonic spaces and create 
spaces for themselves (Soja, 1996). In this regard, claimed space is neither made nor 
controlled by the powerful. Instead, it is differently produced by the powerless beyond 
the arenas of institutionalised participation. 
 
But what enables invited space to transform into claimed or differential space beyond 
dominant hegemony? Lefebvre (1974) argues that central to the transformation is a shared 
right to think and act differently: the right to difference. The idea of right to difference is 
not about each particular individual’s claim to receive an equal distribution of spatial 
resources. Lefebvre understands that it is a right not to be identified in simple categories 
established by a homogenising power to flatten-out spatial diversity. The right to 
difference, according to Lefebvre, is essentially a protest against socio-spatial exclusion 
from pre-defined social norms and pre-established spatial politics. Lefebvre extends and 
generalises such idea of right to difference at the territorial level of city: that is, the right 
to the city.  
 
Right to the city refers not only to a right to access what already exists in the city but also 
to a right to change it (Harvey, 2003). This means that the right to the city is not merely 
an individual liberty to access the resources that the city embodies. Rather, it implies a 
collective right to change the ways the city grows and develops. That is to say, the right 
to the city is about the ability to exercise ‘a collective power to reshape the processes of 
urbanisation’ (Harvey, 2008, p.23). Such right to the city is outside the scope of traditional 





the national level. Instead, it is more like a social force to sustain communal life and 
interests collectively identified at the local level. Key to this idea, thus, are collectivity, 
sociality, and locality rather than individuality, legality and nationality. 
 
Such particular understanding of the right to the city offers a fresh perspective on the 
traditional notion of nation-state citizenship. This is well-captured with the novel idea of 
urban citizenship (Purcell, 2003; Bloklan et al., 2015). Urban citizenship is the status of 
being a member of a certain group with full right to the city. This means that inhabitance, 
not nationality, forms the basis for urban citizenship because ‘the right to the city is 
neither a natural nor a contractual right, but is grounded in the entitlement to physically 
occupy urban space’ (Lefebvre, 1968, p.194). In this perspective, citizenship is no longer 
only a notion of political community ‘nested’ in a nation state. Rather, it embraces an idea 
of associational membership enabling urban inhabitants to generate and exercise 
collective power to reshape the process of urbanisation in their neighbourhood. Such new 
approach to citizenship gives rise to new ‘power relations that underlie the production of 
space, fundamentally shifting control away from capital and the state and toward urban 
inhabitants’ (Purcell, 2002, p.101–102). In this regard, urban citizenship is understood as 
alternative membership with its own communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984) 
serving to produce differential or claimed spaces (Lefebvre, 1974; Cornwall, 2002; 
Gaventa, 2004) at the level of local polity. 
 
Entering the twenty-first century, such locally-oriented ideas of the right to the city and 
urban citizenship have gained global prominence in practice beyond theory (Habitat 
International Coalition, 2010; Nations, 2017). For instance, the right to the city has been 
increasingly adopted as a key idea in many mayoral policy packages, city charters, and 
global compacts across the world. It is evident in a series of symbolic declarations, such 
as Brazil’s City Statute in 2001, the World Charter for the Right to the City in 2005, the 
Montreal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities in 2006, the Mexico City Charter for the 
Right to the City in 2010, and the Habitat New Urban Agenda in 2016 (United Nations, 
2017). 
 
In Korea, the nature of the right to the city has evolved in the changing context of 





nature of the right to the city is well captured in the history of subordinate classes 
challenging the speculative urban accumulation regime while pursuing a community-
based participatory regime. It can be successively identified as the right to subsistence, 
the right to housing, the right to settlements and the right to city-making (Kim, 2017; Shin, 
2018). In the developmental period, the state introduced new urban programmes such as 
the JRP to redevelop substandard neighbourhoods in Seoul. In the JRP, only property 
owners were offered new housing provision or other alternative compensation. On the 
contrary, tenants were excluded from the compensation process and, accordingly, forced 
to be evicted from their homes. In response, a group of tenants organised protests against 
the exploitation of their life spaces and the destruction of their lives. This means that the 
concept of right to the city was first manifested through the claim of ‘right to subsistence’ 
which centred on prevention of immediate eviction of the tenants and a guarantee of 
minimum conditions for their residential life in the developmental urban processes. The 
persistent claim of the right to subsistence gave rise to the creation of tactical strategies 
such as governmental provision of alternative relocation housing, albeit temporarily.  
 
In the neo-developmental period, the prevalence of speculative redevelopment resulted in 
the expansion of brutal and forced eviction. As the potential evictee group increased in 
size, their protests against the alliance of the state, developers, and property owners 
became more organised. The potential evictees demanded more planned approaches to 
their alternative residence beyond the past tactical strategies. In this context, new policies 
were introduced to provide the evictees with alternative compensation such as living costs 
for three months or tenancy in public rental housing (Kim et al., 1996). As the new 
compensation measures settled in, the right to subsistence evolved into the ‘right to 
housing’, which focused on the right to have a home to live in, regardless of house 
ownership. This means that housing began to be considered as part of basic human rights 
and constitutional rights. In this transition of right claim, the legal system for general 
housing welfare for the urban poor was improved, while the National Coalition for 
Housing Rights was established in 1990 (KOCER, 1998). Considering this point, this 
transition is understood as a process of institutionalising the right claim by creating a new 







After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, large-scale infrastructures or housing projects such 
as the NTP were promoted to facilitate capital accumulation and revive the domestic 
economy hit by the crisis. Against the large-scale redevelopment, the claim of right to 
housing was transformed into a ‘right to settlement’, which placed housing in a wider 
context of neighbourhood that encompasses multiple dimensions of habitation. This 
means that the right claim was no longer confined to an individual housing unit but was 
expanded to human settlements where the concept of local community emerged for 
liveable neighbourhoods. Such right to settlement experienced further transformation 
through the Yongsan tragedy, where small business tenants died in the midst of the 
protests against the forced eviction and the limited legal compensation in 2009 (Shin, 
2018). That is to say, the right to settlement became broader in scope by encompassing 
demands from business tenants as well as housing tenants against the hegemony of private 
property rights and the limited compensation regime.  
 
In the post-developmental period, the right to settlement continues to serve to create and 
sustain a counter-hegemonic power in ongoing redevelopment areas. However, at the 
same time, a new form of right claim is also observed in cancelled redevelopment areas 
where speculative profit gain is relatively low. After the 2008 global financial crisis hit 
Korea’s property market, new opportunities for state-led or market-driven large-scale 
redevelopment were reduced. In this context, the undeveloped areas were confronted with 
further deprivation and the state was devoted to finding alternatives for those areas. After 
piloting a series of incremental measures, a new policy framework was introduced by 
enacting the national UR Act in 2013 and enforcing the subsequent URP in 2014 to 
improve the living environment in the deprived areas (Jang, 2018). In principle, in the 
URP, residents can participate in the process of planning, implementing, and evaluating 
small-medium sized projects for their neighbourhood improvement regardless of house 
ownership. In other words, the residents are given the ‘right to city-making’ while taking 
part in the URP process. Unlike the previous right claims, the right to city-making was 
not obtained as a result of protests against forced eviction or the limited legal 
compensation. Instead, it resulted from a combination of the residents’ demand for a 
solution for the deprivation of their neighbourhood and the state’s desire for an alternative 
model for the redevelopment of unprofitable deprived areas. Nonetheless, like the 





social process’ (Harvey, 1989) that places people, not profit, at its centre. That is to say, 
despite its emergence from a different branch, the right to city-making still shares 
common roots in terms of its orientation towards a community-based participatory regime. 
 
In particular, this idea of the right to city-making has become a focal point of planning 
for deprived neighbourhoods since the progressive leadership of Seoul Mayor Park and 
President Moon came into power in 2011 and 2017 respectively. For example, by 
stressing a new mayoral motto – ‘citizens are mayors’ – Park’s administration introduced 
a series of policy packages that institutionalise the right to city-making, such as the 
abandoned space reuse programme in 2015, the mayoral urban regeneration programme 
in 2016, and the citizen participatory budgeting programme in 2017 (Seoul Metropolitan 
Government, 2017). Such emerging policy framework represents a post-developmental 
turn in the urban right claim where the idea of ‘urban citizenship’ (Purcell, 2003) comes 
to the fore, while ‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 1984) gains prominence in the city-
making process. 
 
However, this post-developmental turn does not simply mean a general change in the 
policy framework that promotes CoP and its right to city-making. It implies a structural 
change in the power mechanism underlying this policy framework by which a CoP is 
fostered and its right to city-making is expanded. In other words, understanding the post-
developmental turn requires a more nuanced approach to power dynamics emerging in 
intermediary-led participation. This suggests that there is a strong need to shift our focus 
to governance of community participation that evolves through intermediary intervention 
in the urban regeneration of Korea. In this sense, the following section conceptualises 
power dynamics in intermediary-led participation by exploring multi-layered, multi-stage 
and non-linear concept of governance. 
 
3.3. Governance as a Sorting and Evolving Platform for Inclusion 
This section provides a conceptual basis for analysing power dynamics emerging in 
intermediary-led participation in the urban regeneration of Korea. It begins with a 
conceptual comparison of two perspectives on power: zero-sum power and positive-sum 
power. Drawing on the positive-sum power perspective (Clegg, 1989), the first half of 





partnerships are formed while power dynamics are restructured (Rosenau, 1995; Stoker, 
1998). Particular attention is paid to multi-level partnership, called meta-governance, 
where a government steers decentralised networks by monitoring or assessing those 
networks rather than directly commanding or controlling them (Jessop, 2004). In the 
second half of the section, the focus is shifted to transformative aspects of governance to 
identify how power dynamics and tensions emerge and evolve in reality. For this, it 
reviews the multi-stage concept of Arnstein’s participation ladder (1969) and the non-
linear concept of the horizontal spectrum of interaction (Dorcey, Doney and Rueggeberg, 
1994) to frame transformative power mechanisms underlying the intermediary-led 
participation emerging in urban regeneration of Korea. 
 
3.3.1. Multi-level Governance and Post-Political Trap. 
The word ‘power’ can be generally interpreted in two different ways: zero-sum and 
positive-sum power. On the one hand, power is pre-determined by those in authority, such 
as the state or its bureaucratic apparatuses (Power, 1994). In this logic, power is finite and 
zero-sum in its nature, meaning that if someone gains power, someone else must lose it. 
Hence, power in the zero-sum situation is inequitably distributed or dominated by those 
in authority. On the other hand, some scholars argue that power is infinite and positive-
sum (Clegg, 1989; Wrong, 1995; Haugaard, 2012). For them, power flows freely around 
different groups rather than being possessed by a certain group. That is, power is 
expanded as it is shared. Hence, this approach rejects the view of power as a zero-sum 
game by expanding the concept of authority from the hierarchical bureaucratic context to 
the everyday life context, including citizens’ authority. Simply put, in the zero-sum 
perspective, those who are powerful in one area tend to be powerful in another. But, in 
the positive-sum perspective, power is not seen as domination. This means that people 
with more power in one area are not necessarily powerful in another, and they all have a 
chance of being heard at some point. 
 
Such contrasting views of power serve as the basis to better understand power dynamics 
in the concept of the ‘shift from government to governance’ (Rosenau, 1995; Rhodes, 
1996; Stoker, 1998; Kooiman, 2003). What does governance mean and how does it relate 
to power? The answer to this question could start from a good grasp of the distinction 





carries out its will, purposes and objectives (Stoker, 1998). Accordingly, it is conceptually 
seen as a ‘body’ to manage the power or policy of the state. On the other hand, governance 
is a ‘structure’ or ‘mechanism’ in which such power or policy is managed (Rosenau, 
1995). As a structure, governance represents an architecture of institutions that are drawn 
from but are also beyond government. This is evident in the fact that non-governmental 
institutions such as voluntary groups and private sector organisations are key components 
of the structure. As a mechanism, governance entails a new set of principles, rules, and 
norms that generate a process to include a wider range of actors. Hence, it has a specific 
function of the steering incorporation of both formal and informal actors into decision-
making processes. In other words, governance ‘embraces governmental institutions, but 
it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and 
organisations within its purview move ahead, satisfy needs, and fulfil their wants’ 
(Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992, p.4). 
 
In the governance perspective, therefore, government is not the only power centre of the 
state. Rather, government can transfer its once exclusive power to other actors in a new 
governance framework. That is, the power of government is shared, while governance 
embraces formal (governmental) but also informal (non-governmental) institutions 
within its structure and mechanism. Through this power-sharing process, accordingly, a 
single actor, public or private, no longer exclusively dominates knowledge, overview, 
information, or resources (Kooiman, 1993). Such approach to governance shifts the 
concept of power from a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum or positive-sum context where 
power flows and grows in partnerships. This gives rise to a conceptual shift ‘from fixed 
ideas of power being rooted in the institution of the state to more fluid ideas of power that 
is shared, developed and negotiated between partners, with the potential for dynamic, 
interactive social learning amongst autonomous but interdependent agencies’ (Taylor, 
2011, p.148).  
 
This way of viewing power represents a shift from a government to a governance 
paradigm. While power is shared, sectoral boundaries between the state, the market, and 
citizens are often mixed or rearranged. It is seen as a process of redefining the traditional 
roles that each sector has had. At the core of this process is ‘reconfiguration of 





networks across permeable institutional boundaries and an expanded vision of public 
domain’ (Cornwall, 2004, p.1). This implies that a variety of partnerships emerge in the 
governance paradigm. In such partnerships, government tends to change its role from 
controlling to enabling, and from rowing to steering power mechanisms. In this sense, a 
rise of governance signifies ‘a change in the meaning of government, referring to new 
processes of governing; or changed conditions of ordered rule; or new methods by which 
society is governed (Rhodes, 1996, p.652).  
 
However, as argued by Sullivan et al. (2004), the shift towards governance does not 
necessarily mean that the power of government declines. Despite some loss of direct 
command and control, government still has indirect impacts on power mechanisms by 
establishing and enforcing new rules for a new governance. That is to say, government 
remains influential in the formation and transformation of power relations in the new 
governance, while acting as an accessor which examines each step in the shift towards 
the governance. Michael Power (1994, 2003) understands the modern society with such 
governance as an ‘audit society’ where government becomes an auditor, with others being 
auditees. In his book The Audit Explosion, Power (1994) argues that we live in an audit 
society and face an audit explosion in everyday life. This includes ‘environmental audits, 
value for money audits, management audits, quality audits, forensic audits, data audits, 
intellectual property audits, medical audits and many others besides’ (ibid., p.299). In this 
audit explosion, auditors do not simply implement neutral acts of verification, but design 
rules which auditees have to observe and assess their performance against the rules. 
Hence, as an auditor, government could maintain an upper hand in the context of the 
paradigm shift from government to governance by using audits as efficient technologies 
of checking and assurance. 
 
In the audit society, governance serves as a multi-level platform where government can 
control actors on different levels, albeit remotely, through the managerial instruments of 
accounting, budgetary constraints, and quality assurance. The multi-level platform is well 
captured in the concept of meta-governance: that is, governing of governance in the 
shadow of hierarchy (Jessop, 2002, 2003, 2004). Meta-governance refers to a multi-
layered partnership in which ‘governments steer decentralised networks by indirectly 





According to Jessop (2004, p.53), meta-governance has power dynamics that are resistant 
to ‘top-down internal management and/or direct external control and that co-evolve with 
other (complex) sets of social relations with which their various decisions, operations, 
and aims are reciprocally interdependent’. Government here no longer has absolute power. 
Instead, it acts as an auditor to monitor governance performance or as a court of appeal 
in the event of governance failure. That is to say, government in meta-governance has no 
direct controls over all levels but makes indirect interventions across them without 
‘reverting to traditional statist styles of government in terms of bureaucratic rule making 
and imperative command’ (Torfing et al., 2012, p.122). As a result, ‘at different levels, 
actions are constrained by broader framing actions. Ambition at the lowest levels may be 
frustrated, leaving individuals and communities feeling powerless, and in the shadow of 
different bureaucratic structures’ (Gallent and Robinson, 2012, p.193). Central to such 
frustration with constraints is a system of remote power control that enables government 
to govern other actors at a distance, which forms the basis of meta-governance. 
 
This concept of meta-governance is well explained in the context of post-politics. 
Whereas politics broadly refers to the production and circulation of antagonistic dynamics 
between individuals or groups (Mouffe, 2005), post-politics stands for the absence and 
negation of such contentious relations in technocratic society (Ranciere, Panagia and 
Bowlby, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2009). That is, post-politics describes the contemporary 
politics that neutralises potential tensions by depoliticising decision-making processes 
through technologies of expert administration and management. In this logic, while 
traditional politics offers a space to express dissensus or discontent, post-politics, on the 
contrary, emphasises ‘democratic inclusion of all, thereby suturing the totality of the 
social and precluding the rise of the political moment’ (Swyngedouw, 2009, p.609). This 
means that post-politics is seen as ‘consensual politics’ that replaces antagonism with 
consensus. In consensual politics, conflict has not been removed, but it is instead more 
carefully managed or otherwise residualised by centralising an assumedly neutral 
scientific technocracy, meaning that ‘there exist neither internal social tensions nor 
internal generative conflicts. Instead, the enemy is always externalised and objectified’ 
while technocrats serve as judges in consensual politics (Swyngedouw, 2009, p.612). 
Accordingly, the emphasis is placed on technocratic discretion, preventing rationalisation 





This discretionary system serves to form ‘post-political governance’, which is used as an 
instrument of government to establish a reworked state-centred approach, especially in 
contemporary urban development (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012). 
 
The post-political governance is evident in recent regeneration practices in cities across 
East Asia and criticised for its inherent ‘post-political trap’ (Tang, Lee and Ng, 2012; 
Park, 2013; K Kim, 2019; Kim and Cho, 2019; Križnik, Cho and Kim, 2019; Lam-Knott, 
Connolly and Ho, 2019). The post-political trap stands for the situation where consensus 
is built within agreements achieved through experts and professionals, while those who 
posit themselves outside the consensus are excluded from decision-making (Wilson and 
Swyngedouw, 2014). This means that the consensus-building process could be a trap of 
relying on monolithic technocracy with an emphasis on expertise and professionalism. In 
this view, consensus-building is no longer a process of finding alternatives to the previous 
developmental or neo-developmental challenges but of rendering fundamental 
disagreements as apolitical and invisible through the logic of assumedly unbiased experts. 
Under these circumstances, the ideas of diversity, pluralism, and tolerance are overlooked. 
To rephrase, the post-political trap serves to marginalise a variety of voices of the 
dissenting minority against the backdrop of majority consensus and prevent their 
inclusion in decision-making. This concept of post-political trap is foundational for better 
understanding the meta-governance structure where decision-making becomes 
centralised among technocratic bureaucrats while the need for non-expert involvement or 
input is downplayed. 
 
In Korean cities, meta-governance has been observed in the process of institutionalising 
community participation in the recent planning system. In the past developmental period, 
community participation was regarded as dispensable in the urban development processes. 
Taking the post-developmental turn, however, community participation has gained 
institutional attention, resulting in the formation of a multi-level platform serving to 
facilitate community participation, which represents an emergence of meta-governance. 
Although this was a huge step towards the creation of participatory governance, the multi-
level platform hides a post-political trap hinged on monolithic technocracy. As an auditor, 
government could influence middle-level actors, such as intermediary organisations, in 





technocratic control standards. As a consequence, low-level actors, such as local 
communities, are bound to consider the standards that the multi-level actors observe. This 
situation is analogous with a card game where middle- or low-level actors could neither 
decide the game that is being played nor determine the rules of play or the system of 
refereeing; and the cards are stacked in favour of the more powerful players, referring to 
government and its technocratic apparatuses. Such understanding of meta-governance 
with a post-political trap raises doubt about its participatory mechanisms where 
government could remain influential, albeit in less visible ways.  
 
However, what should be noted here is that meta-governance is not firmly fixed, but is 
designed to evolve in the new institutional framework in Korea. This means that while 
new urban regeneration is carried out, new governance is transformed with the aim of 
involving more actors and rebalancing power differentials, albeit in the shadow of 
hierarchy. In this approach, the underlying assumption is that middle- or low-level actors 
can become more independent or emancipated from high-level actors while governance 
is being transformed. This suggests that it is worth a close look at the transformation of 
governance in Korea’s urban regeneration framework. With this in mind, the following 
section explores the concept of governance with a focus on the multi-stage and non-linear 
aspects of its transformation. 
 
3.3.2. Multi-stage and Non-linear Transformation of Governance 
In URPs, new partnerships are usually initiated through the intervention of intermediaries 
with state support. However, the partnerships are designed to evolve with change in the 
state support, which aims to maximise community participation while minimising state 
intervention. That is, new forms of governance in URPs are officially transformed to 
create a community-based platform through multi-stage processes. Such transformative 
aspect of governance is well-explained with Arnstein’s (1969) concept of the ‘ladder of 
citizen participation’, which identifies different levels of participation at different stages 
of its development.  
 
In her paper ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’, Arnstein (1969) proposes a typology of 
eight levels of citizen participation. From the bottom rungs of the ladder, there are (1) 





where the citizens are merely placed on nominal advisory committees for the express 
purpose of educating them. The middle rungs of the ladder are (3) informing, (4) 
consultation, and (5) placation. These three rungs progress to levels of ‘tokenism’ that 
allow citizens to have a voice to some extent. At these rungs of the ladder, information 
flows between public officials and citizens through surveys, hearings, and meetings. 
However, what citizens achieve is that they have participated in participation, while 
public officials achieve the evidence that they have undergone the required motion of 
engaging those people. Although citizens begin to participate in practice, they may remain 
outnumbered, particularly when their voices are unfavourable from the perspective of 
public officials: that is, power holders (Brooks and Harris, 2008). The top rungs of the 
ladder are enabling citizens to negotiate with power holders. This top stage consists of (6) 
partnership, (7) delegated power, and (8) citizen control. At the rung of partnership, 
citizens are invited to joint policy boards or planning committees in which power holders 
share their decision-making responsibilities with citizens for resolving impasses. As the 
partnership blossoms, citizens enter into the seventh rung of delegated power. At this rung, 
citizens are granted dominant decision-making authority in a particular plan or 
programme. At the topmost rung of citizen control, citizens are in full charge of policy 
and managerial aspects through which they can achieve full power to govern a variety of 
plans or programmes. Hence, citizens here are regarded as ‘full citizens’ rather than 
clients or consumers who can cooperate with each other with their own source of finances 
(Rios, 2008). 
 
As one of the earliest conceptual works, Arnstein’s ladder is useful for summarising the 
development of community participation in multi-stage processes. However, it has been 
criticised for its simplification, which reduces the diversity of participatory situations to 
eight rungs (Bishop and Davis, 2002; Tritter and McCallum, 2006; Collins and Ison, 
2009). The critics argue that participation does not necessarily follow a linear or 
consecutive development route in reality, but evolve in a non-linear or iterative manner 
through feedback loops. Such critical understanding of the development of community 
participation has been advocated by practice-based urbanists (Rosener, 1978; Dorcey, 
Doney and Rueggeberg, 1994; Jackson, 2001). In their argument, community 
participation is situated in a flexible feedback loop system beyond Arnstein’s vertical 





negative, since they are regarded as tokenistic. Hence, the lower rungs are pointless in the 
sense that participation is meaningless unless real power is given to participants. On the 
other hand, Dorcey, Doney and Rueggeberg (1994) suggest that the lower rungs of 
participation should be seen in a different light. Their argument is that the lower rungs 
are not always unfavourable or unsuccessful. Rather, each of these rungs has its own 
functions that are horizontally intertwined rather than vertically graded. The diagram 





In the above horizontal spectrum, community participation is transformed, while the level 
of community interaction is changed. However, community participation is not 
necessarily initiated from the ‘inform’ step. When community members are already 
informed and educated, it can start from defining local issues and testing ideas in order to 
reach consensus. Contrariwise, when facing difficulties in the consensus-building step, 
community participation can go back to the left-hand steps to re-build, such as mutual 
trust or rapport. The point is that community participation can emerge at any point and 
evolve in any direction through the horizontal spectrum (Jackson, 2001). From this 
perspective, it is seen that community participation undergoes a non-linear development 
process under certain local circumstances. That is to say, community participation is put 
on a non-linear route to reach more sustainable status depending on locality, rather than 
only pursing Arnstein’s full citizen control. 
 
Such non-linear approach is useful for better understanding the governance 
transformation of CoP (Wenger, 1998) in urban regeneration of Korea. As noted earlier, 
CoP undergoes a change in its collective identity and capability through iterative feedback 
Figure 6. A horizontal spectrum of community interaction with eight steps.                           





loops over five development steps: potential, coalescing, active, dispersed, and 
memorable. In URP, CoP is informed or educated through gatherings, workshops or 
seminars in potential step. Entering the coalescing step, like-minded members attempt to 
establish a shared vision and reach a common consensus. But when such an attempt is 
unsuccessful, the CoP needs to go back to the previous step and iterate the process. 
Through the iterative process, then, the CoP may be invited to an active step to develop 
its collective capability by repeating shared practices and adapting to changing 
circumstances. But the CoP’s activities may begin to plateau or decline towards the end 
of the URP. With removal or reduction of public funds, the CoP can be faced with the 
situation where it must redefine its collective identity, role, and responsibility in its 
neighbourhood. This means that the CoP should iterate the previous processes while 
going back to an earlier step, such as the coalescing step. At this point, the CoP would 
undergo a significant organisational change: revival or dissolution. When new members 
come in and renew their shared domain, the old CoP is put on a path back to rebirth: the 
potential step. But if considered no longer useful, it should be put on a path towards 
closure: the memorable step. That is to say, it is seen that CoP here inherently evolves in 
a non-linear, recursive, and self-referential manner. 
 
This way of viewing CoP helps to understand a change in the power mechanisms of 
intermediary-led participation in the recent urban regeneration of Korea. However, 
understanding intermediary-led participation is more than just interpreting its power 
mechanisms. It must entail a deeper understanding of the ‘network mechanisms’ 
underlying the landscape of power in the urban regeneration. This calls for a strong need 
to expand our focus to the network perspective to see a complex web of inter-personal or 
organisational relationships and discern the social fabric of intermediary-led participation. 
In this sense, the following section explores network mechanisms in intermediary-led 
participation by conceptualising intermediaries and their social network structure. 
 
3.4. Networks through Intermediaries for Brokering Connections 
This section provides the conceptual basis to identify the nature of the social network 
structure of intermediary-led participation in the recent urban regeneration in Korea. In 
the first half of the section, intermediaries are conceptualised by placing them in a statist-





in the financial structure of intermediaries. Drawing on this conceptualisation, the second 
half of this section embodies the notion of social network structure, which is formed 
through the intervention of intermediaries. For this, the concepts of social capital (Putnam, 
2000; Lin, 2001; Woolcock, 2001), structural holes (Burt, 2000), and structural hole 
spanners (Lou and Tang, 2013; He et al., 2016) are explored, linked, and combined as a 
key conceptual element that constructs the social network structure. Each conceptual 
approach is developed further in the context of contemporary Korean society. 
 
3.4.1. Intermediaries between Statist and Corporatist Regime 
As noted in Chapter 2, intermediary organisations are not a new concept in Korea. They 
have grown within the civil society that took a democratic turn in the 1990s. Entering the 
2000s, the intermediary organisations went through a change in their orientation from 
merely political democratisation to wider issues such as consumer protection, gender 
equality, and neighbourhood improvement. As a result, intermediary organisations have 
been diversified with new purposes and structures. That is, the intermediary sector in 
Korea has become variegated in the post-developmental turn. For this reason, it is hard to 
define the current intermediary sector of Korea in a single word. Its definition is open to 
multiple interpretations. However, it is clear that the intermediary sector belongs neither 
completely to the public, the private nor the community sector. In other words, it is seen 
as a distinct sphere, which is formed somewhere outside the state, the market, and 
communities. Given this, it is worth mapping Korea’s intermediary sector onto the 
Western idea of the ‘third sector’ (Etzioni, 1973). 
 
The emergence of the third sector was a response to the failure of the state or market in 
the 1970s in the Western world. In his book The Third Sector and Domestic Missions, 
Etzioni (1973) doubts welfare state expansion as well as market-based welfare. For him, 
the rationalities of state and market are not in favour of the voluntary or non-profit 
activities that are foundational for citizens’ greater access to improved social services. 
The modern idea of the third sector emerges as a critical alternative to other sectors’ 
reluctance towards social value investing. Etzioni (1973) demonstrates that the first sector 
(state) operates in hierarchical chains of command and control, while the second sector 
(market) works through economic rewards or remuneration. Yet, the third sector relies on 





rewards and deprivations, the power of persuasion and on appeals to shared values and 
idealism’ (Lewis, 2001b, p.328). Hence, the third sector is oriented to more specific, 
realistic, and value-driven goals than other sectors, which are rational-driven.  
 
It is, however, worth noting that the third sector does not only mean exclusion from the 
first and the second world. It also refers to a combination of ‘the best of two worlds, 
efficiency and expertise from the business world, with public interest, accountability and 
broader planning from government’ (Etzioni, 1973, p.315). In other words, the third 
sector exists in a hybrid as well as a separate form between the state and the market. In 
this regard, the idea of the third sector embraces a wider range of organisations, such as 
non-governmental, self-governing, charitable, voluntary, but also public-private-
community interdisciplinary partnerships. Nonetheless, the nature of the third sector 
varies from country to country, as each grows in its own social, economic, and political 
system. It is thus hard to generalise the characteristics of the third sector in the global 
context. Despite this difficulty, several scholars have attempted to categorise the third 
sector by grouping different countries (Gidron et al., 1992; Coston, 1998; Salamon and 
Anheier, 1998; Najam, 2000). 
 
In their paper ‘Social Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-
Nationally’, Salamon and Anheier (1998) argue that the third sector has a distinctive 
nature depending on its ideological regime in different countries: social democratic, 
liberal, corporatist, and statist regimes. The four regimes are defined by two key 
dimensions: 1) extent of government spending on social welfare, and 2) size of non-profit 
sector (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Four types of non-profit regime.  Source: Salamon and Anheier (1998) 
Government Social 
Welfare Spending 
The Third Sector Scale 
Low High 
Low Statist Liberal 
High Social Democratic Corporatist 
 
A social democratic regime is defined by a high level of social spending and a limited 





large state budget, as the third sector is small in size. This means that the third sector has 
a limited role in social service provision, as the state provides the services directly. Instead, 
the third sector acts ‘as vehicles for the expression of political, social, or even recreational 
interests’ (Salamon and Anheier, 1998, p.229) of citizens while lobbying or pressuring 
the service provider (the state). This regime is evident in post-war Western countries such 
as the UK and the USA, which underwent expansion of the welfare state in the 1950s-
70s. At the time, the third sector tended to act as a citizen advocacy group rather than a 
public service provider.  
 
Entering the 1980s, however, Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the USA cut back on 
social welfare spending. Instead, they encouraged the third sector to step in by filling the 
gap that was left by government, which was no longer willing to finance and administer 
welfare programs (Zimmer, 2011). This represents a liberal regime, characterised by a 
low social spending and a relatively large third sector. In this regime, the state is less 
responsible for both the funding and the delivery of social services, while transferring 
some responsibilities to the second or third sectors. To be specific, in the liberal regime, 
the private sector is seen as a key funder or investor for social services, while the third 
sector is viewed as an alternative service provider. It is, therefore, natural that the liberal 
regime experiences new forms of partnerships between the public, the private and the 
third sector for social service provisions. Such liberal third sector regimes can be often 
found in many modern Western countries where new local partnerships are promoted, 
while the social assistance of the state is rolled back (Alcock, 2015). In this sense, the 
social democratic and liberal regimes are foundational for understanding of the third 
sector’s development in the Western world. 
 
Apart the above regimes, there are two additional regimes: the statist regime and the 
corporatist regime. These two regimes were undeveloped in the Western world, but were 
often observed in Eastern countries that experienced a developmental change in their 
social, economic, and political systems (Salamon and Anheier, 1998). Both statist and 
corporatist regimes usually emerge in interventionist states, but they differ in the way in 
which the state treats third sector. First, the statist regime is defined by a low level of state 
social spending and a small third sector. This implies that the state is less interested in 





of third sector organisations are officially recognised, while their growth and roles are 
significantly limited. It was evident in East Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore 
and South Korea under authoritarian control during the 1960s-80s. At that time, third 
sector organisations were not in a strong position to challenge the hegemonic power of 
the state.  
 
Taking the democratic turn in the 1980s-90s, however, such countries have experienced 
a change towards a corporatist regime, in which high social spending coexists with a 
sizeable third sector. This implies that the state has a large budget to fund social services 
while the third sector grows with the state funds to provide these services. In this regime, 
the state usually makes an alliance with the third sector and creates a system of ‘state-
sponsored welfare provision’ within the alliance. In the corporatist regime, therefore, the 
state and the third sector have an interdependent relationship rather than a conflicting one. 
However, as it has grown over time, the third sector has become dependent on the state. 
This means that despite its considerable growth in size, the third sector’s involvement 
remains at the discretion of the state, which continues to determine social service lists and 
designate social service providers. In other words, the third sector is under the influence 
of the state (statist regime) although expanding its organisational and financial size 
(corporatist regime). This point is well-captured with a hybrid concept of ‘statist-
corporatist regime’ (Lee, 2005; Lee and Haque, 2008). The statist-corporatist regime 
exists between the statist and the corporatist concept. Underpinning the hybrid regime is 
a ‘statist element in corporatist relationship’, referring to ‘an active involvement of the 
state in the regulation and/or financing of various areas of social provision [and] welfare 
assistance’ (Lee and Haque, 2008, p.103). In the statist-corporatist regime, therefore, the 
state can control the third sector by deciding who will do what and how in social service 
provision. In this context, it is difficult for the third sector to become autonomous while 
being asked to follow the state’s principle of subsidiarity. Such a statist-corporatist 
regime is foundational for understanding the current intermediary sector in Korea. 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, there are four types of organisation in the intermediary sector 
in Korea; government-circled organisations, minjung (people’s) movement organisation, 
simin (citizens’) movement organisations, and a new breed of intermediary organisations. 





statist-corporatist regime since the democratic turn in the political system in the 1980s. 
That is, while they have gained institutional attention, the intermediary organisations have 
been bound by carrot-and-stick policies of the state, such as financial aids and strict 
regulations on intermediary activities.  However, the level of the statist element varies 
amongst the four intermediary organisations. The level of the statist element can be 
defined by two main dimensions: 1) the degree of financial dependence on the state; and 
2) the duration of the state’s financial support. The graph below provides a categorisation 





According to this graph, government-circled organisations, such as the Korea Freedom 
Federation, are characterised by a high level of dependence on state finance and long-
term state support. This implies that they tend to rely heavily on stable financial support 
from the state in the long term. Likewise, the simin (citizens’) movement organisations, 
such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, also receive long-term 
financial support from the state. However, this financial support is relatively small in 
scale compared to the government-circled organisations. Instead, they have diverse 
financial sources such as membership fees and consultant project-based income. On the 






other hand, the minjung (people’s) movement organisations, such as the Community 
Organisation Network for Education and Training, receive neither sizeable nor stable 
financial support from the state. Instead, they mainly fund themselves with charitable 
contributions such as donations from individuals or grants from corporate sponsors. Such 
alternative funding sources enable them to stay relatively autonomous. 
 
The last group of the new breed of intermediary organisations is radically distinct from 
the above three groups. These new intermediary organisations, such as urban regeneration 
support centres, also receive the state’s financial support. But it is only given to carry out 
the state’s certain programmes, such as the URP, within a fixed term. Moreover, the new 
intermediary organisations cannot get donations, grants, or fees except for the state funds, 
as they are not legally independent organisations but semi-public institutions. That is, 
they inherently have limited access to available financial resources. Under these 
circumstances, each intermediary organisation here is formed temporarily and 
immediately disbanded when a certain programme is completed. This statist-corporatist 
approach to the intermediary sector provides an insight into the financial structure of the 
new intermediaries in urban regeneration compared to other types of intermediaries in the 
post-developmental context in Korea. With this in mind, the next section explores the 
notion of social network structure, which is formed through intervention of the new 
intermediaries, by articulating with the concepts of social capital and structural holes. 
 
3.4.2. Social Capital and Structural Holes in Social Network Structure 
The social network perspective contrasts with other sociological perspectives that see 
society as an aggregation of individuals. From the social network perspective, society is 
perceived as a system of social interactions that occur among individuals or groups 
(Granovetter, 1983; Scott, 1992; Freeman, 2004). The social network perspective is well-
explained with the underlying concept of social capital that informs social interactions. 
Social capital is often compared with physical and human capital. A classical analysis of 
capital as physical assets (physical capital) sees capital as tangible, man-made things: 
roads, buildings and other kinds of infrastructure, as well as labour forces. Another 
analysis of capital as human assets (human capital) views capital as intangible properties: 





analysis provides a certain framework that distinguishes between non-human and human-
based concepts of capital.  
 
In this framework, however, little attention is paid to social assets that are formed and 
developed through interaction among humans. In other words, neither physical nor human 
capital can accommodate social values based on trust, reciprocity, co-dependency or 
cooperation. This calls for another type of capital to include social values beyond the 
binary concept of human and non-human capital. This point has been captured by several 
scholars with what is called ‘social capital’ (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993, 2000; 
Woolcock, 2001). Putnam (1993) makes clear the difference between social capital and 
human capital by quoting a famous anecdote from David Hume. 
If a farmer says ‘I will help my neighbour to finish harvesting his crop before 
it will perish, because I trust him to reciprocate in helping me when my crop 
will ripen,’ this trust is certainly a component of social capital. But, if he says 
‘I trust monsoon rain will stop before starting to harvest my crop’. This trust 
represents his belief in the characteristics of nature but not in other persons. As 
such, it should not be included as a component of social capital. Instead, if his 
trust in rain stopping reflects his ability to predict rainfall patterns, which is 
useful knowledge for farm operation acquired through his long experience, it 
should be counted as a component of human capital in its conventional 
definition. (Putnam, 1993, p.163)  
This cited example provides an insightful point in terms of how social capital is radically 
different from human capital. A famer’s trust in mutual help grows when farmers share a 
set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest 
behaviour, while a famer’s trust in rain stopping results from individual experience or 
knowledge (Fukuyama, 1995). Simply put, social capital is based on mutual exchange, 
while human capital is grounded on personal acquisition. That is, central to social capital 
is mutuality, which informs trust, reciprocity, co-dependency or cooperation among 
humans. 
 
James Samuel Coleman (1990) develops this concept of social capital within the idea of 





capital is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, ranging from expectation, 
confidence or solidarity at the micro level to informal norms or conventions at the macro 
level. All the entities consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain 
actions of individuals who are within the structure. Hence, social capital serves to form a 
social structure where individuals can achieve certain ends, which would otherwise be 
impossible by themselves, or possible only with great difficulty. In this sense, social 
capital is seen as a set of social assets that enable individuals to act together more 
efficiently for shared values. 
 
Following the line of the above thought, Robert David Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) 
develops the concept of social capital by analysing socio-economic well-being in 
American and Italian regions. Putnam describes social capital as ‘features of social life – 
networks, norms, and trusts – that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, 
1995, p67). In particular, he emphasises ‘social trust’ that informs the nature of social 
interactions among individuals, giving rise to diverse forms of social life across different 
groups of individuals. Social trust refers to a belief in the honesty, integrity and reliability 
of others – a faith in people who may not know each other well but interact with each 
other (Earle and Cvetkovich, 1995; Boslego, 2005). As social trust expands, it becomes 
‘trust of a broad fabric of social institutions; ultimately, it becomes a shared set of values, 
virtues, and expectations within society as a whole’ (Beem, 1999, p.20). That is, social 
trust can serve to promote shared values among individuals and thereby transform an ‘I’ 
mentality to a ‘we’ mentality. From this perspective, it may be seen that stronger social 
trust can generate more benefits in communities. For instance, when a high level of social 
trust is present, people may benefit from more emotional support, lower crime rates, 
higher household incomes and intensive community development. However, at the same 
time, stronger social trust may cause negative consequences, such as exclusion of 
outsiders and restriction on individual freedoms (Kosonen, 2004). That is, social trust has 
the two-sided nature of expanding but also strengthening internal social interactions, 
which can reduce the flexibility of social interactions.  
 
Such two-sided feature of social trust is well-captured with what Putnam terms as bonding 
social capital and bridging social capital. Putnam (2000) describes bonding social capital 





characterised by high levels of similarity in attitudes, interests, needs, and available 
information or resources. Thus, it is often found in a group of individuals with exclusive 
and homogeneous characteristics such as familial relationships or friendship, who are 
more inward-looking but less welcoming to new members. In contrast, bridging social 
capital refers to a horizontal social capital based on relationships between individuals 
from communities with different social backgrounds such as class, race, ethnicity, gender 
or education (Putnam, 2000). It is more open-ended, outward-looking, and accordingly 
welcoming to new members. Thus, bridging social capital mediates between otherwise 
unrelated groups rather than reinforcing a narrow grouping (Field, 2003). Despite their 
clear distinction in theory, bonding and bridging capital are often mixed rather than 
separated in practice. As Putnam (2000) notes, many groups simultaneously bond along 
some social dimensions and bridge across others. That is, bonding and bridging social 
capital are not either/or categories where social networks are neatly divided, but more/less 
dimensions with which we can compare different forms of social capital.  
 
On the other hand, Michael Woolcock (2001) develops a third type of social capital by 
adding vertical links between groups with different social power: linking social capital. 
Linking social capital refers to a vertical social capital based on ‘trusting relationships 
between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalised power or 
authority gradients in society’ (Woolcock and Szreter, 2004, p.655). That is, linking 
social capital exists across explicit vertical power differentials, while the former two types 
exist within horizontal networks of people. The inclusion of the third type forms a 
bonding/ bridging/ linking taxonomy. In this triadic taxonomy, linking social capital can 
be seen as an extension of bridging social capital, generating vertical ties with public 
bodies, albeit in the existing hierarchy. Unlike the former two types, hence, linking social 
capital enables people to ‘leverage resources, ideas and information from formal 
institutions’ (Woolcock, 2001, p.13) such as in the form of government or legal systems. 
 
It is worth noting that Neo-Confucian ethics and cultural orientations used to affect the 
formation of social capital in East Asian societies, prioritising collectivism over larger 
society (Li, 2007; Sato, 2010). At the same time, affective emotion was valued over the 
intellectual cognition, while individuals and communities were expected to serve the state 





capital tended to feature strong ties, sentimental logic and closed network structures, 
strengthening bonding rather than bridging social capital. This means that weak social 
ties were neither preferred nor truly effective compared to strong social ties. The 
authoritarian regime in Korea tried to instrumentalise such cultural orientations, which 
rationalised state dominance over the social, economic and intellectual spheres, to 
overcome its lack of political legitimacy and ‘impose and internalise their logic on civil 
society’ (Castells, 1992, p.64). For the state, it was crucial to control the civil society to 
implement its nationalistic economic and political goals, which resulted in brutal 
oppression of civil society between the 1960s and 1980s. The control and oppression, 
however, served to provoke strong resistance and the formation of well-organised social 
movements, which contributed to the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1987. After 
democratisation, the civil society has seen an expansion of its size and diversification, 
which affected the formation of social capital, giving more prominence to bridging and 
lately linking social capital (Koo, 2001; Lee, 2007; Shin, 2018). Yet, in a highly 
competitive and individualised Korean society, where priority is often given to personal 
gains over universal egalitarianism, doubts remain as to whether bridging capital has 
actually been effective (Lew, Choi and Wang, 2011). 
 
The changing relationship between the state and civil society has also affected urban 
development in Korea. Resistance against urban development was rare until the 1980s, 
when the urban poor and anti-eviction movements emerged in response to the demolition 
of deprived neighbourhoods. With the diversification of civil society in the 1990s, social 
movements expanded their focus to a wider range of urban issues, including community 
restoration and expansion of local autonomy (Bae and Kim, 2013). During the 2000s, 
social movements started to collaborate with the state, while the state recognised civil 
society as an important partner and tried to institutionalise citizen participation in 
addressing mounting social and economic problems in Korean cities. Citizen participation, 
however, often remains patchy and tokenistic, as the ties between property owners, 
investors and the state remain strong in the post-political context where decision making 
becomes centralised among technocratic bureaucrats (Yoo and Seo, 2013; Cho and 
Križnik, 2017; Kim and Cho, 2019). In this sense, the recent new urban programmes such 





2001) to expand bridging and linking social capital through collaboration among citizens 
and between citizens and the state. 
However, as noted earlier, this opportunity structure is formed by the intervention of 
intermediaries working between the state and citizens. Such intermediary-led opportunity 
structure is well captured in what Burt (2000) terms ‘structural holes’. A structural hole 
exists in social networks which lack a direct contact or tie between two or more groups 
of people. But the structural hole does not mean that people in different groups are 
unaware of one another. It only means that ‘people are focused on their own activities 
such that they do not attend to the activities of people in the other group. Holes are buffers, 
like an insulator in an electric circuit. people on either side of a structural hole circulate 
in different flows of information’ (Burt, 2000, p.353). Therefore, structural holes are an 
opportunity to broker the flow of information between people from different groups.  
 
People on either side of a structural hole can gain access to different flows of information 
through an intermediary actor called a ‘structural hole spanner’ (Lou and Tang, 2013; He 
et al., 2016). A structural hole spanner has direct access to non-redundant information 
and flexible control over information flow among otherwise disconnected groups of 
people. Hence, by filling a structural hole, the structural hole spanner serves to gatekeep 
or transfer new resources from one group to another. In this conceptual approach, the 
structural hole is an opportunity structure for cross-boundary interactions, while the 
structural hole spanner is a broker that makes use of the opportunity structure. To put that 
into perspective, the structural hole (spanner) and social capital can be conceptually 
combined and serve to draw a comprehensive social network structure. The diagram 
below illustrates a conceptual framework of social network structure by articulating social 







In the above diagram, there are six distinctive groups of people (A1-C1) spanning three 
different types of social capital (bonding/ bridging/ linking). First, there are two groups 
in the area of bonding social capital: A1 and A2. These groups have dense networks with 
strong ties among socially homogeneous people; that is, network closure with redundant 
information benefits. On the other hand, there are three groups titled B1, B2, and B3 in 
the area of bridging social capital. These three groups have looser networks that are 
interconnected through weak ties. Such connections are outward-looking and welcoming 
to new nodes, and thereby expanding their boundaries. Meanwhile, a structural hole 
spanner (blue node) creates a cross tie (blue-solid line) to connect between A2 and B2, 
which would otherwise be disconnected. A structural hole is found in this point where A2 
tries to cross the boundary (black-dotted line) from the bonding to the bridging social 
capital area, and thereby articulate with B groups. Another structural hole can be found 
between B1 and C1 where linking social capital emerges. Structural hole spanners draw 
cross ties from B1 towards C1. In this process, B groups are allowed to leverage resources, 
Figure 8. A social network structure with concepts of social capital and structural hole (spanner).    





ideas, and information from C1. Accordingly, the nodes in B groups at the horizontal 
level can be associated vertically with those in C1. This is seen as a process of formation 
of linking social capital. Such conceptual approach is useful to trace and analyse 
intermediary-led (structural hole spanner) development of horizontal or vertical social 
relationships among participants in the new urban programmes such as the URP in Korea. 
 
For example, one possible scenario is that an urban regeneration support centre in the 
URP exists in a structural hole between C1 (SMG) and B1 (citizens). In this conceptual 
context, the urban regeneration support centre belongs to neither C1 nor B1 but serves as 
a third party to promote cross-boundary interactions between them, leading to the 
formation of linking social capital. Then, the urban regeneration support centre can 
expand its role in fostering bridging social capital in group B, which has been overlooked 
in the highly competitive and individualised Korean society. In addition, it may also 
perform a role of adjusting the level of bonding social capital in group A, which can ease 
network closure in it, by encouraging social interactions between groups A and B. To 
rephrase, the urban regeneration support centre can be seen as a structural hole spanner, 
serving to promote social values based on trust, reciprocity, co-dependency, and 
cooperation among heterogeneous groups beyond homogeneous ones. Such particular 
social network structure is useful for a more systematic understanding of network 
mechanisms of community participation that evolve through the intervention of new 
intermediaries. In this thesis, the notions of social capital and structural holes are 
combined to create a conceptual framework of social network structure and, through it, 




This chapter has explored three key concepts of communities, governance, and networks 
that emerge in intermediary-led participation in the recent urban regeneration in Korea. 
In the first section, the community literature was reviewed to identify the nature of 
communities in intermediary-led participation. Drawing on the perspective of the city as 
an arena of social mobilisation (Jacobs, 1961; Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 2003; Purcell, 
2003), the concept of ‘community of practice’ (Wenger, 1998) was explored as a local 





own ‘communicative rationality’ and generating ‘communicative action’ (Habermas, 
1984). This was followed by a review of the interrelated concepts of ‘right to the city’ 
(Lefebvre, 1968) and ‘urban citizenship’ (Purcell, 2003) underpinning the development 
of CoP. Putting the review into the changing context of urbanisation in Korea, the concept 
of ‘right to city-making’ was further explored to identify community right to participation 
in urban regeneration in the post-developmental context. Such conceptual exploration 
serves as a backdrop for a more nuanced understanding of the nature of communities and 
their participatory rights, which is foundational for data analysis and interpretation in the 
following chapters. 
 
The second section conceptualised governance to frame power dynamics in intermediary-
led participation. Drawing on the positive-sum power perspective (Clegg, 1989), the first 
half of this section conceptualised multi-level forms of governance by reviewing ‘meta-
governance’ (Jessop, 2004) where power dynamics are devolved while decision-making 
is decentralised. Situating this in Korea’s post-political context, it further explored the 
dark side of meta-governance where the hierarchical power structure remains unchanged 
while decision-making becomes centralised among technocratic apparatuses of 
government. In the second half of this section, the transformative aspect of governance 
was conceptualised by reviewing the concepts of multistage participation ladders 
(Arnstein, 1969) and nonlinear involvement transformation (Dorcey, Doney and 
Rueggeberg, 1994) in the context of the development of CoP in urban regeneration in 
Korea. Such multi-level, multi-stage, and non-linear approach to governance provides a 
basic framework for analysing governance arrangements and transformation in the 
empirical chapter.  
 
In the last section, the focus was shifted to the conceptualisation of networks to frame 
social interactions in intermediary-led participation. In the first half of the section, new 
intermediaries emerging in urban regeneration were conceptualised in the statist-
corporatist regime (Lee and Haque, 2008). Based on the conceptual perception, the 
second half reviewed the concepts of social capital (Putnam, 2000; Lin, 2001; Woolcock, 
2001), structural holes (Burt, 2000), and structural hole spanners (Lou and Tang, 2013; 
He et al., 2016). This conceptual review was explored in the contemporary context of the 





combined to create a comprehensive social network structure in Korea’s recent urban 
regeneration framework. Such conceptual exploration provides a conceptual basis for 
interpreting a variety of social interactions and their network mechanisms in the 
discussion chapter. With this in mind, the next chapter presents the methodological 
framework of this thesis to explain how data was collected, analysed, and interpreted in 









                                   Chapter 4. Developing the Methodological Framework 




This chapter provides details on the methodological framework of this research. It 
consists of two sections: research design and research implementation. The research 
design section begins by describing the philosophical underpinning to this research, 
namely social constructivism (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
This is followed by a demonstration of the methodological approach of this research: a 
qualitative and multiple case study approach (Creswell, 1994; Yin, 2003). Then, the 
section illustrates specific methods for case study data collection and analysis. 
 
In the research implementation section, details on the fieldwork process are presented. 
First, the rationale for the three case studies is given by elaborating why and how each of 
the cases were selected and compared. This is followed by an illustration of the data 
collection process, especially the interviewing process, and potential ethical 
considerations in the fieldwork. Then, the section finishes with a description of challenges 
that were encountered in the fieldwork, and the resulting changes that were made to the 
research design. 
 
4.2. Research Design 
4.2.1. Social Constructivist Approach 
This research was concerned with the merits and limits of intermediary-led participation 
and therefore required a methodological approach which could explain intermediary-led 
participation with reference to its impact on community development in the recent urban 
regeneration in Korea. There has been extensive literature on the functional aspects of 
intermediary-led participation. Yet, there has been a lack of focus on its social aspects in 
terms of experiences, interactions and memories underlying intermediary-led 
participation in reality. To elucidate such social aspects, this research has drawn on social 
constructivist epistemology, which views knowledge and truth as created by the 
interactions of individuals within a society (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Schwandt, 2003; 





being socially constructed rather than being discovered, while individuals make meanings 
through the interactions with each other and with the environment in which they live 
(Amineh and Asl, 2015). Accordingly, greater prominence was given to ‘subjective 
reality’ derived from experiences, interactions, and memories in everyday life, rather than 
‘objective reality’ in the physical world (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; O’Connell, 2000). 
Such subjective reality was especially useful for this research, as it could help to fully and 
freely describe social aspects of intermediary-led participation beyond its functional 
aspects. In this sense, this research took social constructivism as its philosophical basis 
for identifying what ‘actually’ happens in the intermediary-led participation and 
explaining how it ‘actually’ contributes to the recent urban regeneration in Korea. 
 
4.2.2. Qualitative Case Study Methodology 
In this research, a qualitative methodology was adopted to capture the subjective reality 
created during intermediary-led participation. According to Patton (1990, p.1), qualitative 
methodology aims to ‘understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular 
context and their interactions there’. This means that it attempts to ‘understand the nature 
of that setting – what it means for participants to be in that setting, what their lives are 
like, what’s going on for them, what their meanings are, what the world looks like in that 
particular setting’ (ibid.). As pointed out by Creswell (1994), qualitative methodology 
thus makes use of an inductive process of collecting empirical data and interpreting 
hidden meanings from those data. For this research, qualitative methodology was more 
appropriate than quantitative methodology, as the research sought to collect and analyse 
experiences, interactions, and memories of participants in intermediary-led participation. 
To put that into perspective, this research applied qualitative methodology to interpret 
knowledge and truth socially constructed in the urban regeneration process in Korea. 
 
This qualitative methodology was combined with a case study approach by placing the 
research in real-life settings. Case studies differ from other research approaches such as 
experiments in that the latter deliberately divorce a phenomenon from its context by 
controlling the context in laboratory settings. As Yin (2003, p.13) argues, a case study is 
‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in-depth 
and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 





to generate an in-depth and multi-faceted understanding of complex issues in their real-
life settings. That is, it allows consideration of context-specific causal links in real world 
interventions that may be too complex for survey or experimental approaches (Platt, 1992; 
Yin, 2003). Hence, case study is preferred when research questions take the form of ‘how’ 
or ‘why’. In this sense, for this research, a case study approach was adopted to see ‘how’ 
intermediary-led participation (phenomenon) actually contributes to Korea’s recent 
community-based urban regeneration (context). 
 
However, it is worth noting that there are different types of intermediary-led participation 
cases depending on different sources of funding, such as central government funding, 
regional government funding and self-funding. This leads to the assumption that the 
different sources of funding would serve to guide intermediary-led participation in 
different or unique ways. This requires more than a single case for an in-depth and multi-
faceted understanding of intermediary-led participation: that is, a multiple case study. As 
Baxter and Jack stress (2008), the evidence created from a multiple case study is strong 
and reliable. This is because such evidence serves as the basis to clarify whether findings 
from each of the cases are valuable or not. That is, a multiple case study could produce a 
more convincing analysis, while the findings are more intensely grounded in several 
sources of empirical evidence. Such a multiple case study approach was especially useful 
for this research, since it could help to analyse data both within each situation and across 
situations and generate cross-case discussions. In other words, it could allow wider 
exploration of intermediary-led participation by identifying contrasts and similarities 
between the different cases. In this regard, a qualitative and multiple case study served as 
the methodological foundation for this research, which sought to capture subjective 
reality in a real-world context. 
 
4.2.3. Data Collection Methods 
Documentary Collection 
In this research, the initial data collection method was the use of documentary sources. 
The aim of the documentary collection was to identify what data has already been 
collected, and to review general issues on the emerging intermediary-led participation in 
the Korean context. Particular attention was paid to the collection of written sources of 





framework. It was worth carrying out such documentary data collection before other 
forms of data collection, such as interviews, because this helped to minimise replication 
of data collection efforts and reduce the unnecessary burden on the researcher (me) and 
research participants, such as interviewees.  
 
Collected documents varied from government publications to the community’s written 
sources. They included cross-sectoral documents such as codes of laws, national planning 
guidance, institutional reports (public sector), annual community reports, monthly 
community newspapers (community sector), and journal articles and reference books 
(academic sector). The table below provides a summary of all the collected documents 
classified by their nature: primary or secondary sources. 
 
Table 2. Summary of written sources collected for this research 
Primary sources: 
raw data compiled by the author 
(me) 
Secondary sources: 
data that describe, interpret, or analyse 
information from primary sources 
• National statistics 
• National or regional planning guidance 
• Codes of laws 
 
• Institutional documents (e.g. reports from the 
national assembly, urban regeneration support 
centres, research centres, civil society 
organisations) 
• Community’s documents (e.g. community 
reports, community meeting minutes, community 
plans, community newsletters, photographs) 
• Magazine interview articles (e.g. experts, 
residents) 
• Conference proceedings (e.g. academic society, 
local councils) 
• Scholarly articles 
• Reference books 
• Encyclopaedias/dictionaries 
  
As shown above, most of the collected written sources were secondary, although some 
were primary. This is because documentary collection here was designed to 
comprehensively explore recent relevant practical and academic discourse before 





was utilised with caution, because it was collected by others, possibly without quality 
control, and the purpose of the data might be different from this research. Hence, this 
study tried to access diverse sources as much as possible to cross-check the previously 
generated findings and thereby enhance their relevance, reliability, robustness, and 
representativeness (Tyrrell, 2016). As the key source of evidence, institutional documents 
on URP centres and local communities were collected. Official government reports on 
URP, particularly regarding official guidance, regulation, support, and evaluation on URP 
centres, were relatively easy to access because most of them are open to the public in 
principle. As for informal documents, some key policy drafts, working papers and 
statistics were obtained through the public officials who participated in interviews. 
However, interestingly, those from the public sector were very sensitive to sharing 
community-related documents such budget plans and expenditures for community 
activities. While visiting UR centres for interviews, I could gain access to networks of 
community organisers working for diverse URP areas. Through the networks, I was 
fortunate to obtain formal and informal documents of local communities participating in 
the URP, such as project plans, budgets, written reports of events, meeting minutes, 
community newsletters and photographs. Even though most of the data could not be 
discussed in this thesis due to confidentiality, the perusal of the internal data afforded 
valuable insights and enhanced my understanding of intermediary-led participation in the 
regeneration process. 
 
Each document was reviewed as a repository of not only simple facts or details but also 
‘social facts’ (Durkheim and Lukes, 1982) such as collective norms, values or beliefs that 
exist external to the individual and affect individual behaviours. This is because the 
documentary collection mainly aimed to gather evidence for a further inquiry into social 
aspects of intermediary-led participation. For example, when reading government 
publications such as institutional reports, particular attention was paid to identifying why 
and how they were produced by looking through recent academic articles which review 
the relevant policy framework. When reading the community’s written sources, such as 
community reports or newsletters, much prominence was given to construing what was 
the most significant issue and why, rather than simply checking what had happened out 
there. Such documentary collection helped to construct the basis for access to subjective 





this research was not just a data collection method, but also a meaning-making process 
where hidden meanings behind literary texts were foregrounded by critically reviewing 
cross-sectoral written sources. Accordingly, the documentary collection here extended its 
scope beyond gathering objective facts or details, and concentrated on creating an 
underlying basis for capturing subjective reality. 
 
In-depth Interviewing 
Another data collection method was in-depth interviewing. This method was used to 
conduct ‘intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore 
their perspectives’ (Boyce and Neale, 2006, p.3) on intermediary-led participation in the 
URP. For this research, a series of in-depth interviews were conducted with key 
informants involved in case studies in order to gain much more detailed information than 
what was obtained from the documentary data collection. In particular, the in-depth 
interviews were made in ‘semi-structured’ or ‘unstructured’ format with an open-ended 
list of questions (Galletta, 2013). These two forms of interviews differ from the in-depth 
interviews in ‘structured’ format where the same predetermined questions are asked to all 
candidates in the same order. In the semi-structured format, interviews are guided by a 
loose protocol with certain themes, while the interviewer improvises specific questions 
and elicits extended answers. Hence, it allows an open-ended discussion between 
interviewer and interviewee. 
For this research, this semi-structured interview technique was mainly used when 
interviewing those from the (semi-)public sector, such as municipal officials, or those 
from the intermediary sector, such as community workers. Protocol covered general 
themes related to intermediary-led participation, such as community development (e.g. 
mutual rapport, collective learning, local knowledge) and community empowerment (e.g. 
property acquisition procedure, communal space management, public service provision). 
Yet, specific questions were improvised in each interview and updated with newly 
obtained data through a series of interviews. The new data includes non-public 
information such as unexpected government budget cuts, preparation of new local 
ordinance, and restructuring plans for local partnerships. 
 
Along with the semi-structured interviews, a more flexible interview technique was also 





and interviewee is re-balanced by encouraging the interviewee to take a lead in the free-
flowing conversation. Questions arise spontaneously during the conversation. This means 
that a more personalised approach is available to collect more sensitive or informal verbal 
data. In this research, the unstructured interview technique was desirable particularly 
when interviewing those from the community sector, such as local residents. This is 
because the unstructured format helped the interviewees to have greater voice by avoiding 
complicated or nervous moods. That is, the interviewees could be empowered during the 
interviews. Such an empowered interview environment was significant, as it motivated 
them to give more authentic answers, leading to some meaningful findings. Accordingly, 
it was possible to reduce the effect of the interviewer (me) on respondents’ answers – the 
so-called ‘interviewer effect’ (Brewer, 2001) – by promoting them to freely express their 
opinions or thoughts. 
 
Both the semi-structured and unstructured interviews were carried out in interviewees’ 
place of work, such as a local office, or in a public space, such as a community room or 
a local café of their choice. The specific site of each interview was carefully chosen to 
make each interviewee feel more comfortable and redress the power imbalance that 
traditionally befell the interviewee. All the interviews took between 30 and 120 minutes, 
either in single or multiple sittings. Each interview was recorded with informed consent 
from each interviewee, after their right to withdraw data was thoroughly explained prior 
to each interview session. Both audio and video recordings were used, although the video 
recordings were made less frequently.  
 
The video recording technique was optionally and carefully used with full consent from 
interviewees. For example, a short video-reflexive session was held prior to an interview. 
In the video session, video footage such as breaking news or other interviews was shown 
to inspire the potential interviewee to reflect on certain themes. Then, they were given a 
chance to decide whether or not to grant permission for video recording while having 
time to reflect on the implication of their decisions. If granted, the video interview began 
with full consent confirming that the interview could be used as visual materials for other 
potential interviewees or those interested in this research. Interestingly, such video 
interview technique was not only used to collect data but also to disseminate research 





attention from the public as well as academics in workshops or conferences. Namely, the 
video interview technique was not only used as a data collection tool. More importantly, 
it was also utilised to share research findings and results to a variety of audiences in a 
more engaging way. 
 
In this research, all interviewees can be categorised into three main groups: the public 
sector, the intermediary sector, and the community sector. The public sector refers to 
those who enact and enforce the URP or similar urban programmes. It includes the central 
government, Seoul metropolitan government, and local councils. The intermediary sector 
comprises those that support the public sector in implementing the URP or similar 
programmes. Examples are the Seoul urban regeneration support centre, local urban 
regeneration support centres, and relevant third sector organisations. Finally, the 
community sector indicates local actors who participate in the URP or similar 
programmes. This involves not only individual local residents but also members of 
community-based initiatives such as social enterprises or social businesses. 
 
4.2.4. Data Analysis Methods 
Data analysis methods vary depending on the nature of research and types of research 
data collected (Patton, 1990). As noted earlier, this research took a ‘qualitative case study 
approach’ to collect ‘subjective reality’ in order to study ‘social aspects’ of intermediary-
led participation in urban regeneration in Korea. Hence, for this research, a qualitative 
data analysis method was formulated. It consists of five distinctive steps: 1) data 
transcription, 2) data classification, 3) data coding, 4) data thematization, and 5) data 
interpretation. Following such data analysis, data interpretation was carried out by using 
the method of critical interpretive synthesis. The diagram below represents the qualitative 







In this research, data analysis started with data transcription, where all the collected data 
were put into written form. First, both audio- and video-recordings were transcribed so 
that they could be studied in detail. Such data transcription was usually completed within 
a month after each interview. In the event that any recordings were not possible, 
handwritten field notes were taken in as much detail as possible. Examples are interviews 
with no consent for recording, or unexpected or improvised talks with no time for 
recording. Such handwritten field notes were then transcribed into more complete textual 
forms by using Microsoft Word. This transcription was normally done on the same day 
as the field notes being taken to ensure that any important details were not lost. 
 
Data Classification. 
The second step was to classify all the collected data. The main aim of this classification 
was to make it easier to retrieve the data during the research process. Some key hard 
copies of documents were organised in ring binders, while electronic copies of documents 
were stored in subfolders according to a certain classification plan. To be specific, all the 
data were classified by assigning identification codes. Each identification code comprised 
four pieces of information: 1) type of case study, 2) source of data, 3) type of data, and 4) 





sequence of data acquisition. The box below shows how the collected dataset was 
categorised and managed. 
Table 3. Classification plan for collected data 
The following four-tier assignment system was used to identify collect data: 
 
Type of Case Study: 
C1 for case study 1 
C2 for case study 2 
C3 for case study 3 
C4 for all the case studies 
 
Source of Data: 
PS for public sector 
IS for intermediary sector 
CS for community sector 
OT for other sources 
 
Type of Data: 
INT for recorded interviews or talks 
INN for not recorded but noted interviews or talks 
GOV for government documents or reports  
ACD for academic papers 
NEW for newspaper articles 
BLG for online blog or magazine articles 
STA for statistics 
DOC for various kinds of documents not applicable to other types above 
 
Sequence: 
01, 02, 03, 04, … 
 
For example, a recorded interview with a respondent from the community sector in case 
study 1 was given a code of ‘C1-CS-INT-01’. An urban regeneration plan document of 
Seoul metropolitan government was identified as ‘C4-PS-GOV-01. Such four-tier 
identification codes were useful, as they offered surface-level information so that the 




The third step was to conduct coding of the collected data. In qualitative research, data 





what they yield and then putting the data back together in a meaningful way (Creswell, 
1994). In other words, it is a process of transforming the collected data to a set of 
meaningful, cohesive categories. In this research, the data coding was implemented 
through two consecutive sub-steps: data examination and code generation. 
 
In the data examination step, I immersed myself in each piece of data in order to decide 
whether it required a code or not. While reading carefully the transcribed interviews, field 
notes, and other documents, all the collected data could be examined at least once. Due 
to the immensity of the data, it was essential to make it as manageable as possible through 
immersion in the data before beginning coding. Hence, in this sub-step, massive data were 
filtered, reduced and then annotated with ideas for coding.  
 
In the next sub-step of code generation, the examined data were coded to aid the analysis. 
A code in qualitative research refers to the smallest unit of text describing the meaning 
and context of the data (Creswell, 1994). This code can be a short word, phrase or 
sentence that represents and captures each piece of data’s important points. In this 
research, the code generation began with identifying each piece of data’s primary content 
and essence and marking them with appropriate labels: that is, low-tier codes. Then, the 
labels were grouped under high-tier codes. Such two-tier codes were used to effectively 
condense and summarise the data rather than simply reducing them. The box below shows 
the details of two-tier codes that were generated while this research was conducted. 
Table 4. List of two-tier codes generated in this research 
CP: Community participation-related topics (Higher Code 1) 
CP1. Government policies and actions on intermediaries 
CP2. Intermediaries’ finance and governance framework 
CP3. Relationships between government, intermediaries, and communities  
         in early stage of URP 
CP4. Community activities and events in early stage of URP 
CP5. Change in mutual trust, rapport and confidence among communities 
 
CD: Community development-related topics (Higher Code 2) 
CD1. Change in intermediaries’ finance and governance framework 
CD2. Relationships between government, intermediaries, and communities  
          during URP. 
CD3. Advanced community practices during URP 





CD5. Formation and development of community initiatives 
CD6. Intervention of expert groups 
 
CE: Community empowerment-related topics (Higher Code 3) 
CE1. Government policies and actions on community initiatives 
CE2. Relationships between government and community initiatives after URP 
CE3. Community initiatives’ finance and governance framework 
CE4. Legal rights of community initiatives 
CE5. Communal space management and communal service provision 
 
RT: Other relevant topics (Higher Code 4) 
RT1. History of a wider range of intermediaries in Korea 
RT2. Government policies and actions on diverse intermediaries 
RT3. Relationships between communities and diverse intermediaries within  
         or outside of institution 
RT4. Wider view on impact of diverse intermediaries on urban regeneration  
         in Korea 
RT5. Wider view on right to the city in Korea’s context 
 
Based on the above new codes, all the collected data were reshuffled to form the basis for 
thematic analysis in the next step. In other words, the new codes served to add a structure 
to unstructured data so that the data could be categorised in analytically relevant ways 
before thematic development. In this research, the computer software NVivo was used to 
facilitate this process. 
 
Data Thematisation. 
Once the data had been coded, I generated a set of themes through cross-sectional 
exploration of the identified codes. A theme refers to an ‘abstract entity that brings 
meaning and identity to a recurrent experience and its variant manifestation’ (DeSantis 
and Ugarriza, 2000, p.362). That is, it is a conception that ‘captures and unifies the nature 
or basis of the experience into a meaningful whole’ (ibid.). Hence, generating themes is 
a process of putting together pieces of experience or ideas, which otherwise would be 
meaningless when viewed alone. In this research, a dozen themes were initially generated 
by sorting, collating, and linking related codes. For example, by linking the codes of CD1 
(change in intermediaries’ finance and governance framework) and CD5 (formation and 
development of community initiatives), a theme of ‘insufficient change in tight time-





in order to form the basis for further data interpretation. The box below presents both the 
higher- and lower-tier themes generated while the related codes were sorted and linked. 
Table 5. A summary of higher- and lower-tier themes this research 
High-tier themes Low-tier themes 
‘Hierarchical’ structure of 
intermediary intervention 
• Direct connection between government and 
intermediaries 
• Insufficient change in tight time-frame 
‘Top-down’ community 
development 
• Centralised and competitive funding structure 
• Restricted legal rights of communities 
‘Multi-layered’ intermediary 
intervention 
• Experts vs. non-experts in intermediaries 
• Specialisation vs. isolation of intermediaries 
‘Conditional’ community 
empowerment 
• Lack of community diversity and representation 
• Limited access to decision-making process 
‘Radical’ forms of     
intermediary intervention 
• Community as a public service provider 
• Government side vs. non-government side 
‘Bottom-up’ community 
development 
• Formation of communal autonomy 
• Vulnerability to market forces 
 
One thing to note here is that such themes were ‘iteratively’ developed with newly 
collected data in the research process. This means that even after the planned fieldwork, 
new data were collected from public media or through my personal connections, and then 
added to the list of codes. These new additions served to produce different combinations 
that affected the old themes. In other words, while new data were updated, the themes 
were modified or refined while this research was carried out. In this way, the thematic 
frame continued to evolve even during the writing-up. 
 
Data Interpretation. 
Based on the thematic frame, I endeavoured to search for ‘patterns, associations, concepts, 
and explanations’ in the coded data (Lacey and Luff, 2009). That is, additional efforts 
were made to deliberate the coded data under each theme in order to identify patterns, 
associations, concepts and explanations. Taking ‘communal service provision’ as an 
example, I deliberated and compared how different stakeholders considered community-
led service provision during the interviews as well as in their documents, and found 





interpreted what these considerations imply regarding community empowerment in the 
urban regeneration framework in Korea. 
 
Such data interpretation was carried out along with ‘rival explanation’ (Patton, 1990) to 
avoid rushing to one answer. In other words, I attempted to consider other logical 
possibilities and see if those possibilities could be supported by other data. This helped 
to prevent hasty generalisation in the initial findings and led to meaningful interpretations 
of evidence. Thus, I did not discard or hide some data that were counter to mainstream 
arguments of this research. Instead, the counter-cases were addressed with explanations 
of their implications or suggestions. This was done because this research aimed not only 
to show solid descriptive data, but also to present candid research findings through which 
readers can understand the other side and draw their own interpretations (Patton, 1990).  
 
This approach to data interpretation made the triangulation process easier. Triangulation 
means ‘gathering and analysing data from more than one source to gain a fuller 
perspective on the situation you are investigating’ (Lacey and Luff, 2009, p.27). In this 
research, I triangulated different data to get a more accurate view on intermediary-led 
participation in the recent urban regeneration in Korea. However, the ultimate aim of the 
triangulation was not to search for ‘one reality’ from multiple data sources. As noted by 
Hoggart et al. (2002), qualitative research inherently should sacrifice coherence of 
evidence in order to understand the real settings. By this logic, rather than displaying a 
trimmed view, this research was willing to present contradictory facts underpinning 
‘subjective reality’ created across different types of intermediary-led participation. 
Ultimately, such data triangulation served to increase the validity and reliability of this 
research by incorporating a variety of critical voices during data interpretation. 
 
4.3. Research Implementation 
This section presents the details of the fieldwork procedure in this research. First, the 
rationale for the choice of three case studies is demonstrated by explaining how each of 
the cases were selected and compared in detail. Following the description of how 
interviewees were recruited and what questions were asked in each interview, the process 





Then, the section finishes with an illustration of challenges that were encountered in the 
fieldwork, and the resulting changes that were made to the research design. 
 
4.3.1. Case Study Selection 
For this research, a multiple case study approach was taken, as there were various kinds 
of intermediary-led participation cases even in the urban regeneration framework. 
Particular attention was paid to main sources of funding for each case in this selection 
process. This is because of the assumption that the nature of funding sources is one of the 
significant factors affecting the development of intermediary-led participation. 
Considering this point, three case studies were carefully selected based on three 
distinctive sources of funding for intermediaries: 1) a national government-funded case, 
2) an SMG-funded case, and 3) a self-funded case. Such case study selection was 
particularly useful for a fuller understanding of intermediary-led participation phenomena 
with different financial and institutional resources. 
 
The first and second cases were selected from publicly-funded programmes: the national 
URP and the Seoul mayoral URP respectively. As noted in Chapter 2, the mayoral URP 
was devised to promote urban regeneration in Seoul by optimising the structure of the 
national URP. Hence, there exist some differences between the mayoral and the national 
URP. For example, the mayoral URP is a six-year programme for areas smaller than 
400,000 square metres, while the national URP is a four-year programme for the areas 
bigger than 400,000 square metres. Besides, the mayoral URP involves more complex 
stakeholders in its partnership, since it is required to engage more administrators and 
experts during the longer programme period. Given this, two cases were chosen to 
identify and evaluate different variations of intermediary-led participation within the 
recent institutional framework of urban regeneration. On the other hand, the third case 
was selected outside of the institutional framework. This means that the third case 
fundamentally differs from the former two cases in the sense that it operates with little or 
no governmental support. Instead, it is a self-funded intermediary-led participation case, 
which is supported by non-governmental actors such as civil society organisations. Thus, 
compared to the former two, it has higher levels of financial independence and 
organisational autonomy, albeit outside the institutional framework of urban regeneration. 





which aimed to provide rich sources of evidence to gain a fuller perspective on 
intermediary-led participation across institutional boundaries in Korea’s post-
developmental context. 
 
In short, three cases were intentionally selected with the assumption that the nature of 
funding sources would affect the development of intermediary-led participation. Two 
cases were chosen from a national government-funded programme and an SMG-funded 
programme respectively. These two were collated and compared to examine different 
variations of intermediary-led participation that exist within the institutional framework. 
The third case was picked from self-funded intermediary-led participation that occurs 
outside of the institutional framework. This third case was used to hint at other logical 
possibilities and inspire a further understanding of intermediary-led participation in the 
wider context of urban regeneration. The map below presents the geographical locations 
of each case on a map of Seoul with brief descriptions of their distinctive features. 
 
In the above map, the blue dot represents the first case study. This is one of the first groups 
of national URPs implemented between 2014 and 2018 in the area of Changsin+Sungin-
dong. After the end of the URP, the area is now in its post-project period with a small 
subsidy from SMG. The orange dot refers to the second case study, which is the mayoral 
URP. In fact, the mayoral URP has a short history and, accordingly, there is still no 
completed case of a mayoral URP. Given this, the second case study was carried out in 





two mayoral URP areas, Chang3-dong and Sadang4-dong, to ensure sufficient data 
collection. The green dot indicates the third case study, which is an urban regeneration 
practice in Dongja-dong. This third case began in 2010 with support from non-
governmental organisations. Since 2015, it has been self-funded by creating a local trust 
fund and raising charitable donations by itself. Accordingly, the third case is run with 
little or no governmental support, while the first and second cases operate with 
government funds. 
 
4.3.2. Case Study Implementation 
To access potential candidates for in-depth interviews, a snowball sampling technique 
was mainly used. Snowball sampling refers to a non-probability sampling strategy 
through which the first group of participants help to recruit the next cohort of participants 
among their acquaintances (Gray, 2004). Hence, this technique is preferred when a 
researcher has no accurate list of potential interviewees or no official access to them. The 
snowball sampling was especially useful for this research, since many potential 
interviewees were reluctant to participate in official interviews, particularly in the 
publicly-funded cases. For example, some community workers were reluctant or declined 
to participate in official interviews, although the purpose of this research was fully 
explained to them. This is probably because they were commissioned by government and 
sensitive to official interviews about publicly-funded cases with a non-governmental actor, 
such as myself. To get alternative access, therefore, this research actively used snowball 
sampling. To be concrete, I participated as an auditor (a listener) in the two-month training 
sessions for community organisers designed by SMG. This helped me to build rapport 
with the trainees who were working as community workers in URP areas across Seoul. 
Then, I used this new personal network to gain access to actual community workers and 
local residents in my case study areas.  
 
Besides, the new network enabled easier access to a wider range of candidates for 
interview. It included those involved in similar urban practices in different areas, such as 
community activists, social entrepreneurs, charity leaders, or local officers. Although they 
were not directly relevant to my case studies, those interviews were nonetheless insightful, 
enabling me to gain a fuller perspective on intermediary-led participation while avoiding 





failing to undertake interviews, even on condition of anonymity, with elite intermediary 
actors, such as regeneration centres’ directors and professional firms’ leaders (see 
Subsection 4.3.4 below for details). This caused the limited analysis and interpretation of 
the elite intermediary actors’ perspectives in the process of intermediary-led participation. 
Despite such limitation, a series of interviews with a variety of community workers and 
local residents enabled me to improve the understanding of the silent intermediary actors, 
albeit indirectly. 
 
Eventually, through the snowball sampling process, 43 interviews in total were carried 
out. In the case study areas, 12 interviews were conducted with actors from the 
intermediary sector, and 14 interviews with actors from the community sector. Three 
interviews were also held with those from the public sector, including national 
government and SMG. Outside the case studies, 14 cross-sectoral interviews were 
conducted with those involved in other similar urban practices. All the interviews were 
organised by assigning identification codes to ensure privacy and anonymity of 
interviewees (see Appendix 1, 2, 3 and 4 for a detailed list of interviewees). The table 
below presents the distribution of the interviewees by their affiliation and site. 
 
Table 6. Distribution of interviewees by site and affiliation. 
Site 
Classification 







Case 1 1 3 5 n/a 9 
Case 2 2 6 6 n/a 14 
Case 3 n/a 3 3 n/a 6 
Outside 
Cases 2 7 2 3 14 
Total 5 19 16 3 43 
 
Interview protocols were made based on three common themes: community participation, 
community development and community empowerment. However, detailed interview 
questions differed depending on each interviewee. Taking the ‘community participation’ 
theme as an example, intermediary actors were asked about how to invite local residents 





about their aspirations or reasons to participate, while public actors were asked about how 
to fund, monitor, and assess participatory practices. As such, each interview protocol was 
carefully created while taking into account the different roles, positions, and conditions 
of each candidate for interview. A one-month pilot fieldwork study was conducted to test 
and revise the case study implementation strategy in April of 2018. Then, the main 
fieldwork was conducted over four months to complete the case study implementation 
from October of 2018 to January of 2019. 
     
4.3.3. Ethical Considerations 
As part of research for the University of Westminster, this study fully complied with the 
University of Westminster Code of Practice Governing the Ethical Conduct of Research. 
Given the qualitative nature of this research, particular attention was paid to ethical 
considerations around informed consent, confidentiality and privacy. 
 
In this research, the main data collection method was in-depth interviews with key actors 
in intermediary-led participation. Prior to interviews, potential candidates were given a 
research information sheet setting out the interview purposes as well as the research 
objectives. Then, informed consent was thoroughly explained to them. Informed consent 
covered the anonymity of interviewees and confidentiality of data they provide. On the 
informed consent form, interviewees were asked to select an option regarding their 
anonymity. If they chose the negative option, their real full names were not shown: instead, 
their initials or pseudonyms were used.  
 
With regard to the confidentiality of data, there were two significant ethical 
considerations: withdrawal of data and storage of data obtained. Prior to interviews, all 
interviewees were given a full explanation about the right to withdraw data they provide 
at any time without giving specific reasons. In particular, when interviewing those from 
vulnerable groups, I ensured that they were given the time to speak about the cause of any 
possible distress, and the option to stop and withdraw all or part of interview. Prompting 
questions were also asked about any distress issues halfway through interviews.  
 
With regard to the acquisition and storage of data, interviewees were asked to choose an 





asked them if they agreed to the conversation being audio- and/or video-recorded. In case 
of disagreement, note-taking alone was used to record conversation contents during 
interviews. In order to address privacy issues, all the recordings were stored on an external 
hard disk which was secured in the locker in M614 at the University of Westminster 
(FABE’s doctoral researcher laboratory). Likewise, all the informed consent forms were 
stored in the same locker, while also being scanned and stored as backups on the same 
external hard disk. 
 
4.3.4. Methodological Challenges 
During the implementation of this research, there were three main methodological 
challenges, namely accessibility to interviewees, representativeness of interviewees, and 
researcher subjectivity.  
 
First, it was difficult to gain direct access to potential candidates for in-depth interviews. 
During pilot fieldwork, even intermediary organisations in the case study areas were 
found to be reluctant to grant official interviews regarding URP. Moreover, it was also 
hard to access the community sector in the case study areas. This is because neither the 
public sector nor the intermediary sector was willing to introduce local residents who 
participate in URP. To address such difficulty, I endeavoured to participate in 
community-relevant events and workshops through which to expand my personal 
network and increase opportunities for indirect access to the potential candidates in the 
case study areas. Despite such improved accessibility, I failed to interview with two main 
groups of actors from the intermediary sector: 1) directors in urban regeneration support 
centres who supervised community workers and 2) leaders in professional firms who 
hired community workers. This was probably because they were sensitive to contractual 
relationships with the public sector, which was the main funder for the URP. The directors, 
who were directly appointed by the government, were local universities’ professors with 
limited experience in fields related to community work. They were reluctant to grant 
official interviews, even on condition of anonymity. Instead, the directors suggested that 
I interview experienced community workers with whom they worked in their urban 
regeneration centres. On the other hand, most of the professional firms involved in URP 
were architectural or engineering companies that specialise in master plans or design 





by the government, the professional firms often had little or no experience in community 
work. For them, the URP was the first substantive project where they actively engaged in 
delivering community participation and community development. The leaders in the 
professional firms were, thus, unwilling to give official interviews. Instead, they 
recommended alternative interviews with practiced community workers whom they 
temporarily hired during the URP. Hence, extra effort was made to better understand the 
elite intermediary actors’ points of view, albeit indirectly, from the interviews with 
community workers and local residents.  
 
Another challenge remained in terms of the representativeness of interviewees, especially 
from the community sector. This challenge was linked to the problem of the ‘usual 
suspects’, referring to particular knowledge types or actors that dominate decision-
making processes and thereby representation of their community (May, 2007; Taylor, 
2007). It is certain that there were some different groups within local communities that 
faced a clash of interests, opinions, and goals in the same case study area. Hence, there 
was a need to balance the distribution of interviewees in the community sector. For this, 
significant efforts were made to select as diverse a range of community actors as possible 
for in-depth interviews, and thereby to mitigate potential ‘usual suspect’ problems. 
 
The last but not the least challenge facing this research was the subjectivity of researcher, 
myself. It was hardly possible for me to stay completely objective during the research, 
because it was natural to bring to data interpretation my personal ideas or experiences. 
That is to say, my subjective perspectives often interfered with the data interpretation 
process. Hence, there was an inherent concern over researcher subjectivity. However, as 
noted earlier in the epistemological discussion, this research aimed to understand 
‘subjective reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) rather than objective reality in order to 
decipher ‘social aspects’ of intermediary-led participation. This means that knowledge 
and truth here were considered as being socially constructed by research participants, 
including the ‘researcher’, myself. In this sense, researcher subjectivity was no longer 
seen as a negative element in the research process. Rather, it was regarded as one of 







This chapter provided the details on the methodological framework of this research: that 
is, the research design and implementation method. It began by presenting the 
philosophical basis of social constructivism. This philosophical foundation guided the 
choice to use a qualitative and multiple case study approach. It also directed the selection 
of the methods used for data collection and analysis. The data collection method included 
documentary collection and in-depth interviews, while the data analysis method consisted 
of five main steps: data transcription, data classification, data coding, data thematisation, 
and data interpretation.  
 
This was followed by a detailed explanation of how to implement the fieldwork. This 
included how to select case studies, how to identify and access interviewees, and how to 
develop interview questions. It also illuminated potential ethical considerations around 
informed consent, confidentiality of collected data, and privacy of data providers. Then, 
it discussed the main methodological challenges facing this research and how they could 
be addressed. The challenges discussed were accessibility to potential interviewees, 
representativeness of interviewees, and researcher subjectivity. 
 
Drawing on the above methodological framework, the following chapters present 






























                                            Chapter 5. Analysing the Governance of Intermediary-led Participation in Urban Regeneration in Seoul  
Analysing the Governance of Intermediary-led Participation 




This chapter presents findings from an analysis of the governance of intermediary-led 
participation in the case study areas. As stated in the methodology chapter, a detailed 
investigation was conducted of three representative case studies: 1) national government-
funded, 2) SMG-funded, and 3) self-funded intermediary-led participation. Each case 
study analysis begins with a brief description of its local context. This is followed by an 
exploration of the transformation of urban regeneration governance, with a focus on the 
changing roles of intermediaries. Then, a thematic analysis of intermediary intervention 
and consequent community participation is provided, with rich local narratives collected 
from each of the case studies. By doing so, this chapter provides the evidential basis for 
further discussion of dynamics of power and networks in intermediary-led participation, 
which is presented in the following chapter. 
 
5.2. National Government-funded Intermediary Intervention: Changsin+Sungin-
dong Case 
5.2.1. Local Context 
The 2008 global financial crisis hit Korea’s domestic property market and caused it to 
cancel or suspend many planned redevelopments in Seoul (Jang et al., 2013). Responding 
to this situation, a new UR Act was introduced in 2013 and new public funds have been 
allocated to the areas designated as URP zones. In this new legal framework, some former 
redevelopment zones have been converted to urban regeneration zones with fresh public 
funds. Changsin+Sungin-dong was one of the first areas in Seoul added onto the list of 





The Changsin+Sungin-dong area (hereafter CSA) is a high density low-rise residential 
area of 1.38 square kilometres with a population of 36,500 (Seoul Open Data, 2018). CSA 
stretches over five small administrative dongs 1 : Changsin1-dong, Changsin2-dong, 
Changsin3-dong, Sungin1-dong, and Sungin2-dong. These five dongs are Seoul’s typical 
inner-city areas next to the Dongdaemun Fashion Market (DFM), which is now known 
as a K-Fashion centre (Korean Culture and Information Service, 2012). 
 
DFM served as a main hub of Korea’s textile industry during rapid export-oriented 
industrialisation of the country from the 1960s and 1980s. While the textile industry 
enjoyed a rapid boom, garment factories combined with retailers’ shops mushroomed in 
DFM and its adjacent residential areas, including CSA. Moreover, many houses were 
rented out as sewing factory spaces or factory workers’ rooms (Kim and Cho, 2019). As 
a consequence, CSA gained fame for its textile manufacturing cluster, where numerous 
sewing factory workers resided and worked during the developmental period.  
 
Entering the 1990s, however, the sewing factories experienced a decline in business, since 
the textile industry moved to other parts of Asia with cheaper labour, such as China and 
Vietnam. This has resulted in social, economic, and physical deprivation in CSA for the 
past three decades (Kim and Cho, 2019). This is evident in the National Indices of 
 
1 Dong is the smallest administrative unit in Seoul. 
Figure 11. Geographical location and neighbourhood images of CSA.                                





Multiple Deprivation (NIMD), which includes three key figures: population growth rate, 
business growth rate, and proportion of old buildings. The table below shows the overall 
deprivation in terms of these three figures in CSA. 
 
Table 7. Figures of population growth rate, business growth rate and old building rate in CSA.  








(built before 1996) 
Changsin1-dong -55.6% 6.6% 90.6% 
Changsin2-dong -59.2% -16.2% 78.6% 
Changsin3-dong -50.5% 4.8% 89.3% 
Sungin1-dong -49.3% -0.6% 83.8% 
Sungin2-dong -42.9% 2.7% 75.1% 
Seoul average 5.1% 11.7% 67.7% 
   Source: National Urban Regeneration Information System (2016) 
The above statistics show that CSA experienced a sharp decrease in its population by 
about 52 percent over the last three decades, while Seoul as a whole had a moderate 
increase by 5.1 percent. CSA also witnessed a decline or only a slight growth in local 
business, although the neighbouring DMF has grown significantly as a K-Fashion centre 
over the last decade. In particular, Changsin2-dong, where many sewing factory workers 
used to reside, has shown a significant drop in the number of local business by 16.2 
percent. Furthermore, CSA has a high proportion of old buildings aged more than 20 
years. As of 2016, about 9 out of 10 buildings in Changsin1-dong were more than 20 
years old. Such figures represent the extent of social, economic, and physical deprivation 
of CSA, which are higher than in other parts of Seoul. 
 
Amid these changes, a neo-developmental New Town Programme (NTP) was introduced 
in CSA in 2007. However, there was little progress in the NTP due to persistent conflicts 
of interest between two groups of residents: anti-NTP versus pro-NTP. Most opponents 
of the programme were middle-class property owners or tenants who were unwilling or 





makes a profit. Meanwhile, many advocates were upper-class property owners who were 
willing to pay the charge, and in return sought to reap some profits. One thing to note 
here is that the charge for the NTP in CSA turned out to be much higher than in other 
NTP areas. This is because CSA was located on the hills with historic relics where 
building regulations restrict the height of new buildings and high-density construction is 
prevented. Hence, the returns were particularly low, whereas the charge for development 
was relatively high. For the opponents, NTP was simply a project that would force them 
to vacate their homes unless the high charge was paid (C1-CS-INT-1-1, 2018). The group 
of middle-class property owners and tenants, accordingly, resisted the NTP for seven 
years, since they could not afford to pay the high charge for returning to new apartments. 
 
After such a long confrontation, the NTP in CSA was withdrawn in 2013. In the following 
year, CSA was listed as a URP zone and given fresh public funds up to 20 billion KRW 
(about £14 million). The URP in CSA was carried out between 2014 and 2018. It is now 
in the post-project period with a small amount of a three-year subsidy from SMG up to 
200 million KRW (about £140,000) (C1-PS-INN-1, 2019).  
 
5.2.2. Governance Relationships 
The URP in CSA underwent three key steps over a period of four years: a planning step 
(1 year), an implementation step (2 years), and a self-sustaining step (1 year). In the 
planning step, residents were invited to a series of community gatherings organised by a 
local urban regeneration support centre (hereafter local UR centre) in CSA, which was 
commissioned by SMG to facilitate the URP process. By participating in the community 
gatherings, the residents were given opportunities to build a rapport and initiative to map 
out a neighbourhood plan. In the next step of implementation, the residents were 
encouraged to engage in an array of spatial practices such as creating communal spaces 
to put the neighbourhood plan into practice. This was followed by the self-sustaining step, 
where residents were encouraged to incubate a local cooperative as a platform through 
which they could continue community-based activities after the end of the URP in CSA. 
During this incubation period, the residents were required to identify the nature of the 
local cooperative. For example, from a conservative standpoint, the local cooperative 
could be identified as an association that promotes the residents to use communal services 





could be regarded as a communal service provider itself. In this last step, accordingly, the 
residents were expected to decide the growth direction of their local cooperative, taking 
their locality into account. 
 
However, it is worth noting that all the steps were constantly guided by the local UR 
centre in CSA. The local UR centre invited the residents to attend gatherings, create the 
neighbourhood plan, participate in the spatial practices, and incubate the local cooperative 
through the three-step process in CSA. Also notable is the fact that the role of the local 
UR centre was changed, while its governance was transformed through this process. This 
means that the local UR centre underwent a change in its organisational structure to 
incorporate more residents into the URP and empower them after the URP. Given this, it 
is useful to take a close look at the governance transformation to gain a better 
understanding of intermediary intervention by the local UR centre in CSA. The diagram 
below summarises how the transformative organisational change in the local UR centre 
has been made through and beyond the step-by-step process. 
 
The local UR centre was established in CSA when the URP was launched in 2014, soon 
after the cancellation of the NTP. It originally had four staff members: one director, two 
community organisers (hereafter COs), and one public officer. In detail, the position of 
the director was filled by an architecture professor from a local university, while the two 
Figure 12. A transformation of intermediary governance arrangements in CSA                          





COs were recruited from an architectural firm. One public officer was sent from SMG to 
assist with the centre’s administrative work, such as monthly accounting and conducting 
surveys on local buildings. One thing to note here is that the entire staff was under a direct 
contract with SMG. That is, they could achieve clear and direct communication with SMG, 
and accordingly, take prompt and effective action to create a new neighbourhood plan. 
 
In the subsequent implementation step (step 2), the local UR centre maintained the same 
contractual system, but its organisational structure was changed by hiring one new 
planner from an engineering firm and two more COs from residents in CSA. What should 
be noted here is that the two new COs were recruited from the local residents, resulting 
in residents-turned-COs. From the residents’ perspective, this was a first window of 
opportunity for direct communication with SMG while working as official members of 
the centre rather than only being invited by the centre (C1-CS-INT-2-1, 2018). From the 
centre’s point of view, it can be seen as a turning point for a change in its organisational 
identity towards a community-based intermediary rather than merely a professional 
assisting body from outside (C1-IS-INT-3, 2019). 
 
Such community-oriented change continued in the following self-sustaining step. During 
this period, the local UR centre was focused on incubating a local cooperative capable of 
taking over its intermediary role. Importantly, the residents-turned-COs played a 
significant role in this incubation process. They simultaneously served as assistants for 
creating the local cooperative while also participating as members of the local cooperative. 
Such change seems to have been the basis of the community-driven transformation of the 
intermediary structure in CSA. After the URP was completed, the local UR centre was 
disbanded and replaced with a local cooperative in 2018. However, it transpired that the 
local cooperative was still not financially autonomous. It was therefore decided that 
further public financial support was needed for the local cooperative to continue hiring 
community workers and maintaining community activities for the next three years until 
2021 (C1-PS-INN-1, 2019). As for 2019, CSA entered a post-project period with an 
additional public subsidy from SMG. That is, intermediary-led participation in CSA is 






Considering the above identified points, the following parts present further analysis of 
characteristics of intermediary intervention and consequent community development by 
using diverse local narratives collected from CSA: that is, ‘hierarchical’ structure of 
intermediary intervention and ‘top-down’ development of community. 
 
5.2.3. Forms of Intervention 
Direct Contract between Government and Intermediaries 
CSA was one of the first URP zones after the NTP was withdrawn. Hence, from the 
institutional perspective, the URP in CSA was a symbolic case to prove and promote the 
achievement of the new UR Act (C4-PS-INN-1). Accordingly, the state, together with 
SMG, endeavoured to carry the URP in CSA to a successful conclusion and ensure that 
it could set a good example for the following URPs. To this end, the state acted as the 
main funder for the URP, while SMG served as a key implementer of the URP. In this 
structure, SMG functioned to directly recruit and contract with all staff in the local UR 
centre. This meant that SMG outsourced the centre’s tasks to individual freelancers such 
as a professor, a planner, and an architect rather than to a large firm or organisation. It is 
certain that such contractual structure promoted clear and direct communication between 
SMG and the intermediaries to facilitate the URP in a more efficient manner. However, 
it is worth noting that such freelance-based contracts allowed them to work only on a 
part-time basis, as SMG had a cap on the number of full-time positions it could offer. 
This created a certain work environment that prevented the intermediaries from accessing 
a full social benefit package. This issue was pointed out by one of former staff in the local 
UR centre in CSA. 
I was working for an architectural firm when SMG was recruiting COs. 
SMG did not outsource COs’ tasks to one company but wanted a direct 
contract with experienced persons like me. At that time, it looked a better 
option for me, as I thought it would enable me to easily and quickly 
communicate with SMG when necessary. But I had to pay for that benefit. 
The centre could only offer me a part-time position. That is, my job was 
no longer full-time since I started working for the centre. This gave me 





myself while working as a part-timer. (C1-IS-INT-3, 2019, a former 
community organiser). 
Strictly speaking, the local UR centre had none of the responsibility for issues such as 
human resource management and welfare benefits that ordinary corporations have. 
Instead, such important responsibility belonged to SMG. Hence, for the staff, the local 
UR centre was merely a place where experienced individuals gathered and worked in a 
group. Under these circumstances, the COs in particular were likely to have been deprived 
of welfare benefits while being given only part-time positions by SMG. From a short-
term perspective, such deprivation was seen as a personal matter that the COs should 
manage individually. Taking a long view, however, it was no longer only a personal 
matter but also something that could cause organisational problems in the local UR centre. 
For example, the unsecured welfare benefits could continue to curtail the COs’ 
performance by constantly demotivating them at work. That is to say, the particular 
contractual structure could directly affect individual performance, and through it, 
influence organisational achievement in the long term. Such issue was raised by another 
former CO in CSA. 
To be honest, I loved my job (as a CO), but I often questioned myself 
about whether or not to keep working in the centre, because it’s an unstable 
job, giving me limited employment rights. Certainly, I’ve derived a lot of 
pleasure from doing something new with residents, but at the same time, 
my future as a CO was uncertain. I’ve always had such concerns during 
the URP in CSA. (C1-IS-INT-2, 2018, a former community organiser) 
This account implies that the direct contract between SMG and the COs could create 
certain working conditions where the COs’ employment rights were limited by the 
casualisation of their position in the local UR centre. In these working conditions, the 
COs were often discouraged from working with full confidence or enthusiasm. This could 
prevent the growth of the local UR centre where they work. In fact, the new intermediaries 
were added by the new UR Act to the Korea urban regeneration framework. However, 
they were indirectly affected or regulated by the other existing national Acts, such as the 
State Public Official Act, which limits the number of full-time workers under direct 





UR centre as a temporary institution had limited rights or responsibilities in the legal 
framework. 
 
For example, the local UR centre in CSA recruited staff members, but could not contract 
them. It also organised community activities, but could not manage the budget for them. 
The centre could not run a profit-making business or raise funds to maintain itself. It was 
only allowed to use public funds from the state or SMG. In other words, the local UR 
centre had no legal rights for its employment contracts, annual budgeting, fundraising, or 
profitable business operation even for the sake of communal interests. All the legal rights 
in CSA were vested in SMG. Hence, it is obvious that the local UR centre tended to have 
a limited sense of long-term ownership in the urban regeneration process (C1-IS-INT-2, 
2018). In this sense, it is understood that the intermediary contractual structure in CSA 
could prevent intermediaries from engaging in self-reliant intervention by putting their 
legal rights under SMG. 
 
Time Constraint for Change of Intermediaries 
As well as the above contractual structure, a tight time frame also failed to support self-
reliant intermediary intervention in CSA. This was particularly evident in the self-
sustaining step, whose goal was to incubate a local cooperative. In this step, the local UR 
centre made an extra effort to transfer its intermediary role to the local community. It 
encouraged active residents to create a new local cooperative while providing them with 
a series of workshops on how to build a community-based social enterprise. However, 
only one year was given to train the local residents and form the local cooperative. That 
is to say, such significant change took place quickly in a limited time frame. This issue 
was pointed out by a former CO dedicated to the formation of the local cooperative in 
CSA. 
Halfway through the URP, our local centre hired two residents as assistant 
staff. At that time, one of my job responsibilities was to train the two 
residents as future community organisers in CSA. So, I organised many 
workshops and invited some experts not only to enlighten ordinary 
residents, but also to help the two assistants grow as a leader group in their 
local cooperative in the future. But, there was only about one year given 





form and manage a local cooperative autonomously, as most of them 
didn’t even know what it was at the beginning. (C1-IS-INT-3, 2019, a 
former community organiser). 
This description confirms that the local UR centre changed its ways of working while 
hiring some residents as staff. This brought about a change in the strategy of intermediary 
intervention: from ‘making things happen’ to ‘helping sustain things’. This means that 
the local UR centre underwent a shift in its role from promoting community participation 
to nurturing community association, taking over its intermediary role after the end of the 
URP: that is, the local cooperative. But again, this important shift was carried out in a 
tight time frame. Hence, as admitted by several COs, it was unlikely that the local 
residents could self-help the local cooperative during the self-sustaining step. Despite the 
efforts of some active residents, there was not enough time to inform and encourage the 
rest of the residents to participate in the self-sustaining step. This point was stressed by 
one of the residents-turned-COs in CSA. 
As a resident, I joined and worked in incubating a new local cooperative that 
ended up succeeding the centre. Such change was something normal to me, as 
I was well informed while working closely with the centre. Yet, many of the 
other residents had no idea about the local cooperative, as they had no chance 
to participate in the fleeting incubation process. After the incubation period, the 
local centre was disbanded and our local cooperative took over its role, but we 
have still struggled to make the local cooperative more autonomous due to lack 
of experience and finance. Now that I think about it, the incubation could have 
started earlier or lasted longer so that we could secure enough time to get good 
results. (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018, a current community organiser) 
It is certain that the local UR centre helped to plan and initiate the local cooperative in 
CSA. In particular, the residents-turned-COs made significant contributions to this 
process across the boundaries between the centre and other residents. However, it 
appeared that the residents-turned COs could not learn all the know-how from the local 
UR centre during the one-year self-sustaining step. They could only pick up 





ensure good communication with the main funder – the public sector (C1-IS-INT-1, 
2018). 
 
It is true that such administrative skills were useful for management of the local 
cooperative after the local UR centre was disbanded. For example, documentation skills 
were used to make reports to SMG, while accounting skills were used to write public 
funding bids to maintain the local cooperative. Despite such advantages, the residents 
were often frustrated while working merely as administrators aimed at securing public 
funds. For them, it was too difficult to improve their own autonomy and build cooperative 
working relationships with SMG. This point was stressed by a member of the local 
cooperative working as a resident-turned-CO in CSA. 
After URP was completed, we were fortunately able to secure a small amount 
of public subsidy that enabled us to recruit young graduates or early career 
social workers. But the subsidy is time-limited. It is not guaranteed that we can 
continue to get such financial support in the future…To be honest, this subsidy 
is no more than a stopgap. I think more time should’ve been given to make our 
local cooperative financially autonomous. I mean, incubating the cooperative 
should’ve started earlier or lasted longer during URP. Then, our local 
cooperative might have been able to develop an adequate level of autonomy. 
But, for now, it is mainly relying on piecemeal support from the public sector. 
(C1-IS-INT-1, 2018, a current community organiser) 
There was clearly a transition from a state-led (local UR centre) towards a community-
driven intermediary (local cooperative). However, this confirms that the transition was 
focused on a quick acquisition of administrative skills rather than a constant development 
of communal autonomy due to time constraints. Eventually, SMG decided to pledge a 
subsidy worth 200 million KRW (around £140,000) with which the local cooperative 
could employ two leaders (local residents), two full-time COs (local residents), and five 
part-time COs (student apprentices) (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018). Under these circumstances, it 
was hardly possible for the local cooperative to develop as a self-help group. Hence, it is 
no surprise that the local cooperative is still dependent mainly on public funds for its 
operating costs. It is, however, worth stressing that such public funds are often made 





tight time-frame, which is segmented into a series of small funding bids, leading to 
increased dependence on public funds. In this sense, the time constraints can be seen as 
an important factor that could keep the intermediary intervention under the influence of 
government and accordingly prevent the intermediary-led participation from becoming 
autonomous. 
 
5.2.4. Engagement of the Community. 
Centralised and Competitive Public Funding Structure 
In CSA, the local cooperative was officially launched after the local UR centre was 
disbanded in 2018. It was initially expected to serve as a communal hub by operating new 
communal facilities such as a community café and a children’s playground (C1-CS-INT-
1-1, 2018). But as mentioned earlier, the local cooperative was still not a self-managing 
organisation, as it was still heavily dependent on external sources of finance. There were 
limited options to cover its lack of finance: public funds (major source) and charitable 
donations (minor source) (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018). Therefore, it is likely that the local 
cooperative has competed with other local groups for the limited amount of public funds. 
Unsurprisingly, the local cooperative has been under the pressure of competition to secure 
an adequate level of financial resources to maintain itself, as was admitted by a member 
of the local cooperative. 
Size-wise, our local cooperative had rapid growth during the last year. More 
than 100 people across five small districts signed up for membership. But 
money-wise, we have been in difficulty since the national funding ceased. We 
still have no stable sources of income and can barely pay our own way. (C1-
CS-INT-1-1, 2018, a local resident) 
In the case of CSA, there was an additional subsidy available from SMG in the post-
project period. In reality, this was nothing more than a temporary solution to the problem, 
leading to weak financial independence. The above interviewee went on to say, 
...we’re lucky to get an additional subsidy, but it’s only a stopgap. The fund 
does not cover all costs, but only staff salaries and property rental fees. To 
maintain the cooperative, we need more money. We have no option but to apply 





if it’s the right way to fund our local cooperative. How much longer will it 
survive in this competitive bidding war? (C1-CS-INT-1-1, 2018, a local 
resident) 
It is certain that more residents were able to participate in ‘bottom-up’ practices through 
the new local cooperative. But they were still obliged to undergo the ‘top-down’ process 
of competitive public funding bids to maintain their practices. In other words, CSA had 
an ironic turn of events where more bottom-up participation was promoted while top-
down competition was still applied to financial resource allocation. Under these 
circumstances, the local cooperative was reluctant to interact with other neighbourhoods 
despite being aware of the importance of such interaction, as described below. 
In general, I’m happy to share local knowledge with other neighbourhoods. But, 
to be honest, I’m discreet about information exchange about funding sources. 
The reason is simple. We need more money and most of the funds are given on 
a very competitive basis. I know the government has recently tried to create 
more diverse funding schemes, but I’m sure that would be still far from enough 
to cover all local demands like ours.  (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018, a current community 
organiser) 
In other words, despite recent institutional efforts, it is likely that the local cooperative 
was directed to gain a competitive advantage over its competitors while refraining from 
candid communication with other local neighbourhoods. The above interviewee went on 
to describe his experiences with competitive funding bids. 
Well, it’s embarrassing, but I must admit that the funding bids were usually 
prepared discreetly rather than openly. Other neighbourhoods that applied for 
the same public funds were our competitors rather than collaborators. So, it is 
quite challenging for us to balance competition against and collaboration with 
other neighbourhoods in such a competitive environment. (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018, 
a current community organiser) 
This confirms that the demand exceeded the supply of public funds, thus strengthening 
its competitive bidding system. In this context, the allocation of financial resources was 





neighbourhoods and systematising their effective management across the country (CSA-
PS-INN-1, 2019). Hence, it is no surprise that CSA tended to foreground such national 
goals over its local interests to win public funding competitions in the course of urban 
regeneration. Furthermore, CSA was required to convince SMG about how it is 
distinctive from other neighbourhoods to increase the chance of winning competitions. 
During these competitions, CSA tended to keep their ideas, strategies and plans covered 
up until funding recipients were selected. That is, for CSA, establishing a competitive 
advantage far outweighed creating a collaborative advantage, at least in the funding 
landscape. Under these circumstances, in practice CSA was likely to develop its 
competitive and perhaps individualistic orientation, while the importance of interaction 
with other neighbourhoods is stressed in the new UR Act. In this regard, the competitive 
funding mechanism can be seen as another actor that can prevent community 
development from being more collaborative and inclusive in the urban regeneration 
process. 
 
Restricted Legal Rights of Community 
Since the UR Act was introduced, the establishment of local UR centres has become 
mandatory in the URP areas. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, the local UR centres had 
limited authority to make important decisions and, accordingly, lacked a sense of long-
term ownership in the urban regeneration process, as they were designed merely as 
temporary actors to support the delivery of the four-year URP. In CSA, such trend 
continued when the local UR centre was replaced with the local cooperative. In fact, 
during the URP, residents participated in creating six communal spaces: a community 
café, a community art gallery, a local learning studio, a local history museum, a children’s 
playground, and a cooperative office (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018).  
 
The residents were welcomed to give their ideas or opinions when designing these 
communal spaces. But they were not invited to participate when making more detailed 
decisions such as who would own or manage the spaces and how. Such important 
decisions were often made by SMG or its extended apparatuses such as the Seoul Housing 
and Communities Corporation. As a result, there has been no legal basis for the local 





major issue, since the local cooperative was declined permission to offer public services 
in the communal spaces. 
 Actually, I was sure that our local cooperative would provide new communal 
services in our new communal spaces. But it was not the case in reality. The 
local cooperative was given a very limited remit, such as short-term free use of 
communal spaces or temporary running of communal services with a small 
subsidy from SMG.…It is obvious that SMG does not regard our local 
cooperative as an official partner due to its lack of experience in public service 
provision. But if this continues, I’m afraid no chance will be given to our local 
cooperative, but to an external corporate with a proven track record…I’m still 
not sure if we can make good use of the new spaces and services when managed 
by a stranger from outside. (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018, a current community organiser) 
In CSA, the new communal spaces were designed to provide welfare-related services 
such as elderly care, lifelong education, after-school childcare or young business 
incubation.  
 
Figure 13. A community café (upper row) and a children’s playground (lower row).      





For the residents, it was taken for granted that such services should be provided by their 
local cooperative. However, for SMG, the local cooperative was one of the candidates for 
public service provision. This means that the local cooperative had to compete with other 
professional firms for full-service provision. In this competition, prominence was given 
to quantitative standards that measure the past performance of the local cooperative. 
Qualitative aspects of its future value, merit, or potential were barely considered. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that the local cooperative has been challenged for the right to 
provide their communal services (by professional firms) as well as having been deprived 
of the right to manage the communal spaces (by SMG). After all, the local cooperative 
ended up with no substantive rights for their communal spaces or services while being 
encouraged to activate them.  
 
Putting this into the concept of three types of space (Cornwall, 2002; Gaventa, 2004), it 
is understood that it was difficult for ‘invited’ communal spaces in CSA to evolve into 
‘claimed’ communal spaces. At the beginning of the URP, the local UR centre invited 
local residents to the process of creation of the new communal spaces. The residents were 
asked to participate in designing and producing these spaces with the help of relevant 
experts. For example, the local UR centre invited a local architect or planner who could 
promote the design process by providing the residents with a series of seminars. It also 
organised site visit workshops through which the residents could monitor the production 
process (C1-CS-INT-1-1, 2018). That is to say, ‘invited communal spaces’ emerged 
through intermediary-led participation in CSA. 
 
Taking a closer look, however, it turned out that the residents were not invited to more 
substantive discussion in terms of how to own and manage the invited communal spaces 
in the future. Such discussion was undertaken and addressed unilaterally by SMG or its 
apparatuses without proper consideration by the community. This meant that the local 
UR centre and the residents were excluded from the property acquisition or management 
processes. Such limited intermediary intervention undermined the transition from invited 
toward claimed communal spaces in the self-sustaining step. For example, the local 
residents proposed to use a new communal space for incubating start-ups such as an 
organic food market or a local sewing studio, which is a claimed community space. This 





was turned down, as it was legally recognised as a for-profit plan, which is banned in 
SMG-owned properties (CSA-CS-INT-1, 2018). That is, under the existing legislation, 
the rise of claimed communal spaces was limited, while the use of invited communal 
spaces was strictly regulated. However, one thing to note here is that such inflexibility 
results not simply from SMG-level regulation. More fundamentally, it is rooted in 
national-level legislation, as was pointed out by a public official from SMG. 
SMG tried to make a free contract with the local cooperative for the public 
service provision in CSA, but this was impossible because a free contract was 
ruled out by a national law. We were instructed to undertake open bidding to 
commission the service provision, but we found that the community-based 
cooperatives were rarely successful in the formal bidding process due to weak 
track records. So, we attempted to find another legal basis to benefit the local 
cooperative from the new national UR Act. But there was no such legal 
provision. Ultimately, we had no option but to give them a provisional subsidy 
at our discretion. I think this issue will remain unsolved without amendment to 
relevant national Acts. (C1-PS-INN-1, 2019, an official from SMG) 
This confirms that the current national legislation prevents the community-based 
cooperatives from undertaking self-management of communal spaces and autonomous 
provision of communal services in Korea’s new urban regeneration framework. For 
example, the Public Property and Commodity Management Act strictly limits profit-
making activities or businesses in publicly-owned properties. Thus, it is hard for the local 
cooperative to run new start-ups, albeit for communal interests, in the new communal 
spaces owned by SMG. The Fair Trade Act does not consider the local cooperative as a 
vulnerable organisation to be protected from market competition. Rather, it is seen as a 
corporate and is required to bid on government contracts for public service provision. 
Furthermore, even the UR Act has no legal provisions enabling the local cooperative to 
autonomously manage their communal spaces or provide necessary communal services 
despite stipulation of its importance in the Act. 
 
Such consideration implies that the existing legal framework would prevent the further 
engagement of local residents beyond mere participation in the urban regeneration 





assets such as communal spaces or services. As a result, the residents remain legally 
powerless over the community assets even though their local cooperative has 
endeavoured to ask for the legal rights. To put this in the SMG’s perspective, there is a 
contradiction between the new UR Act and the existing legislation. For instance, as a 
URP implementer, the UR Act instructs SMG to pay extra attention to community 
initiatives such as local cooperatives in the urban regeneration process. On the other hand, 
as a property owner, the Fair Trade Act forces SMG to put the local initiatives into 
competition with the market for communal service provision. In this contradictory legal 
context, SMG could not take a progressive stance on the new community assets to ensure 
that it could avoid any legal issues related to the community activities happening or 
emerging from the community assets.  
 
With hindsight, it appears that SMG has recently endeavoured to formulate legal 
measures that aim to guarantee communities’ legal rights to their new communal spaces 
(C4-IS-INT-3, 2018). For example, SMG introduced the new legal concept of 
Community Regeneration Corporation (CRC). CRC refers to a community-based 
business initiative that serves to improve communal autonomy by delivering communal 
services on its own. Stipulating this concept in its ordinance, SMG has attempted to give 
legal benefits to local initiatives that are willing to manage their communal spaces. 
According to this new ordinance, CRCs can gain statutory rights to manage local assets, 
provide local services, or even run for-profit businesses in publicly-owned spaces. CRCs 
can also ask for stable funds from SMG and local councils until their system is settled. In 
other words, SMG is now trying to enable local communities to make full use of their 
community assets by treating them as CRCs in their legal system. However, despite the 
SMG’s effort, the use of the CRC concept would still be at the discretion of each local 
council. In order to bring the concept into full force, it is still necessary to make the 
equivalent legal complement or amendment at the national level. In this sense, it is 
understood that communities’ legal rights remain contested despite emerging municipal 
efforts to reframe the rules of the game for the communities. In other words, there are still 
underlying legal limitations that prevent fuller empowerment of local residents beyond 






5.3. Regional Government-funded Intermediary Intervention: Chang 3-dong and 
Sadang 4-dong Case 
5.3.1. Local Context 
Chang 3-dong area (hereafter CHA) and Sadang 4-dong area (hereafter SDA) are located 
on the periphery of Seoul. In general, these areas served as a semi-manufacturing quarter 
to promote rapid industrialisation during the developmental period between the 1960s and 
the 1980s. For example, CHA had labour-intensive industrial facilities such as a paper 
mill and a noodle manufacturing plant, while SDA had a clothing factory. While the 
labour-intensive industries were growing, such areas had a constant influx of workers and 
thereby increased housing supply to accommodate them. As a consequence, high-density 
low-rise houses mushroomed around the periphery of Seoul in the 1980s (J. Kim, 2019).  
 
Entering the 1990s, however, the labour-intensive industrial facilities were relocated to 
other regions due to environmental issues. Moreover, along with the state’s new planned 
city scheme in the 1990s, large-scale housing development started in new satellite cities 
around Seoul (Seoul Institute, 2001). Such changes caused population outflow and 
economic slowdown in previous semi-manufacturing quarters in Seoul. Parts of the 
periphery of Seoul, like CHA and SDA, underwent social, economic and physical 
deprivation over the last decades. This is evident in the National Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation (NIMD). The table below presents the level of NIDM in CHA and SDA 
compared to its average level in Seoul. 
 
Table 8. Figures of population growth rate, business growth rate and old building rate in CHA and 
SDA. 








(built before 1996) 
Chang3-dong 
(CHA) -19.5% -8.7% 73.6% 
Sadang4-dong 
(SDA) -58.5% -9.7% 70.2% 
Seoul average 5.1% 11.7% 67.7% 





The above figures show a shrinking population trend in CHA and SDA for the last three 
decades. In particular, SDA underwent a sharp decrease in population by 58.5 percent. It 
is also confirmed that CHA and SDA suffered constant economic decline, with a drop in 
the number of local business for the last decade by 8.7 percent and 9.7 percent respectively. 
Meanwhile, there is a relatively high rate of aged buildings in the both areas. As of 2016, 
more than 7 out of 10 buildings were older than 20 years. Such official figures imply that 
CHA and SDA have suffered higher levels of social, economic, and physical deprivation 
than other parts of Seoul. 
 
In fact, there have been some institutional efforts to tackle further deprivation in CHA 
and SDA. For example, SMG designated CHA as a housing reconstruction zone where 
old low-rise flats were turned into new medium or high-rise apartments. However, there 
was little or no progress in the reconstruction process, as a reconstruction association was 
not created. This was largely due to its geographical location adjacent to the Choan 
Mountain conservation area. To protect the conservation area, a strict height restriction 
was imposed on new buildings across its neighbouring areas, including CHA: a maximum 
of 20 metres with five storeys (C2-PS-INN-1, 2018). Such building height restriction 
reduced the profitability of the reconstruction and resulted in its cancellation. A similar 
situation also took place in SDA. Despite not being designated as a reconstruction zone 
or an NTP zone, SDA had a group of pro-redevelopment residents (C2-PS-INN-2, 2018). 
However, the redevelopment could not proceed due to strict building height restrictions 
and social housing provision imposed on new housing development in SDA. 






Accordingly, the redevelopment in CHA and SDA ended up with no progress, while the 
deprivation in both areas became worse. Responding to this situation, SMG introduced 
its new mayoral URP in the areas (C2-PS-INN-1, 2018). Strictly speaking, there are some 
differences between the national URP (applied in CSA) and this mayoral URP. For 
example, the mayoral URP granted smaller amount of public funds: up to 11 billion KRW 
(about £7.7 million), matched by the SMG and the local authority. Besides, the mayoral 
URP targeted areas smaller than 400,000 square metres, while areas targeted by the 
national URP were usually bigger than 400,000 square meters. This means that the 
mayoral URPs put more focus on smaller-sized local areas by shifting their main funding 
sources from the state to SMG. The mayoral URP was launched in CHA and SDA in 
2016 and 2017 respectively. As of 2019, CHA was at the implementation step, while SDA 
was at the planning step in its mayoral URP. 
 
5.3.2. Governance Relationships 
After some trials and errors in the national URP (e.g. CSA), SMG devised its own urban 
regeneration scheme, called a mayoral URP, in 2016. In this new scheme, particular 
attention was paid to reducing time pressure and increasing benefits for intermediary 
workers such as COs. Given this, the new scheme was designed in a longer time frame 
including two connected programmes: one + five-year URP. 
 
To be concrete, first there is a one-year programme called Hui Mang Ji, meaning 
Neighbourhood I Dream (hereafter NID programme). In the NID programme, 100 million 
KRW (around £8,000) is granted to encourage residents to gather and exchange ideas 
about their local issues. During this period, residents are invited to attend or create 
community activities. While interacting with each other, they are encouraged to reach 
consensus on a vision for their neighbourhood. The NID programme is a stand-alone 
programme but is similar to the planning step in the national URP. This means that the 
mayoral URP is distinctive by combining the existing national URP with a separate one-
year NID programme. In this regard, the NID programme can be seen as a preparatory 
step, serving as a stepping stone in an extra time frame towards the next five-year 






In the second five-year programme, 10 billion KRW (about £7 million) are awarded to 
produce a neighbourhood plan and put it into action through a series of new spatial 
practices. This second programme comprises three steps, which are the same as those in 
the national URP: a planning step, an implementation step, and a self-sustaining step. In 
general, thus, it goes through a similar process of promoting community gathering (step 
1), facilitating participatory practices (step 2), and incubating local initiatives (step 3). 
 
However, there is an important difference between the national and the mayoral URP in 
practice: the governance structure, and particularly the contractual structure in 
intermediary organisations. The governance structure in the mayoral URP is more 
systemised, creating another intermediary layer at the regional level. Given this, it is 
worth a close look at such structural difference to capture the distinction of intermediaries 
in the mayoral URP. In the mayoral URP, ordinary citizens are given more opportunities 
to work as community organisers. This is possible due to the establishment of the Seoul 
Urban Regeneration Support Centre (Seoul UR centre) in 2016.  
 
The Seoul UR centre is a regional-level intermediary organisation to improve 
coordination among local-level intermediary organisations: that is, local UR centres. As 
a regional coordinator, Seoul UR centre sets up standard guidelines for issues such as 
community committee formation, communal space management, or community 
regeneration company (CRC) operation. It also serves to provide a variety of practical 
workshops to support local UR centres across Seoul. A case in point is an education 
programme, known as Seoul’s community organiser training course. This is a three-
month programme which aims to provide ordinary citizens with classes related to 
community work. Using this cross-local platform, for example, local UR centres could 





recruit well-trained citizens as staff. Compared to the national URP, the mayoral URP is 
thus more likely to have ordinary citizen-turned-COs working in local UR centres. 
Drawing on the case of CHA, the diagram below represents how such COs have emerged 
and grown while intermediary governance in the mayoral URP has been transformed. 
  
 
As shown in the diagram, the NID programme had no local UR centre in its governance 
structure. Instead, there was a support group commissioned by the local authority to carry 
out the NID programme. In general, ‘support group’ refers to a small existing firm or 
agency (with fewer than five staff members) with a proven track record in community 
work-related fields. Strictly speaking, a support group is not a local UR centre in the legal 
framework of the new UR Act. Yet, it appears to have performed an intermediary role 
during the NID programme. 
 
In CHA, a support group was established with three staff members: one director and two 
COs. The director was a leader of a small architectural firm commissioned by the local 
authority, while two COs were hired by the architectural firm (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 2018). 
That is to say, there was no direct contract between the COs and the government. Instead, 
there was a subcontract between the COs and the support group, as the subcontract system 
could provide the COs with welfare benefits. In other words, while working full-time in 
the support group, the COs could secure a package of social benefits such as medical 
Figure 16. Transformation of intermediary governance arrangements in CHA.                 





insurance, employment insurance and health and safety insurance. In this contractual 
context, the COs tended to act as immediate assistants for the support group while staying 
away from the government. Such contractual relationship was a unique feature of 
intermediaries during the NID programme.  
 
 
Figure 17. Workshops for community development led by support groups in SDA (left) and CHA (right)          
Source: SDA and CHA local UR centres 
 
After the NID programme was completed, there was a one-year gap in CHA prior to the 
next five-year programme. During this gap year, the SMG assessed the achievement of 
NID programme in CHA and decided whether to bring CHA to the next programme. Thus, 
the two programmes were procedurally separated to ensure an adequate level of local 
capabilities, although they were strategically connected in the entire process of the 
mayoral URP. Following a successful assessment, CHA was given an opportunity to 
launch the second five-year programme with three consecutive steps: planning, 
implementation, and self-sustainment. In the initial planning step, a local UR centre was 
established with eight staff members: one director, four COs, two designers and one 
engineer. The local UR centre recruited all staff based on the subcontract system, as the 
previous support group had done. However, a more complex subcontract system was 
created while all tasks in the centre were outsourced to external bodies. That is, the 
centre’s responsibilities were subdivided into two main tasks: community building and 
neighbourhood planning. Then, the subdivided tasks were outsourced to an architectural 
firm (community building) and an engineering firm (planning). 
 
On closer examination of this subcontract structure, each staff member in the centre had 





SMG, while the external firms were contracted to the local authority to implement 
subdivided works. Then, COs made a subcontract with one of the external firms, namely 
the architectural firm, to carry out tasks related to community building. In this contractual 
structure, it turned out that there was no actual contract between the COs and the local 
UR centre itself. Instead, all new contracts were made with the professional firms between 
COs and the local UR centre. Compared to the national URP, hence, it is seen that the 
mayoral URP had a multi-level intermediary structure where all tasks were specialised 
and managed by different external contractors.  
 
In the next step of implementation, the contractual structure underwent some minor 
changes. For example, two COs were newly recruited into the community building team 
managed by the architectural firm. In the other team, two existing designers terminated 
the contract with the engineering firm after the neighbourhood plan was completed. 
Despite such minor changes, the subcontract structure itself has remained unchanged. For 
SMG, the subcontract structure was useful, as it enabled them to provide the centre’s staff 
with full-time positions and a full social benefits package (CS-IS-INT-3, 2018). It also 
promoted cooperation between SMG and professional firms with relevant experts to 
implement the URP in a more efficient manner. 
 
However, it appears that such particular intermediary structure prevented COs from 
engaging in direct communication with SMG (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 2018). Moreover, it 
created particular working conditions where COs tended to work in individual mode 
rather than through teamwork, because each staff member in the local UR centre was 
contracted to different external firms that directed, supervised and controlled them in 
different ways. As argued by several COs (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 2018; CS-IS-INT-2-1, 2018), 
it seems that this multi-level intermediary structure will remain in the subsequent self-
sustaining step, as long as COs work full-time for the centre. With this in mind, the 
following sections present a thematic analysis of intermediary-led participation in the 
mayoral URP. Considering the relatively short history of the mayoral URP, the narrative 
data from CHA (in the implementation step) and SDA (in the planning step) are 






5.3.3. Forms of Intervention 
Experts versus non-Experts among Intermediaries 
As mentioned earlier, the mayoral URP has two distinctive features: the subcontract 
system and the extended time frame (1+5 years). In the subcontract system, SMG could 
provide COs with a full-time position by commissioning professional firms that directly 
hire the COs. Hence, it contributed to redressing the drawback of the national URP, which 
was that COs could not access a full employee benefit package. Despite such merits, the 
subcontract system limited mutual interactions between COs and SMG. This is mainly 
because of the direct involvement of professional firms, which led to an emphasis on 
expertise and a distinction between experts and non-experts in the intermediary structure. 
This point was stressed by one of the former COs hired by an architectural firm to carry 
out a community building task during the NID programme in CHA. 
During the NID programme, I had little opportunity for direct communication 
with the government. It was a support group that directly contacted and 
communicated with the government. For the government, the support group 
was an official partner with expertise in the field of community work, but it was 
hard for me to work as a CO in the support group. The leader of the support 
group was an expert in community space planning, but he had little experience 
in planning or promoting community activities or events. Nonetheless, he was 
the only staff member invited to an official discussion with government. I was 
not given such chances for direct discussion, as the government did not see me 
as an expert but only as an assistant. This situation often frustrated me as a 
community organiser during the NID programme. Looking back on it now, I 
struggled to work, as I had to do everything on my own with little help from 
the support group. (C2-IS-INT-4, 2019, a former community organiser) 
One thing to note here is that the support group was an architectural firm with expertise 
in community space planning and design. It had no practical experiences in community-
related activities or events at all. Hence, it is unlikely that the COs would feel well-
supported by the support group while carrying out their community work. Rather, it seems 
that the COs often considered the support group as a barrier that prevented 
communication with the government. In this respect, it is seen that the COs are regarded 





and local residents. This is the point that makes the mayoral URP distinct from the 
national URP, where all staff make direct contract with SMG, albeit on a part-time basis. 
 
This point is also found in the case of SDA. In fact, SDA failed in its first application for 
the NID programme in 2016. After a successful second application, SDA officially 
launched an NID programme in 2017. This meant that SDA could secure one more year 
to better prepare for the NID programme while monitoring forerunners like CHA. 
However, it seems that this longer preparation had little effect on the implementation of 
the NID programme in SDA. This is because SDA also adopted the same subcontract 
system as its forerunners. In SDA, even more qualified experts, such as a doctor, were 
selected as leaders in the support group. It appears that such expert-oriented approach 
caused frequent disharmony in the support group. This was pointed out by one of the COs 
in SDA, who was disappointed with the leader during the NID programme. 
I joined here as a CO halfway through the NID programme. I was a replacement 
for a former CO who left the support group due to a conflict with the leader 
there. The support group’s leader was well-educated and intellectual. 
Apparently, he had a PhD in planning. It felt like he often ignored us when we 
argued against him. For him, we were no more than assistants, with no proven 
record in urban regeneration. Meanwhile, the government saw the leader as an 
expert and regarded his decision as an official local opinion. So, we were likely 
to follow the direction of the leader no matter what he decided. It is certain that 
the leader made efforts to better communicate with government, to be honest, 
but I’m not sure that he was the best leader for the NID programme. As far as I 
remember, I was not receiving any organisational support when doing my job: 
community work. I had to do everything by myself, from planning to practicing 
and reviewing. (C2-IS-INT-2-2, 2019, a current community organiser). 
As such, it is likely that COs were marginal in the support group, which is an intermediary 
organisation, during the NID programme. The support group tended to be led by literati 
or elites who were recognised by the government as experts in the built environment 
industry. That is, there emerged an elitist form of intermediary organisation where such 
expert groups could take the lead in NID programmes. At the heart of such approach lies 





no stipulation in the new Act, there remains a tacit consensus that helps rationalise the 
formation of intermediary organisations led by elite professionals such as planners, 
architects, or doctors, who are believed to officially represent local public opinion. This 
trend is evident in many other areas where the NID programme was launched (C4-IS-
INT-4, 2018). In this respect, it is understood that elitism underpins the intermediary 
structure in mayoral URPs. 
 
It is, however, worth noting that such elitist leaders were unlikely to be well-experienced 
in community work, which is central to NID programmes. For example, the leader in 
CHA was an architect who designed diverse communal spaces, while the leader in SDA 
had expertise in urban planning and real estate. Despite the relevance to urban 
regeneration, it is certain that their professional expertise was far removed from the 
promotion of community activity itself. In other words, the intermediary organisation 
tended to be led by those with a lack of experience, for example, in community building, 
community organisation, and community service provision. In fact, it seems that there 
was a municipal effort to find and appoint elites with practical experience in community 
work (C2-PS-INN-1, 2018). However, this was hardly possible because the field of 
community work has long been marginal in Korea’s mainstream planning thought. In 
other words, it is only recently that community work has started to gain prominence in 
the academic, public and professional sectors. Community work has still not been fully 
recognised as a separate profession but only as a part of relevant professions such as 
architecture or planning in existing institutions. In this context, the government tended to 
choose professionals such as architects or planners as alternative leaders in intermediary 
organisations. Given this, it is no surprise that there emerged a gap between the leader’s 
expertise and the intermediary organisation’s tasks. That is, the intermediary organisation 
was probably confronted with a gap between what they could do best (e.g. planning) and 
what needed to be done (e.g. community building) during the NID programme.  
 
Under these circumstances, the COs were often solely committed to managing to fill in 
the gap without practical help or support from the elitist leader. It should be noted, 
however, that many COs started to join the NID programme immediately after completion 
of the SMG’s community organiser training course (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 2018; C2-IS-INT-4, 





to guide them in how to plan, implement, and assess community work step by step. 
However, this was hardly possible while SMG continued to appoint elite professionals 
with little or no experience in community work as leaders in support groups. In this sense, 
it can be seen that intermediary intervention here took place in an elitist framework that 
distinguishes experts and non-experts, preventing the inclusive growth of COs. 
 
Specialisation versus Isolation of Intermediaries 
As outlined above, COs often struggled to work in support groups, as there was no stable 
organisational structure where COs could learn and grow professionally. Certainly, it was 
difficult for them to communicate with a leader, and, accordingly they received little 
support from these leaders. In this organisational structure, COs were likely to come into 
conflict with leaders, leading to lack of teamwork in support groups. This point was 
stressed by one of the COs in SDA, who was frustrated by a leader’s way of working in 
the support group. 
What made me frustrated was the leader’s sudden announcement that his firm 
would no longer work in SDA after the NID programme. I was upset to see that 
he made the decision alone, without discussion with any of us in advance. This 
situation panicked me due to the fear that I might not be able to work here if a 
different firm was commissioned after the NID programme. For me, it was a 
really uncertain and stressful time, because I was not sure about my future 
career as a community organiser in SDA. (C2-IS-INT-4, 2019, a current 
community organiser). 
This implies that the NID programme could mean different things to different 
stakeholders: leader and COs. For the leader, the NID programme was not the core 
business in the leader’s firm. It was regarded as no more than a small, temporary project, 
as there were many other big projects being conducted in the leader’s firm. Hence, it is 
likely that the leader saw the support group as a provisional organisation from which to 
temporarily recruit COs to deliver the project on time. On the other hand, the COs saw 
the NID programme in a different light. For them, the NID programme was a stepping 
stone on their way to grow as community workers. However, this was not the case in 
reality. The COs were not in a strong position to set their aspirational goals and achieve 





their assigned tasks were done in a timely manner. Hence, the COs could not manage to 
make extra efforts towards new community activities in a more nuanced manner. Besides, 
the COs frequently felt uneasy about their potential unemployment while working for the 
NID programme. This is because they were under contracts with the support group, which 
could be replaced by a different external firm on completion of the NID programme. 
Hence, unsurprisingly, the COs tended to struggle with anxiety, distress or confusion as 
to their future careers and more fundamentally their identity as community workers 
during the NID programme. 
 
Entering the next five-year programme, the support group was dissolved and replaced 
with a local UR centre, which adopted the same subcontract system as the support group. 
However, the number of its subcontractors more than doubled, as more responsibility was 
given to the centre. In other words, the subcontract system in the centre was scaled up, 
while the centre’s workload increased. In CHA, the increased workload was divided into 
two discrete tasks: community building and neighbourhood planning. Then, the two tasks 
were outsourced to two professional firms: an architectural firm for community building 
and an engineering firm for neighbourhood planning. In this extended partnership, it is 
certain that the COs’ position became more specialised and professionalised. However, it 
seems that the COs’ work was more isolated, while the two firms were working separately 
rather than collectively. This point was described by one of COs in CHA who struggled 
to work with a team in the centre. 
Our local UR centre has two teams: a community building team and a 
neighbourhood planning team. I have been working as a CO in the community 
building team. My team members usually commute to work in the centre’s 
office. But, the other team members seldom come to this office except for a 
weekly meeting. They mainly work in the office of engineering firm that hired 
them. Probably, the firm was reluctant to dispatch its staff on site, using as little 
manpower as possible for this small project, but this is not the case for me. 
Economic value doesn’t matter that much to me, as the project itself means a 
lot to me. For me, this project is a stepping stone toward becoming a competent 
CO. I’m sure the centre’s director is already aware of this situation, but no 





actual power to manage or control the commissioned engineering firm. (C2-IS-
INT-1-1, 2018, a current community organiser) 
This description confirms that the local UR centre has a pair of teams working 
independently rather than collaborating with each other. It seems that this independent 
work culture resulted from its unique subcontract system. Looking at the system, it was 
found that a local university professor made a part-time director’s contract with SMG. 
That is to say, the professor worked for SMG as a freelance director to manage the two 
internal teams in the local UR centre. However, it turned out that the two teams were 
commissioned directly by the local authority. In this contractual structure, the director has 
no legal right to recruit and select staff members in the centre. Instead, the professional 
firms are entitled to employ and supply staff members to the centre. For example, an 
architectural firm directly hired COs for a community building team, while an engineering 
firm employed designers for a local planning team. Although the director is the centre’s 
official leader, each staff member tends to comply with what each of the professional 
firms instruct in practice. 
 
Given this, it can be seen that the local UR centre contains three different groups: a 
community building team, a neighbourhood planning team, and a freelance director. 
Technically, these three groups have no contractual relationship with each other. Instead, 
they have contracts with different external bodies: SMG, the local authority or 
professional firms. This means that there is no official contract between the three groups 
working under one roof of the local UR centre. In such a unique partnership, COs could 
take on a more specialised role in the centre while working closely with a professional 
firm. But, at the same time, they could often feel isolated at work while being prevented 
from collaborating with the other professional firm. Hence, for COs, such a subcontract 
system is ambivalent in terms of specialisation and isolation of their work in the local UR 
centre.  
 
Meanwhile, for freelance directors, the subcontract system is likely to serve to limit their 
roles in the local UR centre. That is, while each staff member is mainly instructed by 
external firms, the director could end up in a nominal position. This was pointed out by 





In fact, the director in our centre is a professor of real estate at a local university. 
He usually commuted to the centre three days a week, so he didn’t have enough 
time for direct communication with us while at work. Rather, our contractor (an 
architectural firm) often gave us substantive and timely instructions. For us, 
thus, his involvement felt like just a formality…One day, the director suddenly 
told us that he would resign from his position and leave the centre next month. 
This really upset me because I expected that he would at least discuss such 
important issues with us in advance. Nevertheless, I could understand why he 
made that decision, as I’ve seen him struggling to juggle the centre and the 
school many times. I don’t think it is simply because his profession is not 
community building or something. More fundamentally, it is linked to the 
reality where the director has no right, for example, to select the staff, organise 
the teams, or handle the finance. (C2-IS-INT-3, 2018, a former community 
organiser) 
Simply put, the subcontract system caused the director to suffer from a lack of authority 
to manage the local UR centre. In consequence, it led to weak leadership from the director, 
which could frustrate the COs and accordingly undermine the teamwork in the centre. 
This point makes the mayoral URP different from the national URP in the sense that 
professional firms are foregrounded while the role of the director is downplayed. For 
example, in the mayoral URP, the director has no rights to recruit COs or organise teams 
in the centre. Such rights are given to professional firms that can give COs a full-time 
position and thereby full social benefits packages. Moreover, in the mayoral URP, the 
director is less influential in a multi-layered contractual relationship where the director 
has a part-time freelance contract with SMG, whereas the professional firms have a full-
time outsourcing contract with the local authority. Accordingly, the local UR centre in 
the mayoral URP is more likely to lack internal coordination between outsourced tasks 
while promoting specialisation of each task.  
 
Therefore, it is seen that there has been a change in intermediary structure in the mayoral 
URP by adding an additional layer of ‘professional firms’. It is certain that this additional 
layer has helped COs to gain full-time positions with full social benefits packages while 
taking a more specialised role in the centre. However, it should be noted that it also caused 





In this sense, it can be understood that the intermediary intervention here has a double-
edged nature: that is, vocational specialisation versus organisational isolation within the 
local UR centre. 
 
5.3.4. Engagement of the Community 
Lack of Diversity and Representation in Community Participation 
After the NID programme was launched, new community initiatives emerged in CHA 
and SDA. In the beginning, the COs organised a series of small events where residents 
could meet those with similar interests. At these events, residents were guided to find 
mutual interests and create new initiatives to address the interests. Some examples are 
new initiatives for after-school childcare, urban agriculture, and DIY woodcraft. However, 
it is admitted that there were no active interactions between these initiatives, as they were 
operated separately. That is to say, each initiative acted in a separate silo rather than 
cooperating across silos. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it was hard to find cross-initiative 
cooperation cases during the NID programme. This point was stressed by one of residents 
who participated in after-school childcare activities in SDA. 
During the NID programme, we were encouraged to identify local issues and 
create a small initiative to take collective action for the identified issues. For 
example, a circle of young moms created an initiative for after-school childcare, 
while a group of senior residents formed an initiative for urban farming and 
gardening. As a member of the after-school childcare initiative, I would say I 
really enjoyed the activities while building good rapport with other young 
moms. But, to be honest, I barely joined the other initiatives’ activities, which 
were simply not of interest to me. So, I didn’t mingle with the other initiatives’ 
members. As far as I remember, many other residents also stuck to only one 
initiative during the NID programme. (C2-CS-INT-5, 2019) 
The above description provides an insight for better understanding of the features of the 
new community initiatives emerging in the NID programme. In general, the initiatives 
began to appear when like-minded residents gathered and identified their mutual interests. 
This means that each initiative was created based on a certain common interest serving to 
motivate residents to participate. From this point of view, each initiative can be seen as a 





school childcare or an urban agriculture project within a larger neighbourhood. It should 
be noted here that each shared interest tended to be clear and narrow, thereby preventing 
the initiatives from widening their boundaries. In other words, each community initiative 
was unlikely to extend its interest or expand its membership. This trend intensified while 
the initiatives continued to rely only on funding from the public sector (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 
2018). This meant the each initiative could not help but focus on a narrow interest with a 
minimum number of members to ensure better use of the limited financial resources 
available. Given this, it can be understood that the new initiatives during the NID 
programme were close-knit groups and were unlikely to be inclusive. 
 
Under these circumstances, some residents appeared active by participating in multiple 
activities across different initiatives. It was taken for granted that such active residents 
would serve as local representatives, as they were easily found in cross-initiative activities. 
But, there was also doubt as to whether the active participants could truly represent all of 
the residents. This point was outlined by a CO working closely with some active residents.  
I encountered some residents who were passionate about community work 
during the NID programme. They actively participate in diverse events across 
different community initiatives. I thought this was possibly because they were 
certain kinds of people who have more free time, such as retirees, jobseeker or 
housewives. Certainly, their active involvement helped us to facilitate 
community-based activities despite time constraints. To be honest, we expected 
that new active residents would show up in the next five-year programme, but 
it did not happen. I found out that many activities were still led by the same 
active residents acting as local representatives. Admittedly, this situation made 
me feel that I was working with a small circle of residents despite making 
efforts to promote a wide variety of activities. (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 2018, a current 
community organiser) 
In the NID programme, there emerged a small number of residents who actively 
participated in cross-initiative activities. These active residents continued to lead the 
following activities in the next five-year programme. Unsurprisingly, they were seen as 
local representatives who could connect the government with residents in the mayoral 





groups of people, such as retirees or housewives (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 2018; C2-IS-INT-2-2, 
2018). The reason is that such people were more likely to be able to attend activities 
during the centre’s work hours, so that they could work closely with the centre. This 
means that the active residents could not represent other groups of people such as ordinary 
office workers, who could not attend daytime activities on weekdays. The above 
interviewee went on to argue: 
...for example, it’s hard to find active residents from ordinary working-class 
folk, because they can’t afford to join community activities on a regular basis. 
So, my concern was whether the active residents could represent local people 
due to a lack of diversity in participants. In the second programme, this concern 
continued to grow. Only a few new residents showed up, while the old members 
remained influential in many subsequent activities. To attract more newcomers, 
we tried to promote new spatial practices such as façade repainting or repairs 
in the implementation step, but this does not seem to have contributed to 
diversifying or increasing participation. (C2-IS-INT-1-1, 2018, a current 
community organiser) 
A series of the above descriptions confirm that interest-based initiatives were created 
during the NID programme. It was found that such new initiatives were likely to operate 
in their own silo due to limited financial resources and time constraints. Hence, it is no 
surprise that each initiative had evolved towards a close-knit community that was not 
particularly inclusive of new residents. Despite such siloed development, there emerged 
so-called ‘active residents’ who joined cross-initiative activities during the NID 
programme. In the following five-year programme, it transpired that the active residents 
took the lead in most of the community activities funded by the local UR centre. It is not 
strange that such active residents were regarded as local representatives acting as a bridge 
between residents and government. However, it is worth noting that most of the active 
residents were recruited from a certain group of people who could spare time during the 
local UR centre’s work hours. That is, the issue of who could participate was often 
decided in terms of who could work with the local UR centre. Unsurprisingly, other 
groups of people, such as ordinary office workers, were less able to participate and 
represent themselves in the mayoral URP. Under these circumstances, it is certain that 





those available for constant and regular participation. In this regard, it can be understood 
that new community initiatives here tend to have a lack of diversity and representation 
through community participation led by active residents from certain groups. 
 
Limited Access of Community to Decision Making 
Apart from the above issue of diversity and representation, another issue concerning the 
autonomy of community initiatives emerged in the mayoral URP. The new community 
initiatives have grown and changed along with the intervention of the intermediary 
organisations such as support groups or local UR centres. However, this intermediary 
intervention does not seem to have led to an autonomous community whose members 
could feel more listened to and engaged in constructive dialogue with government. The 
reason is that its intermediary structure was pre-determined and administered by 
government. This means that the residents had no real power and influence in the main 
decision-making processes, while the government held all the legal rights to regulate and 
manage the intermediary structure. Even active residents were likely to have been 
excluded from the important decision-making processes, such as human resource 
management or budgetary control underpinning the intermediary structure. This point 
was stressed by one of the active residents who felt excluded from the process of selecting 
a director in her local UR centre. 
When the five-year programme started, SMG suddenly announced that it had 
appointed a local university’s professor as a director in our local UR centre. I 
knew nothing about his appointment until SMG’s announcement. It felt like 
something that just happened behind closed doors. Despite my active 
participation in URP, I was never invited to the selection process for the 
centre’s director. It was all done exclusively by SMG and the local authority, 
so I had no idea how and why the professor was appointed at all. In fact, we 
residents asked SMG to let us participate in the selection process, but this 
request was refused, with the reason being that our involvement could make the 
selection process unfair or inefficient. After hearing that, I was afraid that I 
might remain excluded from other important decision-making processes. I’m 
still not sure it makes sense to rule out our involvement in deciding staff 





The above description implies that community participation was limited, while the local 
UR centre was under government control. Regardless of whether they had actively 
participated, it appears that the residents ultimately had limited access to key decision-
making processes related to the local UR centre. For example, the processes for the 
centre’s staff recruitment, financial audit, or property acquisition were not open to the 
residents (C2-CS-INT-1, 2018). These processes were certainly important for the 
inclusive intermediary structure, but were reviewed confidentially by SMG and the local 
authority. Accordingly, the residents were only allowed to act within the intermediary 
structure pre-determined by the government. They had very limited scope to act around 
it to reshape the intermediary structure specifically tailored to local needs.  
 
Under these circumstances, residents were only regarded as simple participants in 
community programmes provided by the intermediary organisation. Even active residents 
were not seen as official partners despite their considerable contribution to community 
participation. Instead, the active residents remained as volunteer participants and were 
not as well-compensated as official members (e.g. COs) in the intermediary organisation, 
as their participation was taken for granted. In such intermediary structure, it is not 
surprising that the more actively the residents participated in URP, the more frustrated 
and disconnected from the government they became. This issue was pointed out by one 
of the active residents in the CHA who was constantly forced to volunteer in URP.  
The government was reluctant to provide us with paid positions. It had a clear 
distinction between the centre’s staff and us (residents). For the government, I 
think we (residents) were just public service users, while the staff were 
commissioned service providers. That is, we were no more than service 
consumers despite our active involvement in the service provision. 
Unsurprisingly, many active residents like me just continue to participate as 
volunteers assisting COs in an unofficial manner. The thing is, we’re likely to 
be excluded from many official meetings or discussions, as such things are only 
open to official staff in the centre. This situation often made me feel that I was 
only being sacrificed or mobilised for the success of the mayoral URP. If the 
situation persists, I’m not sure I can continue to participate with such limited 





This shows that active residents were welcomed to participate and support the staff in the 
local UR centre. However, they were prevented from claiming any compensation for their 
active involvement in URP. In other words, there was no reward structure where active 
residents could reap financial or non-financial rewards for their contribution to URP. 
Indeed, this issue was not that serious in the NID programme, where COs mainly led 
activities while residents simply attended them. However, the reward issue came to the 
fore in the following five-year programme. The reason is that some active residents 
started to be asked to share COs’ responsibilities along with the increased workload in 
the local UR centre. This point was outlined by one of active residents in CHA. 
In the implementation step, our local UR centre appeared to struggle with 
increased work burden, ranging from community meetings to construction 
monitoring. To ease the burden, the centre suggested that we take on some of 
the COs’ responsibilities, but under the condition that we should work on a 
volunteer basis rather than a paid basis. To be honest, I don’t think such a 
volunteer-based approach is the best way to sustain our active participation. 
This is quite a critical issue that goes beyond the matter of financial reward. 
Imagine that you continue to volunteer for URP as an unofficial assistant for 
COs. The government will never see you as its counterpart but just as a simple 
participant in URP, so it’s hard to form a true basis for a shared responsibility 
with the centre while being treated as a volunteer labour. (C2-CS-INT-2, 2018, 
a local resident) 
Entering the five-year programme, active residents seemed no longer to be ‘invited 
participants’. They were asked to act as practitioners supporting the local UR centre by 
sharing some of the COs’ responsibilities. This change resulted from SMG’s strategy, 
which aimed to create a more inclusive partnership through local the UR centre (C2-PS-
INN-1, 2018). In other words, the local UR centre was instructed by SMG to incorporate 
more residents, particularly active residents, into its intermediary structure. Borrowing 
from Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation, the active residents in the five-year 
programme entered into a ‘partnership’ within which to negotiate and engage in trade-
offs with the government.  However, it appears that their bargaining range in the 
negotiation was limited under the intermediary structure. For example, the active 





is, residents-turned-COs. The reason for this is that the intermediary structure has a 
particular stakeholder – that is, ‘professional firms’ – that directly hire and supply staff 
members to the local UR centre. As mentioned earlier, the professional firms were 
reluctant to hire new recruits from residents with unproven track records. Instead, they 
were likely to hire skilled workers or train existing employees for more efficient 
management of their manpower within a limited budget. 
 
Under these circumstances, it appears that certain ‘rules of the game’ for intermediary 
intervention were framed. In the rules of the game, most intermediary actors were 
networked through professional firms with multiple contracts between government and 
staff members in intermediary organisations. This means that residents were likely to be 
ruled out as intermediary actors, as professional firms were unwilling to make contracts 
with them. In this game, the residents were only regarded as subjects, clients and 
consumers rather than as those of equal worth and decision-making capacity. That is, 
despite active participation in URP, the residents had no substantive power to influence 
decision-making processes related to the formation of their intermediary structure. 
Ironically, it is no surprise that the more time and energy residents devote to participating 
in URP, which then results in endless volunteering and sacrifice, the more they may end 
up feeling that their intermediary organisation is not truly inclusive. In this regard, it can 
be seen that residents were likely to be prevented from fuller engagement in URP under 
the multi-layered intermediary structure. 
 
 
5.4. Self-funded Intermediary Intervention: Dongja-dong Case 
5.4.1. Local Context 
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, Seoul was strategically mobilised by the 
developmental state to promote labour-intensive industries such as textiles, garments and 
food products. This caused an influx of labourers and an increase of housing supply to 
accommodate these new labourers. Under these circumstances, the Dongja-dong area 
(DJA) served as a place to accommodate, especially, day labourers from the countryside 
due to its excellent transportation network (Lee, 2006). DJA is located next to Seoul 
station, which is one of the largest terminus stations for national railway lines as well as 





there were many low-cost lodging houses in DJA where travellers or visitors could stay 
temporarily. Most of the houses were a low-rise dosshouse type with an array of small 
partitioned single rooms (Lee, 2006). Many rooms in these houses were rented out to 
those who hunted for daily labour while travelling throughout the city as well as to tourists 
who sought cheap accommodation. 
 
Entering the neo-developmental period (1990s-2000s), a series of market-driven housing 
redevelopments, combined with the state’s aspiration for beautification and 
modernisation, occurred in inner-city areas across Seoul. This caused massive evictions 
of local residents who could not afford to pay the charge for redevelopment or the 
increased rent fees. Furthermore, the 1997 Asian financial crisis gave rise to a number of 
business failures and personal bankruptcies that worsened such evictions and caused 
subsequent homelessness (Ha, 2007, 2010). But DJA was excluded from a list of the 
housing redevelopment areas due to its low profitability, caused by a strict building height 
restriction: a maximum of 20 meters with five storeys (C3-IS-INT-1-2, 2019). 
Accordingly, the low-cost accommodation in DJA remained unchanged and served to 
accommodate evictees or homeless people. While such trends continued, DJA gained 
fame as one of the neighbourhoods where the most vulnerable people in Seoul could 
afford to live. 
 
Meanwhile, DJA has no official administrative boundary, since it has naturally expanded 
and spanned over three different dong: Dongja-dong, Garwol-dong, and Huam-dong 
(Kim, 2016). Hence, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which DJA has been deprived 
by using the National Indices of Multiple Deprivation (NIMD), which are based on dong 
units. Alternatively, the overall deprivation in DJA can be estimated using demographic 
statistics from the so-called jjokbang village there. ‘Jjokbang’ refers to a tiny single room 
with less than 10 square metres of floor space (Lee, 2006), which is a typical residence 
type in DJA. The table below shows three sets of demographic information from the 







Table 9. Three different sets of demographic information from jjokbang community in DJA in 2015. 
 




Aged population ratio 
(aged 60 or older) 
Dongja-dong 55.1% 16.1% 
48.6% Garwol-dong 47.8% 23.9% 
Huam-dong 40.0% 8.0% 
Seoul average 2.4% 3.9% 19.0% 
Source: Kim, D.Y. (2016) and Korean Statistical Information Service (2016) 
 
The jjokbang village in DJA is a medium-sized neighbourhood with about 1,000 residents. 
The above figures show that it has a distinctive demographic structure. Firstly, it has a 
high proportion of beneficiaries of the national basic livelihood security programme, 
which provides financial support to low-income individuals whose earnings are less than 
the minimum cost of living. As of 2015, the figure in DJA surpassed 50 percent, while 
the average figure in Seoul was only 2.4 percent. DJA also has a large number of residents 
who are registered disabled. More than 15 percent of people in DJA were registered as 
disabled, while the average figure in Seoul was lower than 4 percent in 2015. Furthermore, 
the table shows a high ratio of aged population in DJA. While only about 19 percent of 
the population in Seoul were aged 60 or older, the figure in DJA was almost 50 percent. 
Moreover, compared to other areas in Seoul, DJA has an extremely high rate of old 
buildings aged 20 years or older. According to the jjokbang building survey in 2015 (Kim 
and Ryu, 2015), more than 97 percent of jjokbang buildings in DJA were more than 20 
years old, while the average figure in Seoul was about 65 percent. Such figures represent 
the extent of social and physical deprivation in DJA, which is higher than in other parts 
of Seoul. 
 
There have been institutional efforts to promote redevelopment around DJA in order to 
prevent its further deprivation. For example, in 2010, SMG allowed reconstruction of the 
existing buildings in DJA by easing the height restriction for new buildings from 20 
metres with five storeys to 90 meters with 18 storeys (Kim, 2016). This was in line with 






Such redevelopment resulted in the conversion of some jjokbang buildings into 
commercial accommodation such as guest houses managed by Airbnb. However, it is 
worth noting that there are still many jjokbang buildings that serve as affordable homes 
for the vulnerable population in DJA. To make their voices heard by SMG, the remaining 
residents collectively created a local initiative in cooperation with a civil society 
organisation. While this collective local effort has been made, further redevelopment has 
slowed down in DJA. Yet the speculative redevelopment trend still continues in DJA. 
 
5.4.2. Governance Relationships 
DJA has two different types of intermediary organisation: the Seoul station jjokbang 
counselling centre (hereafter Seoul station jjokbang centre) and the Dongja area 
sarangbang (hereafter DJA sarangbang). The Seoul station jjokbang centre began as part 
of the organisation of a social service department in Yongsan local authority in 2001 (Kim, 
2016). As its importance increased, the centre was handed over to the regional 
government – SMG – in 2013. Since then, SMG has commissioned non-profit 
organisations to operate the Seoul station jjokbang centre. Between 2013 and 2017, SMG 
commissioned a charity group called the Big Issue Korea, which aims to help the poor 
find work. Since 2018, a faith-based philanthropic organisation called Onuri Welfare 
Foundation has served as the centre’s operator. Through such non-profit organisations, 
Figure 18. Geographical location and neighbourhood images of DJA.                                  





the Seoul station jjokbang centre can provide the residents in DJA with various social 
welfare services such as medical aid, employment support, and legal advice, as well as 
supplies of food and basic necessities. In this regard, the Seoul station jjokbang centre 
can be seen as a publicly-funded intermediary organisation that performs a welfare 
service provider role in DJA to prevent its further deprivation on behalf of SMG. 
 
In contrast, the DJA sarangbang is a self-funded intermediary organisation that aims to 
revitalise the jjokbang community in DJA. The DJA sarangbang was organically formed 
in the late 2000s when an activist organised a local initiative of jjokbang residents against 
the speculative redevelopment taking place around DJA. Similar to the Seoul station 
jjokbang centre, it also provided welfare-related services such as employment support 
and legal advice. However, the DJA sarangbang placed more focus on how to promote 
collective capabilities of jjokbang residents cooperating with radical civil society 
organisations such as Homeless Action or Korean People’s Solidarity Against Poverty 
rather than relying on the public sector (C3-IS-INT-1-2, 2019). Hence, for the residents, 
the DJA sarangbang is a self-help intermediary organisation to improve their 
neighbourhood by enhancing their communal autonomy against market or state forces. 
Considering this point, it is worth a close look at the DJA sarangbang for a meaningful 
comparison with the publicly-funded local UR centres in the new urban regeneration 
framework. The diagram below shows the change in governance arrangements of the DJA 
sarangbang. 
Figure 19. A transformation of intermediary governance arrangements in DJA                       






The DJA sarangbang first emerged in 2008 when a civil rights activist settled in DJA and 
started to organise an initiative of jjokbang residents (C3-IS-INT-1-2, 2019). In fact, the 
activist was a staff member of CONET (Community Organisation Information Network), 
which is a radical civil society organisation serving to educate vulnerable citizens and 
foster their autonomy. As a full-time worker in the CONET, the activist was sent to DJA 
to enlighten the jjokbang residents and promote their collective capabilities by 
challenging the dominant market- or state-led redevelopment happening around DJA. 
While residing in DJA, the activist was given financial support from CONET to create 
and manage a small intermediary organisation called the DJA sarangbang. Hence, it is 
seen that the DJA sarangbang started with help from a non-state and non-profit 
organisation beyond government or market influence. According to an interview with a 
current CO in DJA (C3-IS-INT-1-1, 2019), the activist’s initial efforts provided the basis 
for building rapport and trust among residents in DJA. By organising diverse gatherings 
such as a potluck lunch or an information sharing meeting, the activist encouraged 
residents to discuss personal interests or difficulties and figure out common issues in DJA. 
In this respect, it appears that the early DJA sarangbang was focused on how to identify 
a shared domain of interests or needs among the jjokbang residents.  
 
Since 2010, the focus has shifted towards how to deal with the shared issues identified in 
practice. For this, the DJA sarangbang restructured its internal organisations to take 
practical and effective action for each issue in substance. For example, one identified 
issue was that many jjokbang residents had no access to basic bank services due to their 
low credit scores. That is, the residents were unable to get loans or debit cards, or even to 
open accounts at commercial banks. To address such problems, the DJA sarangbang 
decided to establish an alternative local banking system. For its operation, the DJA 
sarangbang created a new internal organisation called the Dongja area hyeobdongheo 
(hereafter DJA hyeobdongheo) in 2010. Unlike commercial banks, the DJA 
hyeobdongheo took the form of a community-based credit union through which any 
jjokbang resident could make a deposit and get a loan regardless of their credit history.  
 
Meanwhile, another common issue was that most of the jjokbang buildings were not well-





instant meals rather than proper home-cooked meals. In response to this, the DJA 
sarangbang formed another internal organisation called Dongja-dong area sikdorak 
(hereafter DJA sikdorak) to run a communal kitchen where jjokbang residents can eat a 
home-cooked lunch at an affordable price. In this period, the DJA sarangbang grew in 
size by expanding its scope of work and responsibilities. Despite such growth, there was 
little or no change in the management of financial and human resources in its intermediary 
structure. That is, the CONET was still a main source of financial resources in the DJA 
sarangbang, while the CO was an employee hired by the DJA sarangbang.  
 
Entering the year 2015, however, there was a significant change in fiscal mechanism and 
organisational configuration in the intermediary structure. Firstly, the DJA hyeobdonghoe 
was repositioned in parallel with the DJA sarangbang. Then, two COs were recruited and 
assigned to the DJA sarangbang and hyeobdonghoe respectively. This led to the 
emergence of a certain intermediary organisation with a pair of teams that are 
organisationally separated from each other: the DJA sarangbang and hyeobdonghoe. The 
reason for this change is that the DJA hyeobdonghoe gained growing prominence as the 
demand for local banking services increased. After the local banking system was settled, 
CONET discontinued its financial support in DJA. Instead, the intermediary organisation 
began to self-fund community activities by making use of deposits in the local bank or 
donations from charities or individuals. As a result, the COs could start to work under 
direct contract to the DJA sarangbang and hyeobdonghoe without financial support from 
CONET. 
 
Despite such progressive changes, it appears that this intermediary organisation has still 
struggled with conflict with the Seoul station jjokbang centre. This conflict is, in 
substance, rooted in an institutional distinction where the Seoul station jjokbang centre is 
regarded as the only official intermediary organisation while others are deemed peripheral. 
In other words, the DJA sarangbang and hyeobdonghoe are barely treated as official 
counterparts of SMG, since the official position was taken by the Seoul station jjokbang 
centre. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the DJA sarangbang and 
hyeobdonghoe have had difficulty in communicating with the Seoul station jjokbang 





analysis of the self-funded intermediary-led participation by using local narratives 
collected from DJA. 
 
5.4.3. Forms of Intervention 
Intermediaries Emerging at Margins of Welfare 
As noted earlier, DJA continues to serve to accommodate vulnerable populations such as 
those with low incomes and elderly or disabled people, since rent in DJA remains 
affordable for them. Hence, it is no surprise that compared to other parts of Seoul, DJA 
has a large proportion of residents with experience of eviction or homelessness resulting 
in debt problems. That is, many residents in DJA tend to suffer from credit delinquency 
or personal bankruptcy, preventing their access to the services of formal (non-)monetary 
institutions such as commercial banks and insurance corporations. For the residents, 
solving this problem was one of their top priorities to ensure a better quality of life. To 
effectively address such situation, the DJA sarangbang took radical action by creating an 
alternative local banking system and organising a new subgroup for its operation (DJA 
hyeobdonghoe). This radical approach seems to have contributed to initiating the 
residents into planning and managing personal finance, albeit in a limited manner, as was 
described by one of the residents in DJA. 
For a long time, my credit score was very low, so I was prevented from 
accessing any services in commercial banks, as my poor credit history blocked 
me from any application to the banks. But our local bank is different. 
Regardless of your credit history, you are allowed to open a new account and 
get a loan from the local bank when necessary. For example, last month, I 
needed money very urgently to pay for hospital bills for my elderly mother. 
Immediately, I was able to take out a loan of 100,000 KRW (around £70) from 
the local bank. It would’ve been impossible from commercial banks. Perhaps 
other people may think the service is not that big a deal, as it can cover only a 
small amount of money. But for me, it’s crucial, as it is the only way for me to 
get some fast cash in emergency situations. Probably, no commercial banks 
would loan me even small amounts of money immediately. That’s why I’m still 
maintaining my membership in the DJA hyeobdonghoe. (C3-CS-INT-2, 2019, 





It is certain that a community-based credit union emerged, consisting of the vulnerable 
population who were excluded from formal financial institutions. To systematically 
manage this union, the DJA sarangbang created its sub-organisation: the DJA 
hyeobdonghoe. Since then, intermediary intervention has promoted expansion of the 
community-based credit union. The union’s membership was open to all who were 
interested in the local banking services, as well as to residents in DJA. Under this local 
banking system, all members were allowed to open personal accounts and save even very 
small amounts of money. They were also able to use an emergency loan service of up to 
500,000 KRW (around £330) without any conditions despite their persistent low credit 
ratings. It is true that this local banking system can only cover basic services such as 
deposits, withdrawals, and loan to a limited extent. Yet, it appears that such basic services 
have benefitted many residents in DJA who are struggling with debt problems that have 
led to a vicious circle of poverty. In this respect, it is seen that the intermediary 
intervention here played an important role in forming trust-based communities and 
improving their quality of life in DJA. A similar intermediary intervention can be found 
in the DJA sikdorak, which provides residents with a home-cooked lunch at a low price. 
I’ve lived in a jjokbang for a long time. It’s a very tiny single room with neither 
a private toilet nor a kitchen, so it’s difficult for me to eat home-cooked meals. 
Instead, I often made do with junk food such as instant noodles, frozen pizza 
and so on. I was always worried about such unhealthy diet, but there was 
nothing else, as I couldn’t afford to eat out every day. But I’ve got another 
option for lunch since the DJA sikdorak was launched in DJA. For only 1,000 
KRW (around 70p), I can enjoy a nice lunch in the DJA sikdorak. It’s a proper 
home-cooked meal with steamed rice, hot soup, two to three side dishes, and a 
dessert. Although it is only open for lunch, I’m happy that I can have at least 
one full but affordable meal every day. Plus, if I have no cash for some reason, 
they let me pay them back later or just skip the fee. It’s not just me, but also 
many others in DJA. This makes me feel that I can have a warm-hearted lunch 
with family or relatives. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019, a local resident) 
This excerpt confirms that another communal service began through the DJA sikdorak. 
What should be noted here is that the DJA sikdorak is run by local residents rather than 





staff members: one chef and two assistants. They are all local residents and work on a 
voluntary basis. This is possible because a group of residents take it in turns to do the 
voluntary work by making use of donated funds or food from civil society organisations 
or individuals. In other words, a communal dining service was created while a collective 
responsibility was shared among the residents through the DJA sarangbang. Interestingly, 
such collective experiences have resulted in the emergence of similar community-based 
services such as a furniture repair service, a cleaning service, and a funeral service in DJA. 
As many jjokbang residents had no family or cousins, such community-based services 
benefitted them individually as well as enhancing their quality of communal life.  
 
In this regard, the intermediary intervention here contributed to building a platform where 
the residents can produce and consume the communal services that they desire. It is true 
that the Seoul station jjokbang centre also endeavours to provide a variety of communal 
services. But it seems to have taken a more administrative management approach to 
communal service provision, as was pointed out by a resident in DJA. 
The Seoul station jjokbang centre also offered some services similar to what 
the DJA sarangbang provided. But it offered the services in different ways. For 
Figure 20. A communal kitchen service (upper images), a furniture repair service, 
and a funeral service (lower right images) in DJA.                                                                           





example, the jjokbang centre always required me to make an appointment to 
see its director for discussion or consultation, but I was always allowed to stop 
by the sarangbang and talk with its CO without permission. The jjokbang 
centre also held a regular free meal event where donated food products from 
companies are distributed. In this event, I had to stand in a long line to get a 
free meal. This long line was often photographed by the centre’s staff. I really 
hated having these pictures taken, because they made me feel like I was being 
treated as an animal in a zoo or a beggar on the street. In contrast, the DJA 
sikdorak never asked us to queue outside. Instead, they let us stop by for lunch 
anytime in the afternoon. To improve this issue, we raised our voice to the 
centre and even petitioned SMG for it. Their answer was always the same: ‘We 
will do our best to correct it’. But I found that no actual action has been taken 
and no real change has been made so far in the system. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019, a 
local resident) 
This description implies that two distinctive forms of intermediary intervention coexist in 
DJA: administration-oriented intervention (Seoul station jjokbang centre) and 
community-centred intervention (DJA sarangbang). The Seoul station jjokbang centre 
tends to work in the way most public offices do, as it was a publicly-funded organisation. 
When residents wanted to discuss issues with the jjokbang centre, they were asked to 
make an appointment in advance. Moreover, in free meal events, the jjokbang centre 
distributed donated items on a ‘first come first served’ basis under the name of fairness. 
This gave rise to an unusual scene where people lined up from morning for tickets to get 
a free meal. This unusual scene was often visually recorded and used by the jjokbang 
centre to report or promote itself to SMG or other authorities. This means the centre’s 
services were generally processed in an administrative manner. Although originally 
designed to improve the residents’ quality of life, such services rather damaged their self-
esteem and thereby undermined their overall quality of life. This critical point is also 
found in another service, namely the public rental housing service, designed to provide 
the jjokbang residents with new spacious rental flats at an affordable price. 
Last year, I moved to public rental housing in another area managed by the 
jjokbang centre. It’s a small studio type apartment with a private bathroom and 





mentally distressed since moving in. It feels like my flat was the only public 
rental housing, while others were private rental or owned houses. I’ve never 
tried to get along with my new neighbours, because they looked like middle or 
upper class. Probably, it’s only me that receives basic livelihood security 
money in this apartment. This invisible gap daunted and frustrated me. Two 
years ago, one of my friends also moved into different public rental housing. 
But he really suffered from depression after his new neighbours noticed that he 
was a basic livelihood security recipient. Eventually, he committed suicide, 
jumping out of a window, as he couldn’t endure the social isolation in the new 
neighbourhood. I related to and identified with him. For me, DJA is a spiritual 
home, although it’s physically far from where I actually live now, so I often 
come by DJA, because people here let me feel a sense of belonging. We are just 
alike. (C3-CS-INT-3, 2019, an ex-resident)  
In fact, the public rental housing service was planned to decrease the number of jjokbang 
residents by providing them with opportunities to move into studio-type apartments at a 
low price. This service evidently contributed to increasing the quality of the rooms where 
they live. However, little attention was paid to the wider context of neighbourhoods where 
the apartments are situated. That is, the underlying issues of communal living were largely 
overlooked. In this respect, the centre’s intermediary intervention did not adequately 
address more fundamental issues such as self-esteem, mutual confidence, or communal 
life underpinning the formation of sustainable places for the vulnerable population. In 
contrast, the DJA sarangbang was more focused on how to foster the population’s 
communal life, sustain their shared identity and thereby improve their quality of life. The 
creation of the DJA hyeobdonghoe and sikdorak provided a variety of communal services 
such as local banking services, a communal kitchen, a furniture repair service, a cleaning 
service, and a funeral service. One thing to note here is that such communal services were 
run and used by the residents themselves. In this process, the DJA sarangbang helped 
them to manage such services in a more autonomous manner. In this sense, it is 
understood that the DJA sarangbang’s intermediary intervention served to create a 






Intermediaries Inside versus Outside Government Institution 
As stressed above, it is clear that the DJA sarangbang performed an important role in 
improving quality of life in the jjokbang community. Despite such contribution, the DJA 
sarangbang was not seen as an official counterpart to SMG in DJA. For SMG, the Seoul 
station jjokbang centre was its only official intermediary partner, while others were 
deemed to be informal due to the lack of official contracts. Hence, it is no wonder that 
SMG tended to communicate directly with the centre for important decision-making in 
DJA. That is, the DJA sarangbang was generally excluded from the decision-making 
process in planning or managing publicly-funded local activities that can affect the 
jjokbang community, as pointed out by a jjokbang resident. 
Under contract to SMG, the Seoul station jjokbang centre had many 
opportunities to collaborate with external corporations or institutions. For 
example, the centre worked jointly with a large corporation called Korea 
Telecom to create a neighbourhood plan in DJA in 2013. But we didn’t know 
about it until they showed us their draft proposal at the public hearing. Their 
proposal was to beautify the built environment, such as streetscape 
improvement or interior renovation with matching funds by Korea Telecom and 
SMG. What upset us the most was a plan to transform DJA into a so-called art 
village by converting old jjokbangs into new workshops for young artists. We 
neither wanted nor needed that, but that was what they planned, for some reason. 
Fortunately, the proposal was eventually cancelled due to our constant 
campaigning against it. But, since that point, I think the sarangbang and the 
centre have started to drift apart. (C3-IS-INT-1-1, 2019, a current community 
organiser) 
There was a clear distinction between the Seoul station jjokbang centre and the DJA 
sarangbang: official versus unofficial intermediary. SMG regarded the sarangbang as a 
radical group supported by non-governmental organisation outside its control or influence. 
Hence, the sarangbang was often excluded when promoting publicly-funded projects. In 
contrast, the jjokbang centre was often invited to participate in the decision-making 
process for such projects. Hence, as an official intermediary, the jjokbang centre was able 
to gain official opportunities to collaborate with SMG or its apparatuses for 





in official partnerships with diverse stakeholders by taking advantage of its official status 
in DJA. Through this partnership, the jjokbang centre was able to create a large pool of 
volunteers: for example, from neighbouring schools, supermarkets, and hospitals. 
Moreover, the centre could sign multiple memorandums of understanding with diverse 
corporations such as a law firm and a telecommunications company. In other words, the 
jjokbang centre served as a welfare platform to provide useful services such as medical 
care, legal advice, social housing consultation and free food distribution through its 
official partnership in DJA.  
 
However, it is worth a close look at the reasons behind the participation of external 
partners. Drawing on several interviews (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019; C3-CS-INT-2, 2019; C3-
IS-INT-1-1, 2019), it appears that partner schools encouraged their students to do 
volunteer work in DJA to earn credits for mandatory community service. It is also likely 
that partner hospitals encouraged their doctors-in-training to join the DJA medical 
outreach team to meet a basic requirement for promotion after the training period. In this 
respect, it can be seen that the external actors engaged in the partnership with a personal 
stake rather than with a full commitment to combat local problems identified in DJA. It 
is certain that the jjokbang centre made an effort to mobilise external resources to address 
local problems. However, it appears that the problems still remained unsolved or rather 
got worse. This is because every important decision tended to be made based on a 
government goal: maximising efficiency and utilisation of external resources for welfare 
benefit in DJA. Hence, it is no wonder that some radical demands were dismissed, since 
they were judged ineffective or inappropriate to produce tangible results with the external 
resources. Under these circumstances, the DJA sarangbang could do nothing to combine 
the radical local demands and the voluntary external resources. Rather, the sarangbang 
served to reduce opportunities for the residents to access the official partnership and join 
the publicly-funded projects. This point was stressed by a CO in DJA who mentioned 
potential problems resulting from the unofficial status of the DJA sarangbang and 
hyeobdonghoe. 
In fact, the DJA hyeobdonghoe is not a legally-registered cooperative. SMG 
has asked us to register so that it can officially fund or support the 
hyeobdonghoe. But, once we are legally registered, we would no longer be 





For us, the local banking service was not something negotiable: it was essential. 
So we had no option but to give up the benefits of having statutory status and 
maintain the banking service outside the institutional domain. Hence, we were 
given hardly any official funds or support from external actors. For instance, 
the DJA hyeobonghoe is not on the list of those eligible to apply for SMG-
funded projects due to its lack of legal standing. Besides, large corporations like 
Korea Telecom are reluctant to sponsor the DJA sarangbang, because it’s 
unable to issue legal documents for their tax exemption benefit, for example, 
through the CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) programme. As a result, 
we’ve been naturally excluded from many projects involving the private as well 
as the public sector. (C3-IS-INT-1-2, 2019, a current community organiser)  
It is certain that the DJA sarangbang has contributed to developing a local initiative for 
a local cooperative to provide the communal services that jjokbang residents need. 
However, the local cooperative had to stand outside institutional domain to maintain this 
service provision. The reason for this is that such radical and effective local practices still 
remain outside the current legal framework. This has led to reduced opportunity for the 
local cooperative to engage in publicly or privately-funded urban projects. In this respect, 
it can be seen that involvement of DJA sarangbang served to prevent jjokbang residents 
from building new relationships with the private as well as the public sector in their 
neighbourhood improvement process. 
 
To address this matter, the DJA sarangbang made alternative efforts to forge 
relationships with different external actors. For example, it tried to construct a wider 
network with similar vulnerable communities in different neighbourhoods in Seoul. By 
sharing their local banking service, its membership spread across the cross-community 
network in Seoul. Furthermore, the sarangbang extended its relationships with 
progressive external groups such as the Korea People’s Solidarity against Poverty or the 
Korea Human Rights Foundation. While inviting them as guest speakers or consultants, 
it increased the chances for residents to interact with those in support of their radical 
community activities. Despite such alternative efforts, however, the DJA sarangbang and 
hyeobonghoe still remain unauthorised, unofficial, or unlicensed in legal terms. From an 
outside point of view, they are no more than minorities outside the state’s legitimate remit, 





regard, it is understood that the DJA sarangbang and hyeobonghoe enabled the residents 
to nurture their communal autonomy outside governmental institutions by encouraging 
radical intermediary intervention. 
 
5.4.4. Engagement of the Community 
Improved Communal Autonomy out of Government Control 
Since its launch in 2008, the DJA sarangbang has tried to enlighten jjokbang residents 
with poor credit history. While participating in gatherings led by the sarangbang, the 
residents could get practical information about how to recover from bad credit, regain job 
opportunities, or receive basic livelihood security money. Such information-sharing 
served as the basis for attracting residents’ attention and promoting their participation in 
community activities in DJA, as described by one resident. 
I settled in DJA in the 2000s, since the rent was low and it was close to the 
construction site where I worked. I remember an activist started to come 
here from 2008 or 2009. He went from door to door to meet local residents. 
At first glance, I suspected that he was up to something for himself, but 
before long I realised that I had misunderstood. He often organised a 
potluck or a small workshop to inform us about welfare programmes, none 
of which we believed would concern us. In the gatherings, we learnt about 
how to claim welfare benefits to which we were entitled. In my case, I 
gained recruitment information from the gatherings and got a welfare-
related job. Another resident was able to claim and receive basic livelihood 
security money by making use of information from the gatherings. For us, 
therefore, it is important to continue participating in the gatherings, 
because we can be updated with useful news that is related to ourselves or 
DJA. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019, a local resident) 
This confirms that there have been a series of community gatherings such as a potluck 
and an information sharing meeting. Through these gatherings, the DJA sarangbang tried 
to enlighten local residents about basic welfare benefits that they had missed. This was 
useful, as many jjokbang residents needed more welfare benefits since filing for 
bankruptcy or credit delinquency. Hence, as a strategy to facilitate community 





of their basic rights and helped them to reclaim the rights from the public sector. This 
radical approach to community participation gave rise to the emergence of radical 
initiatives where the vulnerable population could nurture a sense of belonging while 
learning about their fundamental rights as citizens through community gatherings.  
 
 
One thing to note here is that such gatherings were not only for the residents in DJA, but 
were also open to those from different neighbourhoods. This point was described by a 
resident who had moved from a different jjokbang village called Donui-dong in Seoul. 
I used to live in Donui-dong jjokbang village after personal bankruptcy. At that 
time, I heard, by chance, about the DJA sarangbang from another neighbour. 
The sarangbang drew my attention, as I could use their free services, which 
were open to everyone. So, I just paid a visit, and people really welcomed me 
and treated me like a neighbour that they already knew. While joining their 
community gatherings, I received a free legal consultation, where I found that 
my ID number had been stolen and used by someone else. Immediately, the 
sarangbang helped me to report it to the authority and prevent potential fraud. 
Since then, I’ve been regularly attending the gatherings as a member of the DJA 
sarangbang. A few years ago, I moved to DJA and I’m happy to live here, as I 
feel comfortable and have a sense of belonging that I’ve never had before. Now 
I’m acting as a local representative serving to introduce and promote the 
sarangbang to people from outside DJA. (C3-CS-INT-2, 2019, a local resident)  





The above description implies that DJA has experienced a growth in its local community, 
while the DJA sarangbang’s membership has increased. Importantly, the sarangbang 
opened its communal services to all comers as well as residents in DJA. This means that 
the local initiative of jjokbang residents could expand its boundary by incorporating those 
from outside DJA as well as those in DJA. This was made possible by the promotion of 
practical information-sharing and improving the sense of belonging among the 
participants through a series of community gatherings. What should be noted here is that 
there was not only a quantitative expansion of community members. There was also a 
qualitative development of the community initiative. Since its organisational transition in 
2015, the DJA sarangbang has tried to improve communal autonomy by widening its 
scope of collective responsibilities. This is evident in the provision of new services led 
by local initiatives, as was described by two jjokbang residents below. 
A couple of years ago, I had a traffic accident and needed surgery on my legs. 
For a couple of months, I had to go to see the doctor for regular health check-
ups. This was a challenge for me, as I was less mobile due to the surgery. For 
the first few appointments, I travelled to the hospital by myself, but my health 
condition got worse. Since then, I have been accompanied to the hospital 
alternately by those from a small community group providing a community care 
service in DJA. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019, a local resident) 
Another resident also described his experience with a different community-led service in 
DJA from which he benefitted. 
The other day, I had to fix some shelves to organise my belongings, but I 
couldn’t manage it, as I had a plaster cast on my arm. Upon hearing my situation, 
two neighbours came to make and nail new shelves to the wall in my room. 
They are members of a small community group offering a furniture repair 
service in DJA. It was really helpful, as I don’t have any family living with me 
to help me out. Their help let me feel a sense of kinship that I hadn’t had for a 
long time. (C3-CS-INT-2, 2019, a local resident)  
In addition to the above, diverse community-led services have emerged, such as cleaning 
services, funeral services, and night guard security. These can be seen as an extension of 





sikdorak lunch service and the local banking system. These new services were also 
introduced based on collective action to solve the local problems in DJA. The important 
thing is that local residents themselves were central to the problem-solving process. 
Rather than solely depending on their intermediaries, the residents tended to identify their 
local issues and take immediate action by creating and providing new communal services 
by themselves. In this process, small community groups formed organically, while some 
residents voluntarily participated as friends, cleaners, caregivers, guardians, undertakers, 
and so on. It is clear that such active community participation has contributed to 
promoting the collective capabilities of the jjokbang community in DJA. In other words, 
communal autonomy could be improved through active community participation in self-
help service provision across DJA. 
 
However, it is worth noting that the advanced community participation remains ‘tactical’. 
This means that community participation has been promoted by facilitating residents’ 
informal tactics rather than pursuing formal government strategies. That is, the 
community participation here is still seen as a set of improvised, provisional, and tactical 
collective actions outside government control or influence. It may be true that such a 
tactical approach is more suitable for DJA, because bureaucratic administration can 
reduce the flexibility of organic communal services, and eventually suffocate further 
participation of the jjokbang residents in their neighbourhood improvement. But on the 
other hand, the community participation here is not supported or protected by official 
institutions. Accordingly, such participation is rather fragile and easily challenged by the 
speculative property market aiming to redevelop DJA within official institutions. That is 
to say, speculative market pressure can threaten to paralyse tactical community 
participation and destroy communal autonomy in DJA. This point is explored in depth in 
the following section. 
 
Autonomous Community but Vulnerable to Speculative Market 
With the introduction of the new UR act, statutory forms of urban regeneration plans have 
been created at regional level. For example, in 2015, SMG published the so-called 2025 
Seoul urban regeneration strategic plan. This strategic plan provided an overall direction 
for urban regeneration of major areas in Seoul. One of the major areas was Seoul station 





forward a detailed urban regeneration action plan in 2017. This action plan encompassed 
more than sixty URPs, supported by the public as well as the private sector (Seoul 
Metropolitan Government, 2018a). Although DJA was adjacent to Seoul station, there 
was no official URP in DJA. This is because DJA was not incorporated into the URP 
zone in the action plan.  
 
Nonetheless, the urban regeneration action plan still has an indirect influence on DJA. 
Examination of this plan reveals that it aims to regenerate the Seoul station area by 
promoting local industries such as retail, leisure, and tourism in line with improvement 
of Seoul station facilities and services. That is, its focus is to revitalise the local economy 
and thereby to regenerate local neighbourhoods in the Seoul station area. It appears that 
this economic growth-oriented approach has drawn attention from speculative investors 
or developers, expecting profits from redevelopment around Seoul station. DJA was a 
case in point. This was pointed out by a CO in DJA, who argued that the speculative 
market forces have recently encroached upon local properties in DJA.  
A couple of years ago, SMG announced a strategic plan to regenerate the Seoul 
station area. I thought it would affect DJA in some way, so I looked at it 
carefully. The plan included diverse projects such as renovation of local 
heritage sites, modernisation of traditional markets, promotion of tourist 
accommodation and so on. In addition, central government also put forward 
another strategic plan last year. It’s about turning a former US army base into 
a large green park adjacent to DJA. I think such new plans motivated landlords 
or investors to renovate old buildings in DJA. For example, last year, more than 
five jjokbang buildings were converted into tourist accommodation like Airbnb. 
As you can guess, many tenants were subsequently threatened with eviction. In 
fact, we, together with the DJA saranbang, made an effort to prevent their 
eviction, but we had little success due to the rising rent rate. SMG also couldn’t 
properly manage or control this emerging issue, because it’s taking place within 
legal boundaries.  (C3-IS-INT-1-1, 2019, a current organiser)  
In fact, there has been a growing expectation of redevelopment in DJA since SMG eased 
a restriction on the reconstruction of existing buildings in DJA in 2010. However, there 





majority agreement among landlords. Even if such an agreement were made, it would 
also be hard to secure the right investor or developer to implement the reconstruction. 
However, it seems that the trend has recently changed while new urban regeneration 
strategic plans have been put forward at regional and national levels. Despite not being a 
direct target of the strategic plans, DJA could attract speculative stakeholders, with the 
expectation that the plans would have a spill-over-effect on DJA. According to some local 
interviews, a landlord had converted some jjokbangs into guest rooms for tourists while 
another landlord sold a whole jjokbang building to a developer seeking to build a brand-
new hotel in DJA. This was made possible by the new strategic plans, which proposed 
economic growth-oriented redevelopment in the Seoul station area and thereby convinced 
many landlords or developers to invest in DJA. Accordingly, speculative motives have 
arisen in DJA under the name of promotion of the local economy based on the strategic 
plans. In this process, many jjokbang residents were likely to be faced with eviction. It is 
true that there have been some negotiations between residents and landlords in order to 
prevent immediate eviction. Through these negotiations, some residents have found 
alternatives to avoid eviction and to continue living in DJA. Yet it appears that these 
alternatives were seen as only a stopgap measure, as was described by one jjokbang 
resident in DJA. 
Last year, I was suddenly given one month’s notice to move out. Seriously, it 
happened to many other neighbours as well. We immediately discussed it with 
the DJA sarangbang and found that the landlord was going to sell the properties 
to an investor. So, together with some human rights lawyers, we started to take 
legal action to protect ourselves from eviction. Eventually, we reached a 
compromise through SMG’s mediation, with the landlord granting us a five-
year leasehold. But I think it’s just a stopgap measure that ends in five years. 
Nothing is guaranteed after the agreed five years. Worse still, there has been an 
increasing number of such speculative landlords in DJA. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2018, 
a local resident) 
Under these circumstances, jjokbang residents have been always exposed to the risk of 
displacement by external speculative forces. Hence, it was important for the residents to 
protect themselves from the potential risk and maintain their communal life in DJA. This 





boundaries. All the residents could do was to ask SMG to delay the displacement by 
controlling the permission for redevelopment projects. This alternative approach was 
effective, as it was about bargaining and negotiation with each individual landlord who 
was interested in a small-sized renovation. That is, there was no collective initiative of 
landlords dedicated to large-scale redevelopment. However, it appears that there has 
recently emerged a group of landlords taking collective action, together with a speculative 
developer, in an attempt to promote a large-scale housing redevelopment in DJA. This 
point was stressed by a resident who was concerned about a clean-sweep redevelopment 
in DJA. 
A few months ago, there was a launch ceremony for a redevelopment union 
nearby. Since then, the union’s members have had regular meetings every week 
and have put up a banner that reads ‘For a better living environment in DJA.’ I 
was curious to find out what it was and tried to sit in on the meeting, but this 
was impossible, because it was a members-only meeting. With hindsight, I 
found that the meetings were led by a group of landlords to promote a large-
scale housing redevelopment in DJA. What’s even worse is that the union will 
undergo an administrative procedure for this redevelopment, once it is agreed 
by the majority of its members. This is what concerns me most now. Most of 
the jjokbang residents are tenants. We have no chance of attending the meeting 
and expressing an opinion about the redevelopment, which will significantly 
affect our personal but also our communal life in DJA. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019, a 
local resident) 
The above description confirms that a wave of collective action from landlords has 
erupted in DJA. This is a clear signal that speculative redevelopment could emerge with 
a collective agreement and legal permission. This means that the future redevelopment in 
DJA will not be negotiable, as it will be carried out not through the decisions of individual 
landlords but through collective decision-making by a group of landlords with speculative 
motives. Under the name of ‘better living environment’, it can possibly eliminate such 
local places as tiny single rooms (jjokbangs), communal kitchens (sikdorak), common 
rooms (sarangbang), or the local bank office (hyeobdonghoe). Hence, from residents’ 
point of view, such new redevelopment would erode their existing personal but also their 





This is viewed as a process of gentrification (Glass, 1964; Clay, 1979) where existing 
residents are displaced while the supply of affordable places is reduced. In this process, 
the existing communal culture in DJA can be threatened with decline or even extinction. 
 
One thing to note here is that such redevelopment is considered legitimate and rightful 
under SMG’s new strategic plan, which aims to revitalise the local economy around Seoul 
station. That is, SMG’s overall direction promotes the private sector to participate in 
redevelopment activities under the name of local economic growth. This trend is more 
evident in non-URP zones with little or no financial support from the public sector. In the 
case of DJA, there were no publicly-funded urban projects, since it was a non-URP zone 
in the strategic plan. But it appears that a partnership between landlords and a developer 
has emerged and attempted a large-scale housing redevelopment project in DJA. 
Interestingly, such collective action is regarded as positive rather than negative, as it 
supports and complies with the strategic plan. This is seen as a point where a group of 
landlords could turn from individual property owners to potential gentrifiers in DJA. 
However, there appear to be no legal actions that the existing residents can take against 
this potential gentrification. Alternatively, they could make their voices heard by 
protesting together with radical civil society organisations against such speculative forces. 
Under these circumstances, the more actively the residents participate in such radical 
actions, the more they are excluded from the decision-making process regarding the 
emerging redevelopment in DJA. In this sense, there is a certain dilemma where 
communal autonomy is organically improved outside official institutional settings, while 
being vulnerable to speculative market forces equipped with legal technology. This 
critical point is central to the process of intermediary-led community participation in DJA. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
Chapter 5 analysed experiences of intermediary-led participation by critically exploring 
local narratives from the three case studies. In the recent urban regeneration framework, 
intermediary intervention was institutionalised to promote community initiatives that can 
serve as direct channels for the voices of local residents. However, the above case study 
analysis revealed that the institutionalised intermediary intervention hindered the 
formation of autonomy of community initiatives, while non-institutionalised intervention 






In the first case study of a national URP, all intermediary actors had immediate 
communication with SMG through direct contracts with it. This contractual structure 
reinforced the casualisation of their position and thereby weakened their confidence or 
enthusiasm at work. This contractual dilemma, however, was often overlooked within the 
legal framework, which sees the intermediary actors as provisional players designed to 
support the national URP. As a provisional agency, the intermediary organisation had no 
legal rights for its employment contract, annual budgeting and business operation for 
community activities. All the legal rights were vested in SMG. As a result, the 
intermediary actors had a limited sense of long-term ownership in urban regeneration. In 
addition, the intermediary actors struggled with the time constraints that hindered the 
growth of a financially autonomous local cooperative, which took an intermediary role 
after the end of the URP. These time constraints led the local cooperative to engage in 
repeated competition for limited public funds allocated for certain national goals. This 
means that financial resource allocation was still made under a top-down competition 
system, while more bottom-up participation was promoted in the course of urban 
regeneration. This situation often frustrated the community members, who lamented that 
their roles were dedicated to securing financial resources rather than enhancing 
communal autonomy. This trend is found in the use of new communal spaces owned and 
managed by SMG. The community members were not able to use the communal spaces 
without consent from SMG. Even when consent for such use was granted at the regional 
level, it was hard to provide the desired services, as their legitimacy was strictly regulated 
at the national level. Accordingly, new community initiatives, which emerged through 
intermediary intervention in the national URP, remain powerless under the top-down 
financial resource allocations and the strict national legal restrictions. 
 
To redress such drawbacks of the national URP, SMG introduced a new scheme called 
the mayoral URP. The mayoral URP reduced time pressure by creating a one-year NID 
programme within its time frame. Moreover, it also improved intermediary work 
conditions by upgrading the intermediary position from part-time to full-time. This 
change was possible through the inclusion of professional firms within the intermediary 
structure. This new approach created a subcontract system where all intermediary 





subcontract system was useful, as it could provide the intermediary actors with full-time 
positions and a full social benefits package. Besides, it also promoted cooperation 
between SMG and professional experts such as architects, planners, and marketers for 
more efficient implementation of the mayoral URP. However, direct engagement of the 
professional firms caused a distinction between experts and non-experts among 
intermediaries. Such expert-oriented approach contributed to specialising the COs’ 
position while encouraging them to work with a professional architectural firm. At the 
same time, however, the COs were often isolated at work while other intermediary actors 
were contracted with different professional firms. Unsurprisingly, each intermediary 
actor tended to work individually, while each of the professional firms worked separately 
rather than collectively to carry out discrete intermediary tasks. In this unique partnership, 
the intermediary organisation ended up with no coordination system for internal 
cooperation. Accordingly, many intermediary actors struggled under the partnership, 
which undermined intermediary teamwork and leadership, rendering intermediary 
intervention less cooperative and coherent.  
 
Under these circumstances, some active residents played a key role in promoting cross-
boundary cooperation by participating in diverse intermediary-led community activities. 
However, they were often excluded from important decision-making such as annual 
budgets or property acquisition for their community activities. These decisions were made 
confidentially by SMG or the local authority. Such exclusion is also found in the national 
URP, but it was deepened in the mayoral URP due to the inclusion of professional firms. 
The expert-oriented approach prevented residents from having official positions or voices 
in the intermediary structure. Rather, it forced them to remain voluntary while taking for 
granted their active participation without appropriate compensation. This meant that 
residents were bound to work around the intermediary structure set by professional firms. 
It was difficult for them to act within the intermediary structure and reshape this structure 
to improve intermediary-led participation. In this sense, it is seen that the community 
initiatives in the mayoral URP were neither autonomous nor empowered under the 
influence of the professional firms. 
 
Meanwhile, the third case study of DJA was reviewed to provide ‘rival explanations’ 





financial resources were local trust funds and charitable donations, which enabled the 
intermediary organisation to promote radical community-based services such as local 
banking and a local kitchen. The important point is that the intermediary organisation 
encouraged the residents to create community initiatives and provide such services on 
their own. In this context, the new community initiatives could improve their autonomy 
while diversifying their activities and participating in the activities as caregivers, 
carpenters, cooks, or undertakers. However, these community activities still remained 
tactical. That is, they were based on informal tactics of residents outside the government 
institution. In fact, the tactical approach helped the community initiatives to maximise 
flexibility in their community activities. From the government perspective, however, 
these community activities were not in line with its rules, while the intermediary 
organisation was not its local counterpart, but a radical civic group acting against it. 
Accordingly, the intermediary-led participation was overlooked by the government, as it 
was deemed to be beyond its remit.  
 
Under these circumstances, the intermediary-led participation was vulnerable to 
speculative market forces seeking redevelopment in DJA. The community initiatives have 
been exposed to the risk of potential gentrification with clearance of their community 
assets, such as the communal kitchen (sikdorak), common room (sarangbang), local bank 
office (hyeobdonghoe) as well as residential rooms (jjokbangs). However, the community 
initiatives could not take any legal action against the potential gentrification, because the 
redevelopment was prepared within the government’s legal framework. In this context, 
the statutory power of the market overrode the non-statutory status of the intermediary 
organisation, giving rise to a threat to the established communal autonomy. In this regard, 
it is understood that the self-funded intermediary intervention served to form communal 
autonomy by mobilising the informal tactics of the community initiatives. At the same 
time, however, it prevented the community initiatives from officially working with the 
government by making their participation tactical and radical, outside the government 
institution. Further interpretation and comparison of the findings of this chapter will be 
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In this chapter, the thematic analysis in Chapter 5 is developed further through articulation 
with the conceptual framework shown in Chapters 2 and 3. To achieve this, the case 
studies are reviewed through the conceptual lens of the ‘community of practice’ (CoP) 
for a more critical understanding of community development through intermediary 
intervention in power mechanisms. Then, they are reviewed through the concepts of 
‘social capital’ and ‘structural holes’ to decipher opportunities and challenges of 
intermediary-led participation in network mechanisms. Drawing on such critical reviews, 
the chapter concludes with a cross-case discussion on intermediary-led participation in 
the recent urban regeneration framework in Korea. 
 
6.2. Is Intermediary-led Participation Instrumentalised? 
6.2.1. Community of Practice under Government Control 
During the URP, a new local initiative has grown in CSA. Looking at its growth process, 
it appears that the local initiative was more than just a group of people living in CSA. The 
initiative was developed when its members identified a common interest and learnt how 
to put it into practice more effectively through regular gatherings. That is, central to the 
initiative was a ‘learning partnership among people who find it useful to learn from and 
with each other about a particular domain’ (Wenger, Trayner and de Laat, 2011, p.9). In 
this respect, the new local initiative in CSA can be seen as a form of CoP (Wenger, 1998). 
Drawing on the temporal aspect of CoP, it is clarified that the local initiative’s collective 
identity has been changed over time in the URP process. The following diagram shows 







As mentioned earlier, the residents in CSA were divided into two opposing camps: one 
for and one against the NTP. Even after the NTP was cancelled, the camps remained in 
conflict. Hence, it was a priority for the local UR centre to ease such conflict and restore 
interaction between the opposing camps. To this end, in the planning step (step 1), the 
local UR centre organised a regular gathering where anyone could come and discuss 
matters, regardless of which camp they were from. In these gatherings, the cross-camp 
residents were invited to participate in building mutual trust and finding common interests. 
This point was stressed by one resident who regularly participated in the gatherings during 
the URP.   
Since 2007, we have been divided into two camps: a pro-NTP camp and an 
anti-NTP camp. During the NTP period, the two camps barely talked but picked 
on each other. However, some changes took place after the URP replaced the 
NTP in 2014. The local UR centre gave us many chances to come together 
across the camps. For example, the centre regularly organised a neighbourhood 
gathering where people could just come and talk, no matter what the issue. At 
first, it was very awkward, but I found it useful, as it was the first time I had 
really listened to people on the opposite side (the pro-NTP camp). I would say 
that the series of gatherings helped ease the tension, although the underlying 
conflict still remains. (C1-CS-INT-2-1, 2018, a local resident) 





This description confirms that the gatherings served to restore the interaction between the 
opposing camps, albeit moderately. This was possible because the former anti-NTP 
residents were strong supporters of the URP. They considered the URP as a publicly-
funded programme rather than a resident-funded redevelopment project. Hence, they saw 
the URP as an alternative to the NTP for their neighbourhood improvement with no high 
redevelopment charge (C1-CS-INT-1-1, 2018). On the other hand, the former pro-NTP 
residents were initially reluctant to accept the URP. For them, it was a project that could 
not make as much profit as the NTP. While it was not the best option, they were not 
against the URP. This was because the NTP was in deadlock and the URP was the only 
realistic option to choose, albeit with less profit. By matching such different interests, the 
local UR centre could run gatherings where residents from the two camps could express 
their interests candidly and understand each other better. This process was fundamental 
to building rapport between the former opposing camps in the planning step.  
 
However, it is admitted that the level of resident participation differed between the two 
former camps. The former anti-NTP residents were actively engaged in collaboration with 
the local UR centre (active invitees). In contrast, the former pro-NTP residents were less 
involved (passive invitees), although they were not against the URP. Despite such 
difference, both groups of residents participated as ‘invitees’ with a common goal of 
improving their neighbourhood through the URP. This trend continued in the subsequent 
implementation and self-sustaining steps. This point was underlined by a former anti-
NTP resident who participated in a streetscape improvement project in the 
implementation step. 
In fact, we anti-NTP residents were often in conflict with each other during the 
NTP. This is because there were both landlords and tenants with different 
interests in the camp. But during the URP, we could ease this conflict by finding 
mutual interests and putting them into practice. For example, the local UR 
centre ran a project called ‘streetscape improvement’. It entailed a series of 
spatial practices: repaving of footways, repainting of facades, and planting of 
new trees. At that time, many residents got involved, regardless of whether they 
were landlords or tenants; even former pro-NTP or anti-NTP. It just happened, 
as the project was certainly good for both sides: increasing the property value 





back on it now, it was really worth the participation, as it proved that we can 
do it together when needed. (C1-CS-INT-3, 2018, a local resident) 
As such, in the implementation step, the local UR centre invited some active residents to 
engage in more advanced participation as ‘advanced invitees’. These advanced activities 
included collective spatial practices, from repainting facades or planting trees to creating 
communal spaces or tour routes. The advanced invitees could participate in such practices 
with ease, as a level of mutual understanding had already been established during the 
previous planning step. They managed to identify shared values, define shared goals, and 
detail necessary actions for best practice while constantly exchanging their experiences 
or knowledge in a process of forming collective intelligence that can constantly inspire 
the active residents to participate in the URP. 
 
To borrow the words of Jürgen Habermas (1984), ‘communicative actions’ emerged in 
the implementation step, while the advanced invitees served to form a ‘communicative 
rationality’. For example, some motivated residents led community meetings and 
promoted knowledge exchange among participants in spatial practices such as repainting 
of facades, upgrading of lighting, planting of new trees, and designing of tour routes. By 
doing so, the participants could understand their neighbourhood in their own way through 
increased interaction, integration, and interdependence. Simply put, the residents in CSA 
were invited to a nuanced process of building a communicative rationality and thereby 
generating diverse communicative actions in the URP. This process was significant, as it 
served to improve their shared sense of belonging to their neighbourhood and inspire their 
ongoing participation. This point was stressed by one resident who participated in the 
joint practice of designing tour routes. 
 
To be honest, although I’m a native here, I’d never been proud of CSA. For me, 
it’s just an inner-city area in Seoul. However, participating in the tour route 
design practice made me change my mind. For the tour route design, the local 
UR centre organised a variety of community workshops. I joined a workshop 
called ‘The discovery of local history and culture’. Collecting historical and 
cultural stories, I was given chances to discuss them and learn more about my 
neighbourhood. With the collection of stories, we put together a local history 





and I somehow became proud of it. For example, I found out that this is the 
hometown of Paik Nam Jun (known as the father of video art). As I’m a big fan 
of his, it’s enough to make me feel proud of living here. I also found that Queen 
Jeongsun stayed here after the loss of her husband, King Danjong. I couldn’t 
imagine that this deprived area would have served the royal family. Such 
findings encouraged my sense of pride and belonging to where I live. (C1-CS-
INT-2-1, 2018, a local resident) 
 
In such joint practices, the residents were promoted to find something new about their 
neighbourhood, which had often been overlooked or forgotten in the past. Their findings 
served as a basic idea to create their neighbourhood plan in urban regeneration. 
Furthermore, the findings were shared with a wider range of residents by documenting 
and disseminating them. That is to say, the residents were invited to the process of 
producing collective intelligence that constantly inspired them to participate in the URP. 
Such collective intelligence is distinct from ‘explicit knowledge’ (Smith, 2001), which 
refers to the ‘know-what’ that is coded and conveyed in certain media such as papers and 
books. Rather, it is more ‘tacit knowledge’ (ibid.) signifying the ‘know-how’ that is stored 
and transferred in the form of memories, experiences, and practices of the residents. 
Hence, this collective intelligence could be beyond the direct control by knowledge of 
dominant groups such as the state or SMG. For the residents, this collective intelligence 
is a significant set of consensual norms underpinning their participatory practices in the 
URP. 
 
Entering the next self-sustaining step (step 3), the advanced invitees were actively 
working with the residents-turned-COs to spread the collective intelligence across CSA. 
They were no longer just invitees but rather ‘assistant practitioners’ officially supporting 
the local UR centre. Such invitees-turned-practitioners took multiple roles in the self-
sustaining step. As administrators, they contributed to facilitating knowledge exchange 
between the residents and SMG while having frequent gatherings: for example, to gather 
feedback on community practices or public support. As practitioners, they also tried to 
pass on their knowledge to new invitees by running a series of hands-on training 





the invitees-turned-practitioners took multiple roles as local administrator and local 
pioneers. 
 
After the publication of the history booklet, the local UR centre provided us 
with more personalised training. For example, I was engaged in intensive 
workshops to create the local walking tour programme. Drawing on the 
contents of the history booklet, I was asked to identify local attractions and 
design a tour route, but I made little progress, as I was just an ordinary 
housewife with no experience in tourism. So, the centre offered people like me 
more practical training courses like tour guide classes. By taking such courses, 
I joined an initiative to build a local walking tour initiative where I started to 
work as a local guide. As a representative of the initiative, I was in direct 
communication with SMG when any administrative problems occurred during 
the walking tour in CSA. At the same time, as a leader running the tour 
programme, I had to train new residents who wanted to be tour guides in the 
future. By doing so, I could gain diverse experiences and extend my personal 
networks of relationships. (C1-CS-INT-2-1, 2018, a local resident) 
 
The local tour programme was just one of many examples that promoted community-
based knowledge transfer in CSA. This was also evident in a variety of emerging 
community programmes. For example, some interested residents were given barista 
training as well as culinary training from pioneers in the community café programme. 
Others learned clothing alterations through sewing and knitting classes run by leaders in 
the community tailor programme. It is certain that such knowledge transfer helped to 
maintain community participation by making the community itself into a knowledge 
repository. That is to say, community participation could continue through explicit 
knowledge exchange and transfer in the diverse community programmes. 
 
Meanwhile, the local UR centre made extra efforts to broaden the explicit knowledge 
base by promoting external knowledge exchange. It organised a series of joint events 
between CSA and other areas. In these events, the residents in CSA could listen to and 
learn from what different URP areas had achieved or missed. For the residents, such 





from other URP areas and take them as a reference point for a better implementation of 
their URP. This point was mentioned by one resident who often participated in these 
external knowledge change events. 
 
I was not sure if we were doing well, because the URP was new to us. I often 
wondered about URPs in other areas. In the meantime, our local UR centre 
invited several COs from different URP areas to present their experiences from 
their URPs while we shared ours. Through this interactive process, I found that 
our difficulties were nothing special, but were very common in many other 
URP areas. They struggled with a very tight schedule, as did we. They also 
suffered from limited sources of finance, which also frustrated us in CSA. Such 
understanding motivated me to look into other areas when any problem arose 
during the URP in CSA. (C1-CS-INT-1, 2018, a local resident) 
 
As such, intermediary effort was made to promote knowledge exchange among different 
neighbourhoods. Apart from the above joint event, the local UR centre organised a series 
of field trips to other URP areas where the residents could see and learn diverse know-
how on the spot. Moreover, it also encouraged the residents to join a regular study group 
where the COs from different URP areas gathered to discuss their community work with 
each other. By participating in this study group, the residents were given opportunities to 
monitor URPs in other areas and thereby to expand their collective intelligence in CSA. 
Such knowledge exchange activities were usually organised and held through the COs’ 
personal connections. In other words, the collective intelligence in CSA could be 
broadened through the external networks established by the COs during the URP. The 
important point here is that such intermediary intervention continued even after the local 
UR centre had been replaced with the local cooperative in the post-project step. In this 
transition, the members in the local cooperative began to act as ‘leading practitioners’ 
rather than just assistant practitioners, while the centre’s staff members left CSA. This 
meant that residents with direct involvement in the local cooperative were given more 
responsibilities. Such transition was facilitated through ongoing interaction between the 






After the URP was completed, the local UR centre closed down and its staff 
members found new jobs. Two former community organisers got public jobs 
with the urban regeneration unit in SMG. Another community organiser opened 
an architectural studio, which specialised in communal space planning and 
design. Although they have left CSA, we still keep in touch with the former 
centre’s staff members. For example, the former CO running her studio recently 
organised a series of workshops to discuss sustainable communal spaces. I was 
invited to the workshops, where I was able to meet many like-minded people 
outside CSA. I was also asked to join a social enterprise seminar designed by 
the other former CO currently working for SMG, at which I established new 
relationships with people from the social enterprise sector as well as the public 
sector. Through such experiences, I now feel like I’m no longer a big fish in a 
little pond of CSA. (C1-IS-INT-1, 2018, a leader in a local cooperative) 
 
This confirms that the former COs still make indirect contributions to community 
development by constantly promoting the local cooperative’s members to participate in 
relevant external activities.  
 
Despite such ongoing support, however, the local cooperative cannot take autonomous 
actions due to its weak financial independence and the strict national legislation. To give 
an example, the leading practitioners often conducted one-off urban practices that 
produced immediate, noticeable progress, such as repaving footways or repainting 
facades to secure public funds for the next term. Thus, it was difficult to promote constant 
urban practices such as alleyway management or housing maintenance where the 





residents could be more empowered. Besides, the leading practitioners were unable to 
autonomously manage their communal spaces, such as a local learning studio, a children’s 
playground, or even a cooperative office. They were required to gain consent from SMG, 
which owned all the spaces. Even if consent is given at the local level, it is hard to provide 
their desired services as their legitimacy is strictly regulated at the national level. 
Accordingly, the residents in CSA remained unempowered, although their collective 
identity orientation has been transformed from that of passive invitees towards 
progressive practitioners. 
 
6.2.2. Centralised Social Networks and Powerless Structural Hole Spanners 
Under the above circumstances, the local UR centre primarily tried to promote 
communication between the residents and the government, which had supposedly been 
overlooked in the past NTP. As a direct broker, the local UR centre often organised 
various events designed to allow the residents to explore the new national urban 
regeneration scheme and helped them to put their ideas into practice. It also encouraged 
the residents to build and spread community-based knowledge so that SMG can better 
understand their aspirational goals or visions for the URP. Hence, it is understood that the 
local UR centre endeavoured to fill a social gap between the residents and SMG by 
creating a window of opportunity for their improved mutual understanding. Such idea can 
be well captured systematically with the hybrid concept of structural holes (Burt, 2000) 
and social capital (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000; Woolcock, 2001). The following 
diagram represents the intermediary structure with structural holes and social capital that 







In the above diagram, there are three distinctive groups of stakeholders across different 
social networks in CSA: the pro-NTP camp, the anti-NTP camp, and SMG. At the 
beginning of the URP, the residents from both camps were invited to regular gatherings 
to build rapport and develop an initiative to map out a neighbourhood plan. It is true that 
such gatherings served to ease the overall tension between the opposing camps. Yet, it 
appears that the former anti-NTP camp was supportive of URP, while the former pro-
NTP camp was still reluctant due to its low profitability. Consequently, this caused a gap 
in the levels of participation between the opposing camps, which can be seen as a 
‘structural hole’ (Burt, 2000). To fill this structural hole, the local UR centre made extra 
effort to bring the two camps together in subsequent events or workshops. Despite such 
effort, this structural hole remained unfilled due to the lack of time and autonomy of the 
local UR centre. In other words, the local UR centre was not fully able to act as a structural 
hole spanner between the two camps, as it was a state-sponsored actor mainly dedicated 
to working between the residents and SMG under a fixed-term contract. Hence, for 





operational efficiency in the URP, the local UR centre rather contributed to reinforcing 
the internal ties in the former anti-NTP camp (bonding social capital) while creating only 
a few cross ties to the other camp (bridging social capital), although the overall tension 
across the camps was reduced. 
 
Meanwhile, some residents, particularly from the former anti-NTP camp, took a more 
active role in the URP through engagement of the local UR centre. They were invited to 
participate in more advanced community activities such as creating communal spaces or 
tour routes, and could join events where they interacted directly with SMG. That is, 
residents were often given new opportunities to communicate with SMG during the URP, 
leading to an emergence of new social ties across vertical power differentials akin to 
‘linking social capital’ (Woolcock, 2001). Taking advantage of such new social ties, the 
local UR centre served to bridge a gap – another structural hole – in social interactions 
between the residents and SMG. In other words, the local UR centre acted as a structural 
hole spanner by strengthening mutual trust and understanding between the residents and 
SMG. Entering the post-project period, however, the local UR centre was disbanded. 
Instead, a new community-based local cooperative was established by taking over the 
role of structural hole spanner: this signalled a change in organisational identity of the 
intermediary from a state-led towards a community-driven organisation. It can thus be 
argued that a community-based intermediary system was initiated in CSA, while the local 
cooperative emerged as a new structural hole spanner.  
 
However, the state has strongly influenced the new intermediary system even after the 
end of the URP. As a structural hole spanner, the local cooperative could neither achieve 
financial autonomy nor have statutory rights to make practical use of community assets 
such as communal spaces or services. This is because the local cooperative was very 
limited in its ability to make its own decisions without governmental consent even for its 
communal interests. The local cooperative could play only a limited role as a structural 
hole spanner in ongoing urban regeneration. Therefore, it is no surprise that the structural 
hole spanner could not achieve meaningful interventions to empower the residents despite 
its contribution to improving their participation in urban regeneration. In this sense, it is 





its legal or financial mechanisms remain centralised, particularly in the use of the 
community assets. 
 
On the other hand, in the post-project period, there have been constant efforts by 
intermediary actors to broaden horizontal ties across different local neighbourhoods 
beyond narrow internal ties in CSA. This means that intermediary actors have provided 
more flexible and long-term support to their former local partners by making use of 
diverse informal counter-hegemonic practices after the end of their short-term official 
responsibilities. For example, CSA’s former COs continue to make indirect contributions 
to community development by constantly promoting local cooperative’s members in CSA 
to engage in the informal process of lobbying for policy changes, disseminating local 
knowledge, and organising social events and circles. This can be seen as progressive 
intermediary intervention to create what Gramsci refers to as horizontal alliances by 
countering the hegemony of top-down participatory mechanisms. That is, intermediary 
intervention was initially co-opted into the state agenda, but is now serving to form the 
basis for expanding horizontal alliances with wider progressive social forces through 
more indirect, informal, individual, and flexible interventions. Such change is meaningful, 
because it signals the potential to build a foundation for progressive urban reform across 
the boundaries between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic bloc in the urban 
development process. 
 
Despite its progressive potential, however, intermediary intervention still plays a limited 
role in elevating the improved community participation to the next level of community 
empowerment. While the intermediary intervention has been mainly instructed by the 
state, the community participation has become standardised rather than diversified. 
Compared to the past developmental state where community participation remained 
patchy and tokenistic, it is certain that the recent post-developmental state has given more 
prominence to active participation of a wider range of communities in the urban 
development process. At the same time, however, the state has imposed more regulations 
on community participation in order to institutionalise it through intermediary 
intervention funded by the state. In other words, while the state previously directed the 
market as a developmental engine, it is now steering intermediaries as a new instrument 





as an auditor or assessor influencing the way in which intermediaries work by 
standardising and evaluating what these intermediaries have to do. That is, the state enacts 
the ‘rules of the game’ of the URP while the intermediary organisation enforces the rules 
to activate community participation. In this game, however, community members have 
been excluded from the decision-making process of determining the rules of play, the 
system of refereeing or who plays. It is difficult for them to play a role in localising their 
intermediary mechanisms for more meaningful community participation. Under these 
circumstances, hence, community participation has been easily instrumentalised to 
achieve the state’s desired goals rather than local interests or needs, while ‘human 
flourishing’ (Friedmann, 2000) is prevented from achieving genuine growth. In this 
regard, despite its inherent potential to shape progressive urban futures, it is understood 
that the intermediary intervention still preserves the sticky nature of the interventionist 
state and affects post-developmental urbanisation in Korea by controlling community 
participation through centralised financial and legal measures, which can be considered a 
developmental legacy of top-down decision making.  
 
6.3. Is Intermediary-led Participation Professionalised? 
6.3.1. Community of Practice through Professional Expertise 
In the mayoral URP, new community initiatives emerged through the intervention of an 
intermediary organisation that promoted learning situations where residents could learn 
from each other while participating in intermediary-led community activities. Like the 
national URP, the mayoral URP hence gave prominence to nurturing community 
initiatives, which can be conceptualised as a CoP (Wenger, 1998). In the general view, 
the CoP emerging from the national and mayoral URPs went through a similar change in 
its organisational identity from a group of invitees to practitioners. However, a close look 
at the mayoral URP revealed that the change in its CoP took place in a slightly different 
manner. This is because the CoP in the mayoral URP has grown under the two distinctive 
intermediary conditions: the creation of the NID programme (for an extra time frame) and 







As mentioned earlier, in 2006, SMG designated CHA as a housing reconstruction zone 
where old low-rise flats could be transformed into new medium-rise apartment buildings. 
However, it made little progress due to its building regulations, which restrict the height 
of new buildings and thereby lower the profitability of new reconstruction in CHA. As a 
result, the housing reconstruction in CHA was cancelled without a back-up plan, while 
social, economic, and physical deprivation in the region worsened. In order to prevent 
further deprivation, SMG launched a pilot NID programme, which is a preliminary step 
in the mayoral URP. Initially, residents appeared to believe that the new programme 
would also be cancelled or short-lived. Hence, during the NID programme, intermediary 
effort was made to convince the residents that the new mayoral URP differs from the 
cancelled housing reconstruction project. To this end, COs organised regular gatherings 
where residents could learn about SMG’s urban regeneration approaches and restore 
confidence in the mayoral URP. This was pointed out by one of the residents who 
participated in the NID programme in CHA.  
 
After the cancellation of the NTP in CHA, we distrusted SMG no matter what 
they suggested. When the NID programme was launched, we all suspected that 
COs would be no more than just public officials, but it was not long before that 





turned out to be unfounded. I saw that the COs worked very hard, although they 
had nothing to do with our neighbourhood. Rather than working in an office, 
they were often in the field and they met as many local people as possible. 
Besides, the COs organised regular gatherings where anyone could come and 
learn more about Seoul’s urban regeneration scheme, which was unfamiliar to 
us. In these gatherings, they tried to listen carefully to what we had to say about 
local issues or even personal difficulties, so I felt their true heart and thought 
that the mayoral URP should differ from other public projects in the past. I 
think such experience promoted my constant participation in community 
activities during the NID programme. (C2-CS-INT-2, 2018, a local resident) 
 
This shows that intermediary intervention helped to reduce the residents’ distrust towards 
SMG, which had cancelled the housing reconstruction in CHA. It was a small but 
important change that enabled the residents to change their minds and begin to pay 
attention to the mayoral URP. In the NID programme, residents were encouraged to 
participate in diverse workshops and construct their own local knowledge while studying 
collectively economic, social and cultural aspects of their neighbourhood. Based on their 
findings from the study, residents could identify shared domains of interests or needs and 
create new initiatives to address them. This can be seen as a preliminary step where a 
group of ‘invitees’ emerged as an initial community of practice that made preparations 
for the mayoral URP while growing a sense of belonging to the neighbourhood, as 
stressed by a resident who attended many workshops.  
 
The COs organised a variety of workshops where I could start to study my 
neighbourhood. For example, we researched underused local spaces such as 
vacant offices, abandoned pocket parks, or shopping arcades. Although I’m 
native here, I have rarely had a chance to take a close look at where I live, but 
attending these workshops gave me the chance to see more about my 
neighbourhood. In the beginning, the workshops helped us to understand 
general local features like the local economy, history, or education through desk 
research. Then, we went out to identify more detailed local issues such as an 
unsafe school zone, a lack of security cameras, or communal facilities. I really 





every corner of my neighbourhood, I felt that I could develop a strong 
attachment and love for the place where I live. (C2-CS-INT-3, 2018, a local 
resident) 
 
The workshops attracted a range of participants from different population groups, from 
students to retirees and from housewives to local politicians. This meant that each of the 
participants had different initial desires and they forged a variety of small initiatives with 
diverse themes. In this regard, it is seen that the NID programme contributed to proactive 
identification of different individual demands before the next step of the mayoral URP. 
Therefore, this was a preliminary step where the community members as invitees could 
prepare to classify their individual demands and develop them into collective action, as 
pointed out by a resident who tried to match her individual aspiration with the shared 
domain of communal interest, namely after-school childcare. 
 
After taking a break from my career to become a mother, I felt that my life was 
dull and boring, but something has changed in my life since I participated in 
the NID programme. When I joined a local knitting club, I felt as if I was back 
in my heyday as a fashion designer. In the knitting club, I encountered some 
women in their 40s who were also young mothers like me. While meeting 
regularly with each other, we created another club for after-school childcare 
that we really needed. Even after the NID programme was completed, we 
actively and deliberately participated in the club activities, because we wanted 
to draw local attention to this after-school childcare issue in the next five-year 
programme. To be honest, I’ve never been so actively engaged in any other 
programmes promoted by SMG. I think it was possible with the great help from 
the COs, who guided us to find out what we needed during the NID and then 






The above description is just one of the many examples of how individual aspirations 
could develop into collective actions through interactions among the invitees. Community 
initiatives for urban gardening, DIY woodcraft, and a senior musical band are also cases 
in point (C4-IS-INT-3, 2018). Central to such emerging initiatives was the intermediary 
intervention, which served as a platform to encourage the invitees to associate their 
individual desires with broader local issues. To borrow Habermas’s (1984) term, the 
invitees were initiated into the formation of ‘communicative rationality’ while interacting 
with each other in the intermediary-led community activities. One thing to note here is 
that the communicative rationality was widened and the consequent communicative 
action was diversified in the mayoral URP compared to the national URP. This meant 
that the invitees in the mayoral URP could undertake a wider range of communicative 
actions based on more comprehensive communicative rationality. This was made possible 
by introducing the NID programme, where the invitees were given one extra year to better 
explore their local issues and organise diverse initiatives to address these issues in 
advance. 
 
In the subsequent five-year programme, the intermediary organisation took on greater 
responsibility and engaged some invitees in more advanced participation: ‘advanced 
invitees’. The advanced invitees were asked to support the intermediary organisation by 
sharing the increased intermediary responsibility. For example, the intermediary 





organisation tried to engage the advanced invitees in paperwork such as creating a project 
proposal or an accounting book. Such engagement helped the advanced invitees to gain a 
sense of how to work with the public sector, as highlighted by a resident who assisted the 
COs in the local UR centre. 
 
Indeed, we residents could learn a lot by watching how the COs worked with 
government. In planning step, I was given an opportunity to assist the COs in 
making official documents like a project proposal, a progress report and an 
accounting book. For example, I helped them to computerise a detailed 
breakdown of expenditure in the centre and make a monthly accounting book 
to be reported to government. Certainly, such practices let me better understand 
how the public budget is spent and saved to run diverse community activities 
in my neighbourhood. Despite my role being small, it was a useful experience 
for me personally, because it let me feel a basic sense of cooperation with 
government that I’ve never had before. (C2-CS-INT-6, 2019, a local resident). 
 
This shows that the intermediary intervention enabled residents to experience the 
processes of working with the public sector, albeit indirectly. As its workload increased, 
the centre began to see residents as an alternative workforce and share some responsibility 
with them. From the intermediary organisation’s point of view, it was a turning point 
where residents-turned-practitioners started to appear in its intermediary structure. From 
the residents’ viewpoint, however, such change did not necessarily lead them to 
constructive dialogues or relationships with the intermediary organisation. Rather, it often 
made them feel disconnected from the intermediary organisation, and by extension, from 
the government. The reason is that the residents-turned-practitioners still remained as 
volunteers rather than staff, while their volunteering was taken for granted. That is, the 
advanced invitees, who took on some of the COs’ responsibilities, were able to develop 
into practitioners only by working on a voluntary basis: ‘voluntary practitioners’. The 
important point here is that these voluntary practitioners had no real power or influence 
in decision-making, as they were not regarded as official members in the intermediary 
organisation. This caused an ironic situation: the more active their participation, the less 
their sense of inclusion by the intermediaries, as described by a resident who participated 






Entering the five-year programme, I saw that the COs struggled with their 
increased workload. They worked with more staff and engaged with much more 
office work than before. I thought the COs wanted to share some of their 
responsibilities with active residents like me, but it was not easy without 
adequate training, as everything was new to us. So, the COs promoted us to 
participate in a variety of training workshops run by external organisations, 
such as a social enterprise association or a home repair cooperative. I found 
such workshops more practical and specialised than the ones held during the 
NID programme, but I found it difficult to practice such knowledge and 
experience in reality. This is because I haven’t been allowed to participate as 
an official member in the local UR centre. I’m still only a volunteer who 
unofficially assists COs, so I feel I still have no real rights in the centre. I’m not 
sure that a basis for shared responsibility between the centre and us can be 
sustainable as long as we are forced to volunteer. (C2-CS-INT-1, 2018, a local 
resident) 
 
The active residents were welcomed to come and assist the intermediary organisation, but 
were only allowed to work as voluntary assistants in the mayoral URP. This point was 
distinct from what was found in the national URP. For example, in the national URP, 
some active residents were officially hired as staff in the intermediary organisation, albeit 
on a part-time basis: as residents-turned-COs. This was possible because all 
intermediaries made direct contract with SMG. As mentioned earlier, however, the 
mayoral URP created a multi-level contractual system where all intermediaries had to 
make contracts through the profit-oriented private sector: professional firms. In this 
contractual system, the professional firms served as gatekeepers to control the process of 
employment and management of intermediary actors, while SMG stayed one step away 
from the process. Looking at this process, the professional firms deployed the existing 
employees rather than recruiting new staff from residents, as the firms were profit-driven. 
This meant that residents were given little opportunity to work as staff in the intermediary 
organisation, but as only volunteers. Unsurprisingly, the CoP in the mayoral URP was 
hence limited in its ability to communicate with SMG beyond the professional firms 






6.3.2. Multi-layered Social Networks and Professional Structural Hole Spanners 
The above consideration can be more clearly presented through the hybrid concept of 
structural holes (Burt, 2000) and social capital (Putnam, 2000; Coleman, 1990; Woolcock, 
2001). The diagram below shows a multi-layered governance structure in CHA, 
consisting of five distinctive groups: SMG (main funder), local government 
(commissioner), professional firm (implementer), participating resident group, and non-
participating resident group.  
 
 
At the beginning of the mayoral URP, residents were invited to identify mutual interests 
and needs, and to create new initiatives to address them. Each of these initiatives was 
internally close-knit while making individual plans and taking immediate action. On the 
other hand, each initiative seldom interacted with other initiatives, and thereby they 
hardly expanded their membership beyond their existing domain of interests. Entering the 
next five-year programme, the intermediary organisation made an effort to facilitate the 





inactive interaction between the close-knit initiatives by working closely with active 
residents. The active residents here performed a key role in promoting cross-initiative 
interaction while participating in multiple activities led by different initiatives. The 
intermediary organisation encouraged such participation by the active residents, leading 
to the creation of social ties among different initiatives. Moreover, the intermediary 
organisation engaged the active residents in building rapport with external players such 
as social entrepreneurs. Such experience enabled each initiative to extend its internal ties 
while communicating with those from external networks. In this sense, it is understood 
that the intermediary intervention contributed to developing ‘bridging social capital’ by 
encouraging the active residents to interact with those from different local initiatives, and 
by extension, with external communities or organisations. 
 
However, as stressed earlier, most of the active residents were from certain groups of the 
population that could afford time to participate in multiple community activities. Many 
others could not manage to make time to participate during their working hours. 
Unsurprisingly, there was doubt as to whether the active residents could fully represent 
the opinions of all local residents. This is a point where a gap is identified between a 
participating resident group (e.g. housewives, retirees) and a non-participating group (e.g. 
ordinary office workers): that is, a ‘structural hole’ (Burt, 2000). The intermediary 
organisation tried to fill this structural hole, for example, by organising weekend activities 
aimed at increasing the participation of the non-participating residents. Despite such 
effort, the structural hole remained unfilled. This is because the extra effort served only 
as a stopgap measure and the increased participation ended up being short-lived in reality. 
That is, the interaction between the two different groups resumed through the 
intermediary intervention but failed to last long. Under the circumstances, the 
intermediary intervention could not adequately serve as a structural hole spanner between 
the two groups. Rather, it widened the gap and raised critical issues such as intermediary-
led community representation and diversity. 
 
Meanwhile, the intermediary organisation shared its responsibility with the active 
residents as its workload increased. For the active residents, this was a good chance to 
gain a better understanding of how the public budget is managed to maintain their 





bridge the gap between the residents and SMG, which is another ‘structural hole’. That 
is, it looked as if the intermediary organisation served as a structural hole spanner by 
incorporating the active residents into the intermediary structure. In reality, however, it 
turned out that even active residents were not closely connected with SMG through the 
intermediary intervention. This is because the residents were only allowed to participate 
in intermediary-led activities as informal volunteers rather than as official staff. Hence, 
despite their increased participation, the residents were given no real opportunity for 
direct negotiation or discussion with SMG beyond the professional firms in the official 
decision-making process. They were not given the opportunity to expand social ties 
across vertical differentials: that is, linking social capital. This trend will continue as long 
as professional firms remain as gatekeepers in the intermediary structure of the mayoral 
URP. This additional layer has made some positive contributions to specialising 
intermediary roles, stabilising intermediary positions, and thereby improving 
intermediary working conditions. At the same time, however, it has caused a lack of 
leadership and teamwork in the intermediary organisation and deepened the isolation of 
each intermediary member. Besides, the additional layer comprised well-trained 
professional members with profit-oriented strategies. In this context, the residents were 
barely regarded as decision-makers but rather were seen as mere service users despite 
their active participation. Instead, the professional firms appeared as official local 
counterparts of SMG in the mayoral URP. Accordingly, the CoP was unable to expand 
its social networks beyond the additional layer of professional firms. 
 
In this regard, this thesis argues that the CoP here has been manipulated rather than 
cultivated through the multi-level platform, referring to meta-governance (Jessop, 2003). 
In the mayoral URP, the meta-governance created a structure of combined operation of 
the professional firms as implementers and SMG as an assessor of that implementation. 
In fact, this meta-governance structure was designed to decentralise decision-making 
processes, but in reality, it served to re-centralise these decentralised processes around 
new local pivots: that is, the professional firms. This means that instead of SMG, 
professional firms managed the middle-level actors’ intervention, and consequently 
steered the low-level actors’ participation in the mayoral URP. This was possible because 





of the mayoral URP. In other words, expertise and professionalism served as the new 
norms and rules for intermediary-led participation in the mayoral URP. 
 
Such expertise-oriented approach may seem a democratic way of mitigating potential 
conflicts through technologies of expert administration and management. It also may be 
taken for granted that non-experts respect professional expertise as neutral scientific 
knowledge. By including professors, planners, and architects, the meta-governance 
structure served as a platform where non-expert residents were able to build consensus 
and take action with expert support. To put it in the post-political context (Ranciere, 
Panagia, & Bowlby, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2009), however, there turned out to be a ‘post-
political trap’ in the consensus-building process. In the mayoral URP, consensus-building 
took place based on agreement achieved through the professional firms and tended to 
marginalise the diverse voices of the minority against the backdrop of majority consensus. 
This means that the consensus-building was caught in a trap, preventing minor groups 
from decision-making while excluding their progressive ideas, such as the right to city-
making and claimed space, which are foundational to foster counter-hegemonic power in 
community participation. The established consensus ultimately served to rationalise 
SMG’s regeneration agenda rather than to represent residents’ diverse demands. The 
result is that SMG remains as the dominant hegemony in the regeneration process, while 
its technocratic apparatus as a gatekeeper continues to manage intermediary intervention 
and consequent community participation. 
 
This points towards the emergence of the long arm of the state that can control 
intermediary-led participation, albeit remotely, through the multi-level platform in the 
mayoral URP. Under these circumstances, community participation has been improved 
while different opinions have managed to establish consensus and minimise contestation. 
However, at the same time, community empowerment remains stagnant due to the multi-
level platform, which has filtered out potential alternative values or imaginaries of those 
who are against the majority consensus, which this thesis recognises as a legacy of the 
interventionist state in the new urban regeneration governance in Seoul. Hence, like the 
national URP, the mayoral URP has also struggled with state intervention, albeit in less 
visible ways, which discouraged community participation from becoming autonomous 





community empowerment through new rules and norms armed with expertise and 
professionalism, which were preferred and co-opted by the state. In this regard, it can be 
understood that intermediary-led participation in the mayoral URP preserves its top-down 
nature under the post-political multi-layered partnership. 
 
6.4. The More Freedom, The More Autonomy? 
6.4.1. Community of Practice outside Government and Profession 
In DJA, new local initiatives started to be formed, while the DJA sarangbang organised 
regular community gatherings and encouraged jjokbang residents to participate. Thus, the 
local initiative was not only a group of residents living in the jjokbang village but also an 
association of those interacting with each other through the regular community gatherings.  
Unlike CSA and CHA, the residents in DJA often shared their personal difficulties and 
sought solutions during the community gatherings, while learning from the experience or 
knowledge of other residents in similar difficulties. This group of residents, hence, could 
grow based on ‘self-governed learning partnership’ among people who find it useful to 
learn from and with each other about certain matters. In this sense, the local initiative that 
emerged in DJA can be seen as a kind of CoP (Wenger, 1998). Compared to CSA and 
CHA, however, the intermediary organisation in DJA (DJA sarangbang) had a more 
radical disposition while generating more progressive ideas and goals. As a result, the 
CoP went through a distinctive change in its collective identity through the radical 
intermediary intervention. The diagram below summarises the change in two consecutive 







As stressed earlier, jjokbang residents in DJA are mainly from vulnerable populations 
such as elderly, disabled or low-income groups. Most of them have lived alone without 
family for a long time and faced chronic difficulties such as economic poverty or social 
isolation. In an effort to address these difficulties, a civil society organisation called 
CONET funded a civil rights activist to establish the DJA sarangbang. As an 
intermediary actor, the civil rights activist organised diverse community gatherings such 
as potluck lunches and information-sharing meetings. At first, many jjokbang residents 
were reluctant to participate in such gatherings due to their suspicion about the activist’s 
purpose. However, this attitude changed when residents who participated in the 
gatherings started to share their experience with others, as was described by one resident. 
 
I was not a big fan of community activity, as I was used to keeping to myself. 
For me, cooperation was even awkward, as I had been barely helped or 
supported. So, I was not interested in the DJA sarangbang at first. Then one 
day, a neighbour told me that the sarangbang helped him get work despite his 
bankruptcy. After hearing that, I popped into the sarangbang and shared my 
issue about bad credit recovery during a gathering. I was given relevant 





information and assistance and eventually recovered from my bad credit history. 
This was a big deal for me and made me continue to participate in the regular 
gatherings. (C3-CS-INT-2, 2019, a local resident) 
 
There was no policy or legal framework to promote the residents’ participation in the 
intermediary-led community gatherings. That is, the initial participation took place 
outside the formal institutional framework. While spontaneously participating in the 
community gatherings, some interested residents shared fundamental information for 
living, such as employment or subsidy advice, and benefited from such information 
sharing. These community gatherings helped to organically boost community 
participation, while those who benefitted voluntarily invited others to the gatherings. In 
these gatherings, the participants were enlightened regarding radical issues, such as social 
welfare rights, associated with their personal difficulties. Compared to the national or 
mayoral URP, thus, the community in DJA can be seen as a more radical group of 
‘enlightened invitees’ learning human rights-related matters and seeking fundamental 
solutions to improve their quality of life in DJA. Such enlightened invitees played a key 
role in generating certain ‘local knowledge’ that covered chronic local problems such as 
poverty, poor health, and economic or social exclusion in DJA. This meant that the local 
knowledge produced in DJA was more about matters of the residents’ survival rather than 
the beautification or modernisation of the neighbourhood. 
 
Such local knowledge helped the jjokbang residents to resolve their personal difficulties, 
but it remained at the individual level. This meant that the initial local knowledge did 
little to systematically promote collective action at the communal level. In an effort to 
stimulate such collective action, the DJA sarangbang encouraged the residents to 
establish their own local system through which to provide community-based services 
such as local banking (DJA hyeobdongheo) and a local kitchen (DJA sikdorak). In this 
local system, as a main player, the CoP experienced a change in its collective identity: 
from enlightened invitees to autonomous practitioners. While turning more diverse and 
progressive ideas into practice, this group of autonomous practitioners could gain a sense 
of confidence, empowerment, and belonging, as was pointed out by a resident who 






After its financial independence from CONET (in 2015), the DJA sarangbang 
began to put forward diverse communal services. Around that time, we 
(residents), together with the sarangbang, started to organise some small 
initiatives to manage the communal services on our own. I participated as a 
community carpenter in a small initiative for furniture repair service. Personally, 
such experience was really important in my life, because it gave me a sense of 
self-confidence, self-empowerment and belonging to DJA that I have never had 
before. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019, a local resident) 
 
Apart from this, a community care service, a cleaning service, and a funeral service were 
also similar cases where the autonomous practitioners acted as service providers. In the 
words of Jürgen Habermas (1984), such diverse services can be seen as stimulus for 
‘communicative actions’ beyond individual behaviours. That is, the diverse service 
provision enabled the residents to generate communicative actions by developing local 
knowledge from the individual level to the communal level: advanced ‘communicative 
rationality’. This was possible because there was a certain degree of community spirit 
created through the regular community gatherings over a period of more than seven years. 
The important point here is that the communicative actions in DJA were more progressive 
and autonomous compared to those in the national or mayoral URP. The reason for this 
is that its communicative actions took place through more radical intermediary 
intervention outside the direct control or support of the public sector. DJA could be free 
from any rules of the game, as it had no official urban regeneration projects funded or 
approved by the public sector. Accordingly, taking advantage of this situation, the CoP 
in DJA was able to make more progressive communicative actions, albeit outside official 
institutional settings. 
 
However, one thing to note here is that such communicative actions remained tactical and 
provisional. That is to say, the communicative actions were based on residents’ informal 
tactics rather than formal government strategies. Hence, it is no wonder that the 
communicative actions were barely supported or protected by official institutions. Rather, 
they were vulnerable to speculative property market forces, which hinged on the official 
institution. Recently, a collective action from landlords appeared, seeking a clean-sweep 





residents with eviction and displacement, which could lead to the decline or extinction of 
their existing communal culture. Such gentrification issue motivated the autonomous 
practitioners to consolidate and take a more radical approach to what has happened in 
DJA. 
 
As far as I know, a big redevelopment plan is underway in DJA. All I want is 
to be able to continue to live in this neighbourhood rather than being displaced 
or scattered to random places. I’m not sure if I can live with such a sense of 
belonging and confidence if that happens. I know the landlords will never listen 
to my voice. Also, SMG will not be able to stop the redevelopment itself as 
long as it complies with SMG’s regulations. This is why we are now more likely 
to strengthen our solidarity and cooperate with external civic groups and human 
rights lawyers to protect our communal life from the speculative force. I think 
we may be forced to leave here and lose this community if the redevelopment 
begins without a backup plan for us. (C3-CS-INT-1, 2019, a local resident) 
 
This implies that there was a considerable change in the collective identity of the CoP, 
while a potential risk of displacement emerged due to gentrification. Against this potential 
gentrification, the group of autonomous practitioners was transformed into an association 
of ‘local activists’. As local activists, the residents started to organise protests as a way of 
making their opinions heard to ensure their basic rights in DJA. The concept of basic 
rights here did not only refer to human rights such as freedom or equality at the individual 
level. More importantly, it also embraced ‘collective right to city-making’ at the 
communal level, resonating with what Lefebvre (1968) termed ‘the right to the city’. In 
this context, the right to city-making was not a legal right but a collective claim to the 
right to participate in the decision-making process about the speculative redevelopment. 
That is, the community of practice in DJA grew as an activist group while claiming its 
right to city-making as an alternative way of standing against a group of landlords with a 
speculative motive. This is because there was no legal right or basis for the community 
to influence the redevelopment, which would significantly affect the quality of communal 






6.4.2. Isolated Social Networks and Radical Structural Hole Spanners  
In an effort to improve the collective rights, the DJA sarangbang intervened to expand 
social networks of the residents in DJA by promoting an alliance between the residents 
and progressive civil society organisations outside DJA. In this alliance, the residents 
were able to refine their vision statements and share them with a wider audience: for 
example, through public hearings or press conferences at the local but also the national 
level. This approach contributed to attracting broader public attention to critical local 
issues such as potential gentrification and decline of communal life in DJA. Despite such 
contribution, however, the DJA sarangbang was not regarded as SMG’s official 
counterpart in DJA. Instead, the Seoul station jjokbang centre was its official counterpart. 
For SMG, the DJA sarangbang was nothing more or less than one of radical local groups 
promoting tactical community activities outside its institutional boundaries. In this 
context, the DJA sarangbang was not able to establish new social relationships between 
the residents and SMG. Rather, it helped to reinforce the social bonds between the 
residents and the external civil society organisations against the bureaucracy of SMG. 
This idea can be well captured using the hybrid concept of structural holes (Burt, 2000) 
and social capital (Putnam, 2000; Woolcock, 2001). 
 
The diagram below shows a social network structure among five main stakeholders in 
DJA: DJA jjokbang residents, DJA jjokbang landlords, other jjokbang residents, civil 
society organisations, and SMG. In fact, there was little mutual interaction among the 
DJA jjokbang residents until the DJA sarangbang was created in 2008. As most residents 
were from relatively vulnerable populations, they could hardly afford to care about 
anything other than their own personal difficulties. However, this trend was gradually 
changed when the DJA sarangbang began to organise community gatherings such as 
potluck lunches and information-sharing meetings. Such gatherings served to encourage 
the residents to identify local issues associated with their personal difficulties, such as 
poor credit history or inadequate cooking facilities. Some active residents, together with 
the DJA sarangbang, created local initiatives to address the identified communal 
problems. For example, a local initiative was formed to create an alternative local bank 
where residents with poor credit history could open accounts and obtain loans with ease. 
Another initiative was created to run a communal kitchen where residents with no cooking 





collective ideas were put into practice through the intervention of CONET-funded 
intermediaries: the DJA sarangbang and hyeobdongheo. 
 
 
In 2015, the intermediaries became financially self-reliant by making use of deposits in 
the local bank and donations from charities or individuals. As self-funded organisations, 
these intermediaries tried to broaden the scope of their work by supporting more diverse 
community activities. Examples include new community activities such as furniture 
repair, patient care, and communal funerals. The important point here is that such change 
contributed to expanding the social circles of the DJA jjokbang community through 
mingling with other jjokbang residents beyond DJA. This was possible because all the 
community activities were open to all comers regardless of where they live. Putting this 
change into the social network structure, it can be seen as the emergence of bridging social 
capital across different jjokbang villages. 
 
However, such change in social network structure took place outside the institutional 
system. As stressed earlier, the DJA sarangbang was not in official partnership with SMG. 





Instead, the Seoul station jjokbang centre was its official intermediary counterpart in DJA. 
As a result, the DJA sarangbang was often excluded from official decision-making 
processes for public projects. This meant that many jjokbang residents in collaboration 
with the DJA sarangbang were also excluded from these processes. This is a point where 
a gap is identified between SMG and the jjokbang residents in DJA: that is, a ‘structural 
hole’. In fact, the DJA sarangbang tried to fill this structural hole by, for example, 
engaging civil society organisations, which served to make the residents’ voices heard 
through press interviews or webcasts. However, the structural hole remained largely 
unfilled, because the intermediary effort remained tactical rather than strategic. In other 
words, the DJA sarangbang approached the structural hole by mobilising the tactics of 
the jjokbang community while challenging the bureaucratic strategies of SMG. This 
tactical approach contributed to keeping the community participation fairly flexible and 
autonomous. But, at the same time, it constrained the community participation from 
improvement with official support or protection from SMG. Ultimately, the DJA 
sarangbang was unable to act as a structural hole spanner between the residents and SMG 
while maintaining its focus on greater flexibility and autonomy of community 
participation. 
 
Meanwhile, some jjokbang landlords in DJA had a speculative turn of mind, since SMG 
introduced a new urban regeneration strategy aimed at commercial revitalisation of Seoul 
station and its surrounding areas. Drawing on this new strategy, the jjokbang landlords 
began to convert their properties into commercial spaces such as tourist hotels with the 
expectation of higher profitability. Such emerging commercial redevelopment caused 
concern over potential gentrification in DJA. To mitigate the negative consequences, 
SMG had to negotiate with the jjokbang landlords over their proposed redevelopment. 
This point can be seen as an attempt to fill another ‘structural hole’ between SMG and 
the jjokbang landlords in DJA. As an official intermediary counterpart, the Seoul station 
jjokbang centre, rather than the DJA sarangbang, led the negotiation and drew up a five-
year leasehold agreement. Such negotiation process served as an opportunity structure 
where the jjokbang landlords could create new relationships with SMG; that is, linking 
social capital. For the jjokbang residents, however, the negotiation was simply a stopgap 
measure or an interim step that helped the landlords to rationalise their future 






During the period of the five-year leasehold, the jjokbang landlords formed a 
redevelopment association and pushed forward with their plan to convert their jjokbangs 
in DJA into high-rise apartment complexes. On the other hand, the jjokbang residents 
opposed the redevelopment plan, which could facilitate the demolition of their homes and 
the removal of their communal culture. Such conflict of interest generated another 
structural hole between the jjokbang landlords and the residents in DJA. The DJA 
sarangbang made an effort to bridge this structural hole: for example, by organising joint 
meetings of the two groups. However, this effort only contributed to reconfirming the 
differences between the groups. A group of the landlords had already built a strategic 
partnership with developers in favour of speculative housing redevelopment in DJA. In 
this strategic partnership, the negotiation with the DJA sarangbang was not preferred, but 
was seen as an optional extra. The reason is that the DJA sarangbang was neither a 
member of the strategic partnership nor a counterpart of SMG in DJA. Unsurprisingly, 
the landlords tended to give little attention to the local demands that the DJA sarangbang 
put forward despite their significance. 
 
In this context, however, the jjokbang residents could not raise any legal objection to the 
redevelopment plan, as it was prepared within the legal framework. In other words, there 
was no legal basis for the residents to take action against the speculative redevelopment 
despite its potential negative consequences for their life in DJA. As an alternative, the 
DJA sarangbang promoted the residents to engage with a city-wide grassroots network 
resisting gentrification across Seoul. This alternative approach helped the residents to 
expand their social networks by interacting with those from different jjokbang villages as 
well as with a wide range of civil society organisations. However, it is noteworthy that 
the social network expansion was hardly observed beyond a limited circle of jjokbang 
residents or their philanthropic supporters. This means that the bridging social capital was 
gradually developed but eventually transformed into sizeable bonding social capital, 
resulting in the emergence of a large ‘network closure’ outside the institutional 
framework. That is to say, the jjokbang residents were able to broaden and strengthen 
internal relationships within the growing network closure, which articulated with external 
networks of radical civic groups. This peculiar condition gave rise to a unique CoP with 





areas, the CoP in DJA carried out more ‘radical social praxis’ (Kwon, 2002), challenging 
the dominant hegemony of state and market while cooperating with the DJA sarangbang 
and its networked organisations. In other words, the radical intermediary intervention 
enlightened and motivated the CoP to create a counter-hegemony that can serve the 
genuine local interests.  
 
 
Figure 29. A radical collective action for housing welfare in DJA and a UN rapporteur’s visit to DJA.                  
Source: DJA sarangbang 
 
In this interpretation, the community is more than just a group of residents living in DJA, 
but also holds ‘associational membership’ based on communal life and culture in DJA. 
The intermediaries promoted such associational membership, rather than speculative 
collusion, by encouraging the residents to expand their collective intelligence and 
collective actions. In other words, the residents, rather than developers or investors, were 
given opportunities to nurture their associational power through the intermediary 
intervention that activated the interaction with radical civil society organisations. This 
can be seen as a process of shaping ‘urban citizenship’ (Purcell, 2003), referring to a new 
membership of the residents to reshape the processes of their urban regeneration in DJA. 
That is, the intermediary intervention served as an opportunity structure for the residents 
to establish community-based social membership beyond legally-defined citizenship or 
ownership and create differential or claimed spaces such as the local kitchen beyond 
invited or closed spaces in DJA. Hence, in this opportunity structure, the residents in DJA 
could be more empowered to plan and implement their own agenda compared to those in 






Analysing this opportunity structure through Gramsci’s counter-hegemony framework, 
one notes that intermediary intervention in DJA has served to balance the existing social 
order of hegemonic historical bloc with the new social order of the emerging counter-
hegemonic bloc. By challenging the dominant hegemony of the state and the market, the 
intermediary organisation has played a key role in creating Gramsci’s ‘horizontal alliance’ 
while promoting the residents to engage with wider social forces resisting gentrification 
across Seoul. Such horizontal alliance expansion has laid the foundation for advancement 
of a counter-hegemonic bloc where the residents can develop more accurate local rules 
and norms that reflect their common-sense values. Through this process of organisational 
development, local actors in DJA could become more flexible and autonomous in the 
mode of their participation by managing counter-hegemonic changes based on their own 
local values and beliefs. 
 
However, one thing to note here is that while such balancing act has become skewed 
towards radical change, the improved community empowerment ironically constrained 
the residents from cooperation with the government. This is because progress in the 
community empowerment was made through the intermediary intervention, which 
prioritised residents’ informal tactics over formal government strategies. This means that 
for the state, the intermediary-led participation was nothing more than a series of tactical 
actions that occurred outside its institutional framework. It is true that the intermediary-
led participation was more self-determined and self-directed while being free from the 
rules of the institutional framework. That is to say, the residents’ radical interests were 
well reflected in their community activities, leading to growth of genuine human 
flourishing beyond the control or influence of the government. In return for this freedom, 
however, the intermediary-led participation has had little support or protection from the 
government. Rather, it has been easily challenged or threatened by outside forces, such 
as speculative property markets, which mind the institutional rules. Under these 
circumstances, the intermediary-led participation in DJA could collapse at any time when 
market-oriented intervention takes place. This is an ironic point where the community has 
become vulnerable to the external forces while its internal autonomy is improved. In other 
words, the freedom helped the community to improve its self-reliance, but at the same 
time, it caused its exclusion from legal protection from potential threats of the market in 





interventionist state in the present urban processes. In this sense, it is understood that the 
intermediary mechanisms in DJA have another form of developmental legacy that puts 
tactical, radical, and plural approaches outside of the institution, leading to deepening 
precarity of the established communal autonomy. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
Based on the findings from Chapter 5, this chapter further analysed and compared the 
three different types of intermediary-led participation through the lens of the conceptual 
framework set out in Chapters 2 and 3. In each of the three case studies, the intermediary-
led participation was reviewed in terms of power mechanisms by examining changes and 
challenges that each CoP underwent. Then, the intermediary-led participation was 
interpreted in network mechanisms by scrutinising the social capital and structural holes 
emerging from each intermediary structure. 
 
In the first case study of the national URP, there was a change in the collective identity 
of the CoP: from simple invitees to leading practitioners. As a group of invitees, the CoP 
started to build its own communicative rationality while participating in intermediary-led 
community activities. This led to the formation of its own collective intelligence, which 
served to inspire constant participation of the community beyond the bureaucratic 
knowledge of the government. Taking advantage of this collective intelligence, the CoP 
grew as a group of practitioners that established the local cooperative. The important point 
here is that the local cooperative took an intermediary role after its official intermediary 
organisation was disbanded. This signalled a change in the organisational identity of the 
intermediary from a government-led to a community-driven organisation. As a new 
intermediary, the local cooperative led their community activities and expanded their 
collective intelligence by making the community itself into a knowledge repository.  
 
From the social network perspective, the local cooperative played a key role in enhancing 
mutual trust and understanding between the residents and the government. That is, it could 
act as a new structural hole spanner to form a bridge between the residents and the 
government by promoting linking social capital. However, as a structural hole spanner, 
the local cooperative could neither achieve financial autonomy nor have statutory rights 





to make autonomous decisions for its communal interests without governmental consent. 
As a result, the CoP is still reliant on government funds, while its decision-making is 
restricted by government legislation. In this sense, it is seen that the intermediary-led 
participation in the national URP preserves its top-down nature through centralised 
financial or legal measures, although it has contributed to improving the institutional 
capacity of the CoP by expanding its social relationships with the government. 
 
In the second case study of a mayoral URP, there was also a change in the collective 
identity of the CoP: from simple invitees to voluntary practitioners. However, this change 
was slightly different from the one in the national URP. At the beginning, the CoP was 
invited to the NID programme where it could broaden communicative rationality while 
exploring more local issues over a span of one extra year. In the subsequent five-year 
programme, the CoP grew as a group of practitioners supporting the intermediary 
organisation. As practitioners, the community members took over some intermediary 
responsibilities and engaged themselves in more advanced community activities. In this 
transition, the CoP acted as a key driver, but could not make full use of its own collective 
intelligence due to the interference of professional firms. 
 
Compared to the national URP, the mayoral URP created a more complicated, multi-
layered partnership by adding professional firms to its intermediary structure. In fact, this 
additional layer was introduced to address the drawbacks of the national URP. It made 
some positive contributions to specialising intermediary roles, stabilising intermediary 
positions, and thereby improving intermediary work conditions. However, at the same 
time, it caused side effects associated with poor teamwork and leadership, which 
undermined internal cooperation in the intermediary organisation. For the community 
members, this additional layer was a barrier that restricted their inclusion in the 
intermediary structure. Because the professional firms were profit-oriented, they were 
reluctant to recruit new staff from the community members. Instead, their existing staff 
were deployed, or well-trained professionals were hired to maximise profits. As a result, 
despite their active participation, the community members remained as voluntary 
assistants with no official power in decision-making for the mayoral URP. This gave rise 





activities, the more they became frustrated and excluded from the official decision-
making process. 
 
From the social network perspective, it is seen that the intermediary organisation acted as 
a structural hole spanner between the residents and the government by enabling the 
residents to experience how to work with the government. However, as a structural hole 
spanner, the intermediary organisation was not a neutral mediator, as it was mainly 
affected by the logic of the professional firms. This structural hole spanner was not able 
to promote direct social networks between the residents and the government. Instead, it 
served as a gatekeeper that prevented the residents from expanding their official networks 
with the government by excluding them from official positions in the intermediary 
structure. Under these circumstances, the government still retained remote control of the 
intermediary mechanisms by mobilising the expertise of the professional firms. In this 
regard, it is understood that the intermediary-led participation, which emerged in the 
mayoral URP, also has a developmental legacy of top-down decision-making formed 
through new rules and norms armed with expertise and professionalism under the multi-
layered partnership. 
 
In the third case study, the organisational identity of the CoP was transformed in a 
different way: from enlightened invitees to community activists. Unlike the former two 
case studies, the intermediary organisation in DJA maintained its financial autonomy 
through local trust funds and charitable donations. Taking this advantage, the 
intermediary intervention could enlighten the CoP about more radical issues such as 
social welfare rights. Hence, compared to the other case studies, the CoP in DJA was able 
to develop a more progressive disposition through the radical intermediary intervention. 
In this context, the intermediary intervention enabled the CoP to establish its local system 
for providing community-based services such as local banking and a local kitchen. In this 
local system, the CoP in DJA was able to create more diverse communal services and 
generate a stronger sense of confidence, empowerment, and belonging in its community 
life. However, such community-based activities took place outside the government 
institution. That is, the communicative actions in DJA were often considered 
unauthorised, as they barely followed the rules set by the government. Indeed, such 





communicative actions while being free from the government rules. In return for this 
freedom, however, the communicative actions were hardly supported or protected by the 
government. Rather, they were challenged and threatened by speculative property 
markets. This caused an ironic situation where the CoP has become vulnerable to external 
forces while its internal autonomy has been improved. 
 
From the social network perspective, the intermediary organisation tried to act as a 
structural hole spanner between the residents and the government by encouraging the 
residents to collaborate with civil society organisations and make their voices heard by 
the government. However, this collaboration could not serve to establish linking social 
capital. Rather, it reinforced the social bonds between the residents and the civil society 
organisations, leading to the emergence of large network closure outside the institutional 
framework. In this context, the CoP grew as a group of local activists that claimed the 
right to city-making against the potential gentrification in DJA. Compared to the national 
or mayoral URP, the intermediary intervention in DJA enabled the CoP to be more self-
motivated and self-directed by expanding internal social networks within the growing 
network closure. At the same time, however, the social network expansion was not able 
to go beyond the limited network closure, while external speculative forces established 
official relationships with the government. As a result, the CoP is often excluded from 
official decision-making processes for public or private-led urban projects, which would 
significantly affect the existing communal life in DJA. In this regard, it is understood that 
the self-funded intermediary-led participation has also struggled with another 
developmental legacy that would rule out the inclusion of radical intermediary 
intervention and consequent communicative actions. 












7.1. Main research findings 
This research presented detailed case studies of community participation led by different 
types of intermediary organisations in the recent urban regeneration of Korea. In the last 
two chapters, it examined how community participation led by publicly-funded 
intermediaries has been affected by centralised financial and legal measures that enable 
the state to retain its remote control over the intermediary mechanism. In particular, it 
transpired that such publicly-funded intermediary intervention was not adequate to serve 
to enhance communal autonomy but strengthened the post-political context where 
decision-making in regeneration has become more centralised among technocratic 
bureaucrats. The study also observed how self-funded intermediaries were deprived of 
opportunities to gain state support, as their intervention was framed as radical 
experiments outside the official instruction of the state. This observation revealed that the 
self-funded intermediary intervention enabled the locals to build their communal 
autonomy in the regeneration process. However, at the same time, this intermediary 
intervention remained tactical and, accordingly, restrained the established autonomy from 
being protected from waves of speculative but legitimate development movements. Now, 
at the conclusion of this thesis, the three research questions presented in Chapter 1 can be 
answered as follows: 
  
1) How does intermediary intervention change governance arrangements in regeneration 
and affect power relationships in community participation? 
Publicly-funded intermediary intervention contributed to the creation of multi-level 
regeneration governance in which the state was able to maintain its dominant power 
over the intermediaries by mobilising top-down financial resource allocations and 
strict national regulations. In this governance structure, communities were given few 
opportunities to cultivate counter-hegemonic power during their participation in 





unbalanced power relations prevented the elevation of community participation to the 
next level of community empowerment in the shadow of hierarchy.  
 
On the other hand, self-funded intermediary intervention served to form self-reliant 
regeneration governance, which acted as a local platform to enable communities to 
establish counter-hegemonic power against the dominant system of the state in 
regeneration. However, the established counter-hegemonic power has become 
precarious, while this intermediary intervention was considered illegitimate and 
subsequently challenged by speculative but legitimate market interference. Hence, it 
was difficult for this unstable counter-hegemonic bloc to constantly serve to improve 
the communal autonomy that could counteract the top-down power of the state or the 
speculative power of the market in the regeneration process. Rather, the community 
participation was more likely to become susceptible, albeit indirectly, to this power, 
by which self-funded intermediary intervention is excluded from state support and 
protection. 
 
2) How does intermediary intervention develop social interaction patterns in 
regeneration and influence social networks in community participation? 
From network perspectives, state-funded intermediary intervention served to generate 
linking social capital in regeneration by enabling participants to experience how to 
work with the state. It also encouraged the participants to interact with a wide range of 
people by expanding their collective intelligence across their neighbourhoods, leading 
to the building of bridging social capital. However, such social capital formation did 
not take place organically, but rather under the management of experts co-opted by the 
state. This created a multi-layered social network structure where intermediaries acted 
as gatekeepers, which directed bottom-up interactions based on new norms and rules 
with an emphasis on expertise and professionalism. In this multi-layered network 
structure, it was difficult for the communities to freely expand their social interactions 
beyond the intermediary layer due to the ‘post-political trap’, which led to 
standardisation in community participation by undermining its flexibility. Hence, the 







On the other hand, self-funded intermediary intervention was limited in its ability to 
create linking social capital, as it was positioned as a radical node outside formal 
networks of the state. Instead, it served to build bridging social capital by encouraging 
the communities to interact with radical groups of people or organisations beyond their 
own neighbourhoods. However, the bridging social capital was unlikely to expand 
beyond the limited circle of the radical groups, and, then, was transformed into sizeable 
bonding social capital, which gave rise to large network closure. This led to the 
creation of segregated social networks without connections with mainstream social 
networks in the official regeneration process. In this separate social network, while 
their social interaction with power differentials remained inactive, the communities 
have shown a more radical and tactical disposition in their participation in a wider 
range of neighbourhood improvement practices. 
 
3) Can intermediary intervention serve to sustain community participation and attain 
community empowerment in regeneration in the long run? 
The answers to the first and second research questions suggest that intermediary-led 
participation has inherent limitations resulting from the fact that intermediary 
intervention remains under the influence of the state and its technocratic apparatuses, 
albeit implicitly, in Korea’s regeneration framework. Thus, it seems unlikely that an 
adequate level of community empowerment would be achieved through intermediary 
intervention in a set period of time. However, at a deeper level, power relationships 
formed by intermediary intervention are not bound in a static domination-subjection 
structure. Social networks emerging through intermediary intervention are also not tied 
to a binary inclusion-exclusion principle. Instead, they are all fluidly transformed and 
restructured while intermediary actors continue to communicate with their former 
partner communities, and thereby help them to make new networks and relationships 
even after the completion of the URP. Besides, intermediary actors have made constant 
efforts to identify problems related to intermediary intervention and persuade the state 
to modify the relevant legal or policy frameworks by making public the identified 
problems. Therefore, in the long term, intermediary intervention contains seeds of as-
yet unrealised potential, albeit with the current flaws, for an alternative city-making 
pathway between opposition and adaptation to the dominant system. In this sense, 





negotiations’ where intermediaries continue to counteract the control of the state, albeit 
within limits, and suggest alternatives through constant communication with citizens 
for more inclusive regeneration. 
 
These three findings are further discussed with three key themes in the following sub-
sections. The three key themes are: 1) developmental legacies in intermediary 
intervention, 2) capitalist threat to intermediary-led participation, and 3) intermediary 
intervention as a site of complex struggles and negotiations. 
 
7.1.1. Developmental Legacies in Intermediary Intervention 
For a critical review of the intermediary intervention in Korea’s recent regeneration, it is 
useful to revisit the historical overview of the state intervention in its urban processes.  
As explained in Chapter 2, Korea witnessed unprecedented economic growth in the 
second half of the twentieth century, while its state tried to tame and harness a small 
number of large industrial conglomerates for national ends. To facilitate late but rapid 
industrialisation, the state strategically intervened in developing a selection of cities as 
industrial bases by directing national resources and investments to the cities. Such state 
intervention led Korean cities to ‘developmental urbanisation’ (Hwang, 2016; Shin, 2016; 
Doucette and Park, 2019) where cities were deliberately expanded to support industrial 
and social policies that aimed to maximise national development. However, the mode of 
state intervention changed while the state experienced a neoliberal change in its property 
market that deregulated planning regulations and attracted foreign investments in an 
attempt to revive the domestic economy, hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. For 
economic turnaround, the state intervention served to promote large-scale housing or 
infrastructure projects as new vehicles to increase national capital accumulation. This 
state intervention served to facilitate speculative or neo-developmental urbanisation 
(Choi, 2012; Shin and Kim, 2016; Joo, 2019), leading to commodification and 
gentrification of Korean cities through market intervention managed by the state. 
 
However, Korean cities experienced a property market slowdown, since the 2008 global 
financial crisis reduced or revoked opportunities for the state and the market to collaborate 
on new urban projects. This prompted calls for alternative approaches to the past state-





the introduction of the national UR Act, the Korean state set out to institutionalise 
community participation and promote community-based initiatives as acting associations 
in the urban development process of the deprived areas. In this institutional context, new 
intermediary intervention surfaced, whereas the state intervention took a step backwards. 
Such transition brought Korean cities to ‘post-developmental urbanisation’ (Jeong, 2016; 
Cho and Križnik, 2017; Park and Hong, 2019) where citizens can become more directly 
and actively involved in planning and management of their deprived neighbourhoods 
through the assistance of intermediaries. 
 
As presented in Chapters 5 and 6, the findings of this study suggest that the new 
intermediary intervention still has legacies of the interventionist state in regeneration 
practices, although the state has drawn back from direct intervention in principle. At the 
core of the legacies are the centralised legal and financial measures for intermediaries, 
which put constant restrictions on the legal rights and financial resources needed for 
communities to sustain their participation in regeneration. In the legal framework, 
intermediary organisations were recognised as merely provisional agencies to support the 
delivery of the national or mayoral URP for a set period of time. There was no legal 
ground for intermediary organisations to direct their employment contracts, annual 
budgeting or business operations for community activities. Instead, national or local 
authorities had competence over such legal matters related to the management of 
intermediary systems. This resulted in a lack of long-term ownership of the regeneration 
process among intermediary actors. Furthermore, in terms of financial security, the 
intermediary organisations had limited sources of funds. They were not able to run profit-
making businesses or to raise private funds, but only allowed to utilise public funds, 
which were given by national or local authorities during the URP period. Such narrow 
funding options prevented intermediary interventions from being financially self-reliant, 
which consequently undermined the formation of financial autonomy of community 
initiatives under time constraints. Accordingly, even after the end of the URP, local 
communities still struggle financially while relying heavily on limited amounts of 
competitive public funds rather than being able to self-fund their ongoing activities.  
 
This is evident in the first case study, where a community initiative remains financially 





community initiative in CSA continues to apply for public funding programmes to cover 
taxes, utilities, and labour costs that incur from ongoing community events or workshops. 
They should also apply for the right to use their communal spaces, which are owned by 
SMG or local authorities. Even when the application is accepted at the regional or local 
level, it is hard for the community initiative to use the spaces in their preferred ways, as 
their legitimacy is strictly regulated at the national level. After all, the community 
initiative remains under the influence of top-down financial resource allocations and strict 
national legal restrictions, which this study recognises as a key element of developmental 
legacies underlying intermediary intervention in the recent regeneration practice. 
 
Such developmental legacies have become clearer, albeit in more invisible ways, since a 
‘multi-level’ contractual system was introduced to the intermediary structure. This is 
observed in the second case study, where all intermediary contracts were made with 
professional firms co-opted by SMG. In CHA, intermediary actors tended to work 
individually because each of these intermediary actors was contracted with different 
professional firms that directed, supervised, and controlled them in different ways while 
carrying out discrete intermediary tasks. This led to a lack of a coordination system for 
internal cooperation in the intermediary organisation and undermined intermediary 
teamwork and leadership, which consequently rendered the intermediary intervention less 
cooperative and coherent. This means that the multi-level contractual system deepened 
the isolation of each of the intermediary actors despite its contribution to their vocational 
specialisation in the intermediary organisation. 
 
More importantly, direct engagement of professional firms in the intermediary structure 
gave rise to a clear distinction between expert and non-expert groups in regeneration. This 
distinction provoked the creation of a ‘post-political trap’ (Swyngedouw, 2009) in the 
intermediary structure in which professional expertise is recognised as standards for 
consensus-building, whereas many other minority voices are assessed and reviewed 
against these standards. This meant that decision-making in regeneration became 
centralised, albeit invisibly, among assumedly neutral scientific expert groups, while the 
need for non-expert groups’ involvement and input in such processes has been 
downplayed. For example, even active community members in CHA were often excluded 





in the intermediary structure. Instead, they remained engaged in regeneration practices as 
voluntary assistants for their professional firms, as they were considered merely active 
participants rather than experts or professional players in the regeneration framework. 
This expert-oriented approach strengthened the dark side of ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop, 
2004) that operates under hierarchical chains of technocratic commands and controls. 
This means that the meta-governance has been armed with post-political technologies and 
rationalities, which could facilitate the technocratic consensus-building and enhance the 
effectiveness of intermediaries’ participatory qualities and output delivery within a given 
period. Under this meta-governance structure, the intermediaries acted as members of the 
state’s technocratic apparatuses who can be seen as the most able to ‘turn policy agenda 
into delivery based practice’ (Raco, 2015, p30). In this context, the state was able to keep 
control over community participation, albeit remotely, through technologies of expert 
administration and management accepted by the state. This points towards the emergence 
of another element of the developmental legacies underlying intermediary intervention: 
the multi-level governance hiding the post-political trap, which is hinged largely on 
monolithic technocracy in regeneration. 
 
Against the backdrop of these developmental legacies, the new partnerships between the 
state and citizens were rendered governable in the shadow of hierarchy, while the 
operations of intermediary power in the partnerships were rendered invisible. 
Intermediaries tended to avoid any explicit display of insubordination and antagonism to 
the state. Owing to the fear of negative sanctions, the intermediary intervention was 
carried out in compliance with financial, legal, and professional standards that the state 
established or valued. Hence, even though there was no longer visible coercive power to 
suppress intermediaries, the new partnerships contained ‘disciplinary power’ (Gramsci, 
1929; Foucault, 1980; Luke, 1981), which generated ‘invisible handcuffs’ that trapped 
the intermediaries within the narrow bounds of expert knowledge (e.g. law, social work, 
planning, architecture). Under the disciplinary power regime, intermediaries were in 
power relations without resistance and were unable to develop counter-hegemonic 
intervention during the URP. As a result, the growth of counter-hegemonic power in 
community participation was substantially undermined. It is true to say that citizens 
gathered and formed a ‘CoP’ (Wenger, 1998) through the intermediary intervention in 





autonomy nor have statutory rights to manage its communal spaces or provide public 
services in its neighbourhoods. It was very limited in its ability to make its own decisions 
without governmental consent even for its communal interests. This means that 
intermediaries could not achieve meaningful interventions to empower the CoP due to the 
persistent developmental legacies despite their contribution to the formation of the CoP 
in regeneration. 
 
Such critical viewpoint provides a more nuanced understanding of Korea’s current 
planning context where intermediary-led participation has become popularised while 
community-based unban regeneration has gained prominence. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, in fact, the novel urban programmes such as the URP were devised to incorporate more 
diverse actors beyond only property owners or investors and create community-based 
initiatives as acting associations in the planning and management of deprived 
neighbourhoods. Since then, community participation has been foregrounded as an 
essential element for the state to establish a new planning framework for more inclusive 
and sustainable urban development. However, the findings of this research revealed that 
community participation has become standardised or regulated through intermediary 
intervention rather than diversified or autonomised. This was largely due to the state’s 
attempt to apply more rules than ever to community participation in order to 
institutionalise it through intermediary intervention.  
 
Therefore, thinking critically, it is understood that while the state previously directed the 
‘markets’ as developmental engines, it is now steering the ‘intermediaries’ as new 
instruments to mobilise community participation in urban processes. This particular way 
of viewing the intermediaries suggests that community participation is subject to 
instrumentalisation to achieve certain goals of the state rather than the local demands 
because the state remains influential in intermediary intervention in regeneration. In this 
sense, this thesis argues that the developmental legacies of the interventionist state exist 
in the recent regeneration in the ways in which the transformative potential of counter-
hegemonic intermediary intervention is undermined, and the growth of counter-
hegemonic power in community participation is consequently hindered under the 







7.1.2. Capitalist Threats to Intermediary-led Participation 
This thesis placed its initial focus on the transition in the urban development partnership 
from state-market collusion to state-citizen cooperation in Korea’s planning system. 
Close examination of the latter illuminated detailed dynamics of community participation 
with a focus on intermediary intervention between the state and citizens in regeneration. 
In the examination process, the market was set back from the main discussion, as it was 
not an immediate member of the state-citizen partnership. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the market was removed from or insignificant to community 
participation in the recent regeneration practices. Rather, exploration of the case studies 
revealed that the speculative market forces continue to exist and influence or even 
threaten the emerging community participation, albeit covertly, in the long term.  
 
This is evident in the first case study, where a new local cooperative was declined 
permission to offer public services in their communal spaces. The local UR centre in CSA 
was originated from the group of the new breed of intermediary organisations, which 
receive sizeable financial support from the state within a ‘fixed term’ (see Chapter 3.4). 
This means that the intermediary organisation was formed temporarily and immediately 
disbanded after the fixed term. In CSA, potential capitalist threat was triggered in the 
post-project period when official state support and protection was terminated. For 
example, during the URP, the residents in CSA could create new communal spaces 
designed for purposes such as elderly care, lifelong education, after-school childcare and 
young business incubation. It was taken for granted that such welfare-related services 
would be provided by their local cooperative after the end of the URP. However, it 
transpired that the local cooperative had to compete with other professional firms, because 
the state regarded the local cooperative as one of the candidates for public service 
provision. The important point here is that the competition tended to give prominence to 
quantitative standards that measure the past performance of the local cooperative. 
Qualitative aspects of its future value, merit, or potential were barely considered. 
Fortunately, the local cooperative secured further short-term state support to experiment 
with the new service provision. Yet it is likely that the local cooperative will be threatened 





to manage their communal spaces by speculative service providers with proven track 
records when the short-term state support and protection end. 
Such capitalist threat to community participation has appeared more obviously in the 
regeneration practices led by self-funded intermediary organisations. This is particularly 
evident in the third case study, where community participation has been challenged by 
potential gentrification caused by the commercial redevelopment that emerged around 
DJA. Unlike in CSA, the intermediary organisation in DJA was derived from the minjung 
(people’s) movement organisations, which mainly fund themselves with charitable 
contributions from individuals or grants from corporate sponsors (see Chapter 3.4). Hence, 
the intermediary organisation in DJA was able to maintain greater financial autonomy 
through local trust funds and charitable donations. Taking this advantage, the CoP in DJA 
could be relatively free from the state’s rules and norms, which enabled them to be more 
flexible and autonomous in the mode of their participation in regeneration. In return for 
this freedom, however, the community participation has had little support or protection 
from the state. Rather, it has been easily challenged and threatened by waves of 
speculative but legitimate development movements. Indeed, some intermediary efforts 
have been made to encourage the CoP to network with radical groups of people or 
organisations against the speculative waves, and to nurture their associational power, 
which could serve to form local-based collective intelligence beyond the market-oriented 
knowledge and inspire their constant participation in regeneration. This can be seen as a 
process of shaping ‘urban citizenship’ (Purcell, 2003) to reshape the regeneration process 
in DJA. That is, the intermediary intervention served to enable the residents to develop 
community-based social membership beyond legally-defined citizenship or ownership 
while creating ‘differential or claimed spaces’ (Lefebvre, 1974; Gaventa, 2004) rather 
than being complacent in invited or closed spaces. 
 
However, the urban citizenship was not able to expand its membership beyond the limited 
circle of the radical groups. Rather, it was isolated from the mainstream planning 
framework. In other words, despite its growth in size, the new associational power was 
not truly effective, particularly when a group of landlords, together with a speculative 
developer, set out to plan a large-scale housing redevelopment in DJA. The reason is that 
the redevelopment plan was processed within SMG’s official planning framework, 





This means that the statutory power of the market overrode the non-statutory status of the 
CoP, which gave rise to a threat to the established autonomy of the CoP in DJA. For 
example, some landlords had converted their jjokbangs into guest rooms for tourists, 
while other landlords sold their whole jjokbang buildings to a developer seeking to build 
a brand-new hotel. Such market-oriented changes are signalling that ‘speculative 
redevelopment’ (Shin and Kim, 2016) could emerge with a collective agreement and legal 
permission. However, there were no legal actions that the local residents could take 
against the speculative redevelopment movements, which were advocated in SMG’s 
planning framework. Hence, it seems more likely that the community-based places such 
as communal kitchens (sikdorak), common rooms (sarangbang), local bank office 
(hyeobdonghoe) as well as jjokbangs themselves could disappear in DJA. In other words, 
the speculative market forces could possibly lead to the diminution or extinction of the 
existing communal life and culture by lawfully encroaching on the places where 
community members have lived, gathered and interacted through intermediary 
intervention. This is seen as a potential capitalist threat by which the established 
communal autonomy can be undermined or even destroyed while the existing residents 
are confronted with forced eviction or displacement from the communal living 
environment as well as from personal properties.  
 
To rephrase, regardless of funding sources, it is clear that intermediary intervention has 
contributed to the creation of ‘claimed spaces’ where the residents can try something new 
for their communal interests. It also served to nurture ‘associational power’, which could 
inspire the residents to constantly participate in new community activities by giving 
meaning to their participation. However, it transpired that the claimed spaces and the 
associational power still remain precarious due to the financial and legal limitations, 
which can create room for the capitalist competition and thereby threaten the existing 
communal life and culture that have been formed through intermediary intervention. This 
thesis recognises such critical point as another invisible struggle of intermediary-led 
participation whose communal sustainability continues to be challenged by the 
speculative but legitimate market forces, which extend their interest to the new communal 






7.1.3. Intermediary Intervention as a Site of Struggles and Negotiations 
The final finding of this study is that intermediary intervention has served as a negotiation 
platform to address the local struggles in regeneration, although it has also been an 
underlying cause of the struggles. As noted above, the present intermediary intervention 
retains the past developmental legacies, which can function to ‘instrumentalise’ 
community participation according to post-political standards. Moreover, the 
intermediary intervention tends to leave the door open for future market intervention, 
which can ‘threaten’ community participation by restraining communities from self-
management of their community assets beyond capitalist values. However, close 
examination of local narratives from the case studies highlighted that each of the 
intermediary actors has made constant contributions to addressing the state’s 
instrumentalisation of and the market’s threat to community participation while 
persistently communicating with communities, negotiating with authorities, and, thereby, 
serving to rectify the relevant legal or policy framework, albeit within limits. 
 
In 2018, the Seoul UR centre, together with about one hundred other local UR centres, 
established the so-called association of urban regeneration support centres at the national 
level (C4-IS-INT-3, 2018). This nationwide intermediary association has organised 
regular committee meetings and workshops where member organisations could exchange 
information and accumulate practical knowledge with regard to their intermediary works 
in regeneration. Such regular gatherings have been foundational for the member 
organisations to take collective actions to identify their common challenges and seek 
possible solutions to them throughout the regeneration process. In particular, Seoul UR 
centre has played a leading role in sharing the identified challenges with the state and 
proposing possible solutions to the state. To give an example, Seoul UR centre collected 
opinions from different local UR centres and suggested to SMG the new concept of 
Community Regeneration Corporation (CRC), which is a community-based business 
initiative with a legal right to deliver communal services (see Chapter 5.2). Such efforts 
of Seoul UR centre urged SMG to stipulate the concept of CRC in its ordinance and 
provide institutional support until the system of CRC is settled. In fact, in many URP 
areas, such as CSA and CHA, community initiatives such as local cooperatives were not 
able to properly use their community assets without governmental consent or market 





initiatives to manage their communal spaces, provide communal services, and even run 
for-profit businesses for communal interests beyond legal limitations, albeit with limited 
institutional support.   
 
Moreover, Seoul UR centre put forward a standard guideline for communal space 
planning and management, and persuaded SMG to bring the guideline into its policy 
framework (C4-IS-INT-3, 2018). As noted in Chapter 5, local residents tended to be 
excluded from the actual process of surveying, negotiating, and acquiring local properties 
for future communal spaces. This important process was reviewed confidentially by the 
public sector, such as SMG or local authorities, as the public sector was supposed to have 
ownership of the properties. Accordingly, the exclusion of local actors often caused some 
specific problems such as inflexibility in the use of communal spaces or inadequacy in 
the selection of their locations. In this light, it was significant to create a standard 
guideline for communal space planning and management in the policy framework, 
because it was the first step to officially engage community initiatives in the actual 
process of decision-making for their communal spaces from an early stage.  
 
Such collective efforts of intermediary organisations were also observed in DJA. For 
example, one of the local challenges in DJA was the potential gentrification, which could 
cause the forced eviction or displacement of the local residents. A regional association of 
jjokbang village support organisations was formed and pushed SMG to negotiate with 
jjokbang landlords over their proposed redevelopment plan by controlling its permission 
process. Certainly, such intermediary effort contributed to reaching a pragmatic 
compromise on a five-year leasehold extension. Even though it is seen as a stopgap 
measure, this intermediary collective effort was also important in the sense that it 
triggered a wake-up call for speculative redevelopment movements, regardless of their 
legitimacy, if there is a strong likelihood that they would cause harmful influence on the 
existing communal life and culture in certain deprived neighbourhoods with no sensible 
solutions or alternatives.  
 
What is more interesting is that such intermediary contributions were not only made by 
macro-level collective actions. More diverse cases were found in micro-level individual 





example, after the URP was completed in CSA, the local UR centre was disbanded, and 
the community organisers (COs) started to work in other places. However, even though 
they have left CSA, the former COs continue to communicate with the residents in CSA 
and encourage them to expand their collective intelligence and improve their communal 
autonomy, albeit indirectly. As described in Chapter 6, one of the former COs who got a 
public job in SMG has kept the residents updated with regeneration information from 
across different departments in SMG. She also has sent them informal invitations to a 
variety of gatherings, such as social enterprise seminars, at which they could establish 
new relationships with people from the social enterprise sector as well as the public sector 
in a casual fashion. Another former CO opened an architectural studio and started to work 
as a consultant for different urban regeneration areas. Since then, she has organised a 
study group where COs from different URP areas gather to discuss their community work. 
The residents in CSA are welcomed to join the study group informally, at which they can 
observe what happens in other neighbourhoods and take a more objective view to assess 
their own status quo. In other words, the residents are given more opportunities to expand 
social networks as well as broaden collective intelligence through ongoing, albeit 
unofficial, interventions of the former COs after the official end of the URP. 
 
The important point here is the fact that such intermediary interventions have become 
more informalised and diversified, which can be seen as a result of the evolution of 
‘hidden resistance’ (Scott, 1985, 1990) of intermediary actors. In fact, many intermediary 
actors were aware of the dark side of the state’s ‘disciplinary power’ (Gramsci, 1929; 
Foucault, 1980; Luke, 1981) but could not help hiding their resistance while exhibiting 
outward compliance during the URP. That is, a group of intermediary actors tended to be 
engaged in disguised, low-profile and undeclared forms of resistance while working as 
COs in certain URP areas. However, the trend has been changed since they were freed 
from their duty to deliver the URP. They no longer need to take passive or obedient 
attitudes towards the disciplinary power. Instead, they have each become individual 
supporters who are willing to encourage their former partner communities to improve 
their counter-hegemonic power, albeit remotely, while performing diverse intermediary 






Such subtle evolution of intermediary resistance gave rise to a meaningful change in 
intermediary intervention. This means that intermediary actors could see their way to 
provide more flexible and long-term support to their former local partners by making use 
of a wide variety of informal counter-hegemonic practices after their short-term official 
responsibilities. The informal practices include, for example, lobbies for policy changes, 
creation of standard guidelines, informal dissemination of practical knowledge, social 
events and circles, and learning group organisation and sharing. It is certain that these 
informal practices have helped community initiatives to manoeuvre around the 
disciplinary power in a pragmatic manner rather than merely reinforcing their cohesive 
and unified force against the ruling power. 
 
Such consideration implies that although intermediary intervention was co-opted into the 
state agenda at first, this co-optation is now serving as a stepping-stone towards achieving 
balance between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces to sustain progressive urban 
reform in the long term. Regardless of macro- or micro-level actions, the ongoing 
interactions between the locals and the intermediaries have expanded the basis for 
building Gramsci’s horizontal alliances, which distil a new social order from the existing 
hegemonic social order by making use of informal counter-hegemonic practices. Such 
constant intermediary intervention has put the power dynamics of hegemony and counter-
hegemony on a path with possibilities of resistance, emancipation, and negotiation 
beyond a fixed power relationship. This means that the intermediary intervention has 
maintained counter-hegemonic forces, enabling the locals to transform the mode of their 
participation while achieving balance between opposition and adaptation to the dominant 
policy system. In this sense, the informal but constant intermediary intervention can be 
seen as an opportunity structure that serves to build a foundation for progressive urban 
futures where the co-optation can transcend cycles of bureaucratisation, 
professionalisation, and institutionalisation of counter-hegemonic ideas and practices. 
 
This new way of viewing intermediary intervention suggests that intermediary actors are 
no longer merely post-political agencies to turn policy agenda into delivery-based 
practice. Rather, each of them can act as useful and necessary companions to the local 
actors involved in the recent regeneration while constantly trying to identify, review, and 





flexible intervention. In the long term, this can lead to gradual improvement or adjustment 
of the recent regeneration framework through informal counter-hegemonic practices of 
intermediaries. This novel understanding of intermediary intervention highlights its 
future-oriented value, enabling community initiatives to become more autonomous by 
directly and more actively engaging in the regeneration process, although its current 
outcomes seem to show a lack of local capabilities. 
 
From the long-term perspective, therefore, it is understood that the intermediary 
intervention contains seeds of yet-to-be-realised potential, albeit with the current flaws, 
for creating a future city-making pathway between opposition and adaptation to the 
dominant disciplinary power, which can serve to render progressive values and 
imaginings of the city. In this sense, this thesis argues that the intermediary intervention 
is a ‘site of complex struggles and negotiations’ in which the locals continue to struggle 
to improve their right to participation in city-making while the intermediaries maintain 
communication with the locals and negotiation with the state to address the local struggles 
by changing their own resistance modes throughout the continuing regeneration process. 
This can be seen as a signal of building a positive foundation for more inclusive and 
sustainable urban futures in the long term. 
 
7.2. Contributions of this Research 
This study contributes to the existing body of literature in several aspects. Firstly, it 
provides a combined overview of urban development and intermediary organisations in 
the historical context of Korean cities, particularly Seoul. While much of the literature 
focused on Korean urban development and its transformation, this study allows us to gain 
insight into how the urban development and intermediary organisations have been related 
to and affected each other in Korea’s changing planning context. While some studies have 
focused on the evolution and contribution of the intermediary organisations in welfare 
policies, they have not extended their debates to the new type of intermediary 
organisations that have emerged in the recent planning policies. In this sense, this research 
bridges the gap between these studies by developing the debate on the new intermediaries 
in Korea’s urban planning context beyond its social welfare context. By doing so, this 





community-based regeneration with attention to the new intermediaries working between 
the state and citizens in Korea. 
 
Secondly, this study provides an empirical basis for illuminating the complex dynamics 
behind intermediary intervention in the community-based regeneration. This study is one 
of the first qualitative studies on power relationships and social networks of communities 
that are constructed through intermediary intervention in Korea’s recent regeneration 
framework. Several planning studies on intermediary intervention have been conducted 
to date, but they have mainly paid attention to intermediary operation or management in 
regeneration. While such studies tend to focus on the functional aspects of intermediary 
intervention, this study expands its focus to the social aspects by examining how 
intermediary intervention has affected the formation and transformation of power and 
network dynamics of community participation in the regeneration process. In other words, 
this study provides knowledge of ‘subjective reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) 
beyond objective facts, which enables us to gain critical insight into the fundamental 
nature of community participation in Korea’s recent regeneration framework. 
 
In this context, the unveiling of the developmental legacies and capitalist threats in 
intermediary intervention is a specific and original contribution of this study to 
knowledge of the socio-political dynamics underlying the community-based regeneration 
in Korea. Close examination of the case studies demonstrates that the financial resources 
and legal rights of communities remain restricted due to the centralised financial and legal 
measures for intermediaries in regeneration. These financial and legal limitations create 
room for capitalist market intervention in regeneration, which can threaten to deprive 
communities of their right to community assets and, eventually, to communal life in their 
neighbourhoods. But, at the same time, the case studies also show that these intermediary 
actors continue to serve as collective or individual platforms to address the local struggles 
by changing their own resistance modes throughout the regeneration process in the long 
term. In this regard, the uncovering of the latent potentials of intermediary intervention 
as a constant negotiation site between the state and citizens is another significant 
contribution of this study to the current academic debates on challenges and opportunities 
of intermediary-led participation in Korea’s planning system. Such findings concerning 





balanced understanding of the recent community-based regeneration based on new 
partnerships between the state, citizens and intermediary organisations in Korea. 
 
Finally, these empirical findings contribute to existing knowledge of the ‘post-
developmental urbanism’ in Korea (Jeong, 2016; Cho and Križnik, 2017; Park and Hong, 
2019). As noted in existing literature, Korean cities were often used as subnational 
political units to support national economic growth, by which citizens were largely 
excluded from urban processes. But they have recently experienced a post-developmental 
turn in urban processes through decentralised decision-making authority, depoliticised 
forms of governance, and institutionalised mechanisms for community participation in 
city-making. While the existing literature tends to present a general overview on the post-
developmental turn, this study adds a critical review by providing a deeper understanding 
of intermediary intervention in city-making. The critical review maintains that 
intermediaries often serve as technocratic apparatuses of the state to centralise the 
decentralisation, bureaucratise the depoliticisation, and instrumentalise the 
institutionalisation of community participation. That is, intermediary intervention can be 
associated with new modes of hierarchical control over community participation, albeit 
indirectly, in city-making. This represents one of the significant characteristics of Korea’s 
post-developmental urbanisation that embeds the top-down dynamics, referring to the 
developmental legacies, in urban processes. However, the critical review also highlights 
that intermediaries do not only serve as a shadow state, but also act as constant mediators 
to soften or blunt the embedded top-down dynamics in the long term. This means that 
intermediaries expand their role from a short-term delivery of progressive urban projects 
to a long-term transformation of state institutions, laws, and regulatory processes to allow 
citizens to manoeuvre through rather than against the existing system. In this regard, this 
study provides a fuller picture of Korea’s post-developmental urbanism, which continues 
to transition from a state intervention regime to a civic participatory regime through the 
changing intermediary intervention in city-making processes. 
 
This critical review provides an opportunity to expand the empirical basis for a wider 
discourse on post-developmental urbanism in East Asia. As much of the literature shows, 
other East Asian cities such as Singapore, Taipei and Hong Kong are also in a post-





urban policy formation on the one hand (Cabannes, Douglass and Padawangi, 2018; 
Douglass, Garbaye and Ho, 2019) while their policy implementation still retains the 
sticky nature of developmental statism on the other (Park, Hill and Saito, 2011; Doucette 
and Park, 2018). As these cities learn from each other, similar tools are often being shared. 
These include innovations such as the sharing economy, collective land tenure, 
participatory budgeting, community currency, and urban community gardens, to name a 
few. One shared characteristic is that the innovations often entail the creation of new 
urban governance accompanying intermediary intervention rather than direct civic 
participation due to the lack of civic culture (Lam-Knott, Connolly and Ho, 2019).  
 
Following this line of thought, considering Seoul as an empirical site for analysing ‘the 
urbanism as a way of life’ (Wirth, 1938), this study provides empirical evidence for a 
better analysis of the contemporary urbanism in the Asian context with attention to 
intermediaries emerging in a post-developmental turn. While the co-opted intermediary 
intervention is regarded as a stepping-stone towards progressive urban reform, the 
concept of urbanism is situated in the context of power and network dynamics of 
negotiation where counter-hegemonic forces collaborate between opposition and 
adaptation to existing top-down systems, whereas hegemonic forces oscillate between 
oppression and persuasion of emerging bottom-up initiatives through intermediary 
intervention. Such nuanced understanding of power and network dynamics constructed 
through intermediary intervention serves to capture the evolving nature of post-
developmental urbanisation, which signals the potential to build a foundation for 
progressive urban futures in the long term. This particular consideration contributes to 
expanding the scope of the recent progressive cities debates (Cabannes, Douglass and 
Padawangi, 2018; Douglass, Garbaye and Ho, 2019) by adding a critical review on 
transformative intermediary intervention across the boundaries between hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic blocs. Through this, therefore, it is understood that the findings from 
this study serve as a puzzle piece to draw a bigger picture of the contemporary urbanism 
of Asian cities with similar developmental legacies. In this regard, this study provides the 
opportunity to contemplate the pluralistic concept of Asian urbanism discourse (Hogan 
et al., 2012; Bunnell and Goh, 2017; Shin, 2019) by sharing empirical insights into the 






7.3. Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
There are three main limitations to this study and suggestions for future research. First, 
this study involved time-restricted research. As Farrington et al. (1993, p.159) observed, 
‘partnership is an evolving process which has both passive and active elements over time’. 
Accepting their observation, this study attempted to comprehensively examine the 
evolving process of state-citizen partnerships in urban processes against the backdrop of 
an extended period of time, running from the pre-partnership era (developmental period) 
to the current partnership stage (post-developmental period). Even after the two 
fieldworks in 2018, the researcher continued to review and update data according to the 
changes to the regeneration partnerships in the case study areas. This diachronic approach 
has allowed the researcher to discover unexpected consequences in the changing 
partnerships and find their significance within the wider planning system of Korea, which 
otherwise would have gone undetected.  
 
However, this study could not discuss all of the recent events, which might bring about 
considerable changes to the regeneration partnerships in the future. For example, SMG 
officially launched a pilot programme to promote the CRC (Community Regeneration 
Corporation) in URP areas in 2019. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the introduction of CRC 
is important, because it can enable community initiatives to gain the legal right and 
financial support to utilise their community assets, which can protect them from capitalist 
competition against external market forces. However, at the same time, concern has been 
raised that it would cause further competition over the limited amount of competitive 
public funds to gain legal rights and financial support. That is, new institutional change 
to promote community initiatives has its own double-edged nature. This critical point 
may require a more detailed examination. Besides, during the interviews with COs, the 
researcher happened to hear of their future plans after the completion of the URP. Using 
their personal networks, which have been formed during the URP, some of them planned, 
or had already started, to establish new social enterprises specialising in community work 
together with former or current COs. This means that a group of COs have endeavoured 
to collectively create a community work-based intermediary platform beyond an 
architectural or planning profession-based agency. This change is significant, as it can 
serve to foreground community-oriented value rather than profit-driven logic in the 





in a rudimentary stage at the time of writing, this research could not deal with this issue 
in the main chapters, despite the fact that it is likely to have a profound influence on the 
ways in which intermediary actors work. In this regard, further investigation on the recent 
events related to institutional or intermediary changes may be necessary to account for 
their potential impacts on the community-based regeneration in the long term. 
 
Second, this study did not discuss the power relations between communities and markets, 
which are interested in community assets such as communal spaces or services. As noted 
in Chapter 2, to promote the creation of community assets was a huge and unprecedented 
step towards more inclusive urban development beyond the past state-led or market-
driven approaches. However, during the fieldwork, it transpired that most of the 
communal spaces were owned by the public sector, while communal services were run 
by public funds. Hence, it is no wonder that it was difficult for communities to improve 
their communal autonomy, particularly in the use of their community assets. As Chapters 
5 and 6 briefly addressed, such limitations rather allow external market forces to intervene 
in the process of communal space management or service provision, which could threaten 
the established communal life by stripping communities of their right to community assets. 
These market forces may include, for example, external housing cooperatives or 
community service agencies that apply commercial strategies to maximise their profits, 
as well as private property developers or investors. However, the case studies showed 
only a signal of the conflicts between communities and markets, which had not yet 
surfaced, as they were still under the state’s support. For this reason, the power relations 
between communities and markets and their effects in the regeneration process could not 
be explored in depth despite their significance. Moreover, this study could not properly 
reflect on the viewpoints of elite intermediary actors such as directors in UR centres and 
leaders in professional firms, as they were reluctant to grant official interviews during the 
period of URP. This resulted in the limited analysis and interpretation of their 
perspectives in the process of intermediary-led participation. Further discussion on these 
issues may be possible by examining market intervention or involvement in the 
continuing regeneration process or exploring how former intermediary directors or 






Lastly, this study calls for comparative analysis of intermediary-led participation in urban 
regeneration in different cities in Korea. With the three case studies, this research does 
not claim to have found universal characteristics that may be straightforwardly applied to 
all the recent urban regeneration projects across the country. Indeed, Korea’s tax revenue 
is highly centralised, while its tax expenditure is relatively decentralised (Hong and Kim, 
2016). This asymmetrical balance of tax revenue and expenditure causes many local 
authorities to rely heavily on national government subsidies to experiment with new 
policy programmes such as the URP. Given that Seoul is one of the wealthiest cities, with 
a high level of financial independence, such national dynamics may produce uneven 
experiences of intermediary intervention in other Korean cities with weak financial 
independence. Hence, it is worth undertaking a cross-city comparison of experiences of 
intermediary-led participation for a more comprehensive understanding of the recent 
community-based urban regeneration in the wider national context of Korea.  
 
Such cross-city comparison is also worthwhile in the international context. In particular, 
it would be useful to compare and contrast the experiences between Korean cities and 
other East Asian cities with similar developmental legacies. Despite sharing historical 
similarities, it is true that each of the East Asian cities have developed their own unique 
social, political, economic, and cultural environments in their urban processes. For 
example, Singapore is a land-scarce state where 90 percent of land is publicly owned, 
while Seoul is not land-scarce, and land is privately owned (Huat, 2000; Halia, 2016; Joo, 
2019). That is, in Singapore, citizens’ dependency on state provision renders them clients 
of the state, while land rent is a significant source of the state’s revenue, but for Seoul, 
property development is more likely to have benefitted the private developers or 
landowners. Such comparative dynamics may produce non-identical experiences of 
intermediary intervention, which could provide a richer understanding of post-
developmental urbanism in progressive cities of East Asia. This comparative approach 
can allow us to capture the nuanced nature of the recent community-based regeneration 
in Korea while broadening our horizons on the current post-developmental urbanism 
taking place in East Asian states. In this sense, the cross-city comparative investigation 
of intermediary-led participation will be able to offer a helpful framework through which 
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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees from Case Study 1 
 
Sector Identification Affiliation Interview Date Duration (hours) 





organiser in CSA 
(local cooperative leader) 
Dec. 20. 2018 2 
C1-IS-INT-2 Former community organiser in CSA Dec. 22. 2018 1 




1 Local resident in CSA 
(former anti-NTP camp 
leader) 
Dec. 29. 2018 2 
C1-CS-INT-1-
2 Jan. 12. 2019 0.5 
C1-CS-INT-2-
1 Local resident in CSA 
(local cooperative 
member) 
Dec. 29. 2018 2 
C1-CS-INT-2-
2 Jan. 12. 2019 0.5 
C1-CS-INT-3 
Local resident in CSA 
(local cooperative 
member) 









Appendix 2: List of Interviewees from Case Study 2 
 
Sector Identification Affiliation Interview Date Duration (hours) 
Public   
Sector 
C2-PS-INN-1 Official from SMG Dec. 07. 2018  1 
C2-PS-INN-2 Official from local council in SDA Dec. 21. 2018  1 
Intermediary 
Sector 
C2-IS-INT-1-1 Current community 
organiser in CHA 
Nov. 13. 2018 1 
C2-IS-INT-1-2 Jan. 04. 2019 2 
C2-IS-INT-2-1 Current community 
organiser in SDA 
Dec. 11. 2018 0.5 
C2-IS-INT-2-2 Jan. 03. 2019 2 
C2-IS-INT-3 Current community organiser in SDA Jan. 03. 2019 2 




Local resident in CHA 
(former community 
leader) 
Nov. 13. 2018 1.5 
C2-CS-INT-2 Local resident in CHA  Dec. 24. 2018 1.5 
C2-CS-INT-3 Local resident in CHA  Dec. 24. 2018 1.5 
C2-CS-INT-4 
Local resident in SDA 
(current community 
leader) 
Jan. 03. 2019 1 
C2-CS-INT-5 Local resident in SDA Jan. 03. 2019 2 









Appendix 3: List of Interviewees from Case Study 3 
 





organiser in DJA 
Jan. 04. 2019 1 
C3-IS-INT-1-2 Jan. 06. 2019 2 
C3-IS-INT-2 Current community organiser in DJA Jan. 06. 2019 1 
Community 
Sector 
C3-CS-INT-1 Local resident in DJA (current community leader) Jan. 04. 2019 1.5 
C3-CS-INT-2 Local resident in DJA Jan. 04. 2019 1.5 










Appendix 4: List of Interviewees outside the Case Studies 
 
Sector Identification Affiliation Interview Date Duration (hours) 
Public   
Sector 
C4-PS-INN-1 Official from Ministry of Land Dec. 11. 2018 1 
C4-PS-INN-2 
Official from local 
council in a different 
district of Seoul 
Dec. 12. 2018 1 
Intermediary 
Sector 
C4-IS-INT-1 Community organiser in different area Nov. 22. 2018 1 
C4-IS-INT-2 Community organiser in different area Dec. 04. 2018 1 
C4-IS-INT-3 
Director in Seoul urban 
regeneration support 
centre 
Dec. 11. 2018 1.5 
C4-IS-INT-4 Community organiser in different area Dec. 11. 2018 1 
C4-IS-INT-5 Community organiser in different area Dec. 11. 2018 1 
C4-IS-INT-6 Social entrepreneur in Sharing for Future Dec. 18. 2018 1.5 
C4-IS-INT-7 Social entrepreneur in Jegi-dong Sarangbang Jan. 08. 2019 1.5 
Community 
Sector 
C4-CS-INT-1 Local activist Dec. 16. 2018 2 
C4-CS-INT-2 Local activist Dec. 20. 2018 1 
Other Sector 
C4-OT-INT-1 Anglican Priest Nov. 12. 2018 1 
C4-OT-INT-2 
Researcher in Korea 
Research Institute for 
Human Settlement 
(KRIHS) 
Nov. 27. 2018 1 
C4-OT-INT-3 
Researcher in 
Architecture and Urban 
Research Institute (AURI) 
Jan. 05. 2019 1 
 
